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THE NEW FRAGMENT OF IBYCUS IN P.OXY. 2260

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καὶ ὁμοίως κατὰ τὸν
"Ιβυκον. τὸν γὰρ 'Ηρακλ[ε]-
α π[ρ]όμαχον γενέσθαι
φ[....]ουδ[....]υν ἀρι-
στ[....]ερο-
φρ[....].δ[....].γὰρ
ἔτικτε(ν) αὐτός, κορυ-
φᾶς δέ οἱ ἐξάνεπαλτο

[End of column.]

From a commentary (or the like) on a poetic text; the subject in the present context is the Birth of Pallas, full-armed, from the head of Zeus. Lobel ad loc. observes: 'If I have read and supplemented correctly, I cannot see the relevance of what emerges. Heracles had the title *Πρόμαχος* at Thebes (Paus. ix. 11, 4), but there appears to be no room in the gaps for more than the mention in some form of Zeus and Athena, both of whom are necessary.'

I think the relevance may be as follows: the author has found in Ibycus (as in Euripides, Callimachus, and Stesichorus, quoted in the same column above) a passage referring to the birth of Athena from the head of Zeus; but that passage was a subordinate part of a sentence of which Heracles was the principal subject, and the commentator has thought fit to quote the sentence from its beginning:

τὸν γὰρ 'Ηρακλέα πρόμαχον γενέσθαι
φ[αὶ τ]οῦ Δ[ιὸς ε]ὐν ἀριστ[ο]πάτραι
κρατ[ε]ρόφρ[ονι Πα]λ[λ]άδι[α]ν γὰρ ἔτικτεν αὐτός,
κορυφᾶς δέ οἱ ἐξάνεπαλτο [

Such a text provides in suitable metre the necessary mention of both Athena and Zeus, and gives in ἀριστοπάτραι (Bacchyl. 11. 106 Sn.) a desirable antecedent to τὸν γὰρ ἔτικτεν αὐτός. The supplements in the third line are suggested by Lobel ad loc. After ἐξάνεπαλτο I should expect εὐν ἔντεσι or the like, since the preceding quotations have all made the point that she was full-armed at birth. It would be possible to supply φ[ησί π]ου, sc. "Ιβυκος, in the second line: but the order of the words, especially if Δ[ιὸς] is correct, seems to me to make this solution much less probable.

On what occasion was Heracles, together with Athena, πρόμαχος Διός? At the battle against the Giants: Apollod. i. 6. 1-2, (Ζεὺς) 'Ηρακλέα κύμмахον δι'

Ἀθηνᾶς ἐπεκαλέσατο· κἀκεῖνος (Heracles) πρῶτον μὲν killed a number of Giants, Ἀθηνᾶ δὲ killed some more.

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THE AORIST IN μὴ CLAUSES

<i>I.T.</i> 1340-1	ἐσθλθεν ἡμᾶς μὴ λυθέντες οἱ ξένοι κτάνοιεν αὐτὴν δραπεταὶ τ' οἰχόλατο.
<i>Or.</i> 1668-9	καίτοι μ' ἐσθῆι δεῖμα, μὴ τινος κλύων ἀλαστόρων δόξαιμι σὴν κλύειν ὅπα.
<i>Hipp.</i> 924	δέδοικα μὴ σου γλώσσ' ὑπερβάλλῃ κακοῖς.

THE traditional interpretation of *I.T.* 1340-1, 'there came into our minds the fear that the strangers might have killed her and made off' (so, approximately, Paley, England, Way), was challenged by Jerram in his edition of 1885: 'κτάνοιεν. The aor. is rendered by Paley and others "should have killed"; but this would rather have been the perf. opt. The aorist expresses the act simply, "should kill"; κτείνοιεν (pres.) would mean, "should be killing" or "try to kill".' Platnauer's edition of 1938 upholds Jerram's rendering, with the note: 'κτάνοιεν "might kill," not "might have killed" (England) which would demand a perf. or pluperf. indic.' In this case Euripides can be saved from a contravention of what we regard as normal syntax, not indeed without damage to his meaning, but without making him write nonsense. Two other similar aorists, however, do not admit of such explanation. *Or.* 1668-9 must mean 'there used to come into my mind the fear that I *had* supposed': Orestes is referring to the occasion when Apollo gave him instructions to commit matricide, not to something which he had feared might happen. *Hipp.* 924 has a similar aorist in primary sequence: Hippolytus is commenting on what Theseus has already said (οὐ γὰρ ἐν δέοντι λεπτοουργεῖς), not on what he may be going to say, and Paley's rendering, 'should have run into excess', must be right. It seems clear that the three passages hang together, and that the traditional rendering of *I.T.* 1340-1 is correct.

All three statements, particularly the comment of Hippolytus, are tentative,¹ the expressions of a fear that something may turn out to have happened. The normal form of expression for such fears, at any rate in prose writers of the fourth century, was the perfect subjunctive in primary, the perfect optative, as Jerram pointed out, in secondary sequence. There are, however, two passages in Homer in which the aorist subjunctive is used exactly as in the *Hippolytus* passage: *Il.* i. 555-6 δειδοῦκα . . . μὴ σε παρέιπῃ . . . Θέτις, 'I am afraid that Thetis may have persuaded you';² *Il.* x. 538 δειδοῦκα . . . μὴ τι πάθωσιν, where the context demands the translation, 'I am afraid that something may have happened to them'. A similar aorist subjunctive after ὄρᾶν μὴ is found in *Il.*

¹ In the *Hippolytus* passage a perfect indicative would be normal in syntax, but too emphatic for politeness. Could the indicative have been used in the other passages? The examples quoted (e.g. Kühner-Gerth, 553 b. 6) are always of *present* fears about the present or past. In an admittedly not exhaustive search I have not been able to find an instance in secondary sequence and should

have thought that the pluperfect at any rate would be difficult to explain.

² Van Herwerden proposed, although without manuscript authority, to read *παρεῖπεν*, on the analogy of *Od.* v. 300 δεῖδω μὴ δὴ πάντα θεὰ νημερτέα εἶπεν, but there the meaning is rather, 'The goddess was right, I am afraid.'

x. 97 ff. ὅφρα ἴδωμεν, μὴ . . . κοιμήσωνται, ἀτὰρ φυλακῆς ἐπὶ πάγχυ λάθωνται, 'in case they may have gone to sleep and forgotten'. In *Od.* xxi. 393 ff. the aorist optative represents the secondary form of such a subjunctive: τόξον ἐνώμα . . . πειρώμενος . . . μὴ κέρα ἔπες ἔδοιεν, 'for fear worms should have eaten'.

No doubt the apparently perfect sense of the aorist in these Homeric passages is to be explained as 'an inference drawn from the context' (Goodwin, *M.T.* 93; cf. Monro, *Hom. Gr.* 303). The usage is, in fact, parallel to the general use of the aorist subjunctive or optative to express future perfect time in relative and temporal clauses, except that in the latter case the time of the aorist is determined by the main verb and not, as in the μὴ clauses, by the context as a whole.

Goodwin contrasts the aorist subjunctives after μὴ in Homer with the later use of the perfect as 'instances of an earlier laxity of usage, like the use of ἀπολοίό κε for both *would have perished* and *would perish*'. The passages here adduced from Euripides, however, suggest that in μὴ clauses the epic licence was still available to poets at the end of the fifth century, a conclusion supported by *Rhesus* 863-4¹ (δέδοικα . . . μὴ . . . κατακτάνη, 'has killed', as the context makes clear). The perfect subjunctive and optative were, as a rule, metrically intractable, and the poet could apparently rely on the context to give an aorist the required sense. Deliberate imitation of Homeric usage cannot be ruled out, since two of the Euripidean instances come from messengers' speeches, and the *Rhesus* is full of echoes of *Iliad* x; but the analogy of the aorist as future perfect in other constructions, the absence of guidance in the immediate, as opposed to the general, context of the instances in the *I.T.* and *Orestes*, and the appearance of the usage in dialogue suggest that it was not wholly strange to Euripides' contemporaries. Like other epic usages in the language of tragedy, it was probably a form of expression not yet altogether superseded or else capable of revival, as was the use of μὴ with the independent subjunctive in expressing apprehension, because it developed a possibility implicit in the Greek of any period.

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XENOPHON, *MEMORABILIA* I. 6: THE ENCOUNTERS OF SOCRATES AND ANTIPHON

I. TRANSLATION

- 1 We should not be doing justice to Socrates if we omitted his conversations with Antiphon the sophist. For, on one occasion, wishing to draw away
- 2 Socrates' disciples, he approached him in their presence and said: 'I thought, Socrates, that philosophers should be happier than other people, but you seem to me to get just the opposite out of philosophy. You live indeed in a fashion which no slave in his master's house would tolerate . . .'
[There follows a description of Socratic asceticism which Socrates defends as being an approach to the divine characteristic of 'lacking nothing'.]

¹ I have to thank Professor P. T. Stevens for helpful criticisms and suggestions, in particular for pointing out the *Rhesus* passage

and its implications and for referring me to the passage in *Od.* xxi.

- 11 On another occasion, Antiphon in conversation with Socrates remarked:
 'I account you a fair man, Socrates, but wise, not at all. And you appear to
 me to realize this yourself, since you ask no fee for attendance with you.
 Yet if you thought your coat or house or any other of your possessions was
 12 worth something, far from giving it to anyone free, you would accept its
 exact worth and nothing less. Clearly, then, if you thought attendance with
 you was worth anything, you would ask nothing less than what this too was
 worth. Fair, then, you may be, for not getting money on false pretences, but
 not wise, for your wisdom is worth nothing.'
- 13 To this Socrates replied: 'Our theory is this. Good looks and wisdom
 may be exploited in a good, as well as in a bad, way.¹ For example, if a
 man sells his good looks to a customer for money, the world scornfully calls
 him a prostitute. But we consider it moral and good if a man procures for
 himself as a friend someone whom he discerns to be a high-principled lover.
 So with wisdom. The world scornfully calls sophists those who sell their
 wisdom to a customer for money. But we consider it behaviour befitting a
 citizen of high principles, to discern someone with good natural ability,
 teach him whatever good thing we may possess, and thus gain his friend-
 14 ship. Indeed, Antiphon, as other people take pleasure in a good horse or
 dog or hawk, I myself to an even greater extent take pleasure in having
 good friends, and teach them whatever good thing I may possess myself,
 and put them in the company of others from whom I think they are likely
 to be helped on the way to a good education. Furthermore, I unroll and
 peruse in my friends' company the treasures of the wise men of old which
 they have written down and bequeathed to us, and we excerpt anything
 good we come upon. We consider ourselves amply rewarded if we win each
 others' friendship.' To me as I heard this Socrates appeared to be a man of
 supernatural blessedness, and to be leading his hearers to a high standard of
 personal conduct.
- 15 On another occasion Antiphon asked him how he claimed to train others
 in public life, when he, in spite of his knowledge, did not enter politics himself.
 Socrates replied: 'In which way do you think, Antiphon, I should practise
 politics more intensively: if I practised the art by myself or if I were to take
 care that as many as possible were fitted to practise it?'

II. COMMENTARY

Xenophon's account of Socrates' encounters with Antiphon is plainly a vehicle for a defence of Socrates against criticisms of (1) his asceticism, (2) his unprofessional refusal to take fees, and (3) his claim to teach politics while not himself entering public life. It is possible that Antiphon actually levelled these criticisms at Socrates. If he did, the conclusion must follow that he himself rejected asceticism, took fees, and either refrained from teaching politics at all (which is most unlikely), or both taught politics and took part in public life (which would be the case if Antiphon of Rhamnus and the sophist were identical). Alternatively, the encounters are fictitious. But even in that case Xenophon must have chosen Antiphon as a suitable critic, and he would only

¹ I much prefer this translation; but if *ἐναι* is not here to be taken as equivalent to *ἐξείναι* the meaning is, 'to exploit good

looks and wisdom is a good, as well as a bad, thing'.

have been suitable if he did in fact present a contrast to Socrates in these respects.

The chapter is prefaced by the statement that Antiphon criticized Socrates in the presence of his disciples (*συνουσιασταί*), wishing to draw them away from him. If we look at the criticisms more closely we can see that they form a concerted attack on the Socratic school as a society with three main aspects, the Socratic 'life', Socratic friendship, and the relationship of Socratic wisdom to public life. We are, then, I think, justified in regarding the chapter as a whole, to which, as a whole, the prefatory remarks refer. All the three criticisms are, accordingly, to be regarded as levelled at Socrates in the presence of his disciples, and not only the first.

Professor E. R. Dodds betrays misunderstanding of Socrates' answer to the second of Antiphon's criticisms when he claims (*The Greeks and the Irrational*, Univ. of California Press, 1951, pp. 132-3, n. 100) that the former's use of the words *παρ' ἡμῖν* implies that Antiphon the sophist was not an Athenian and therefore must be different from the orator. Dodds is right in perceiving that Socrates contrasts 'our' opinions with those of others among whom Antiphon is included. But these others are not foreigners as opposed to Athenians. They are the outside world as opposed to the Socratic school, and are referred to twice subsequently in the third person plural (*ἀποκαλοῦσιν*). On Dodds's interpretation there is nobody to whom these third person plurals can refer. It makes nonsense to suppose their subject to be 'foreigners'. Again, in the next paragraph 'we' is specifically identified as Socrates and his friends and pupils. And finally, if 'we', as Dodds claims, means 'Athenians', we have to suppose that the peculiarly Socratic doctrine of friendship as the motive force in ethical and intellectual improvement was common currency in Athens at the end of the fifth century.

Sense requires that *παρ' ἡμῖν* should mean 'with me and my disciples', i.e. the *συνουσιασταί* who were, it seems, present. Dakyns almost certainly takes the words thus when he translates: 'it is a tenet which we cling to'. Socrates is explaining that the reason why he does not ask a fee lies, not in his realization of the worthlessness of his *σοφία*, but in the theoretical basis of the association. The theory is as follows. Wisdom and good looks are analogous possessions and both can be used (i.e. traded, exploited; *διατίθεσθαι* is almost the equivalent of *πωλεῖν* also in Xen. *Cyrop.* iv. 5. 42) in a good, as well as in a bad, way. The sophist trades his wisdom, and the *πόρνος* his good looks, in a bad way, i.e. for money. Here Socratic theory and common opinion are identical. The Socratics, however, hold that there is a good way in which these commodities can be traded. It is perfectly moral to use your good looks to get high-principled friends, and thoroughly beneficial to society to use your wisdom to gain intelligent ones. Friendship, then, takes the place of money as the basis of the association of master and pupil in the Socratic circle. This is just that friendship, the association of unlikes 'because of their need' which is described in the *Lysis* (215 c ff.); and the distinction between the good and bad forms of love, with emphasis on the ethical value of the former, is the subject of Socrates' reply to Lysias in the *Phaedrus* (237 b-256 e). By Plato's testimony the doctrines are specifically Socratic.

There can be no reasonable doubt that Socrates, by the phrase *παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται* means 'it is an opinion of my circle', and not 'it is an Athenian opinion'. If that is so, there is no reason to infer that Antiphon the sophist was a

foreigner. If we are to infer anything about Antiphon the sophist from the passage, it is that he, unlike Socrates, both taught politics and took part in public life, i.e. that he is probably to be identified with the Rhamnusian.

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THE OXYRHYNCHUS HISTORIAN AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE 'CORINTHIAN WAR'

IN their edition of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (No. 842 in vol. v of *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*) Grenfell and Hunt provided an analysis of the different accounts of the incidents which led to the 'Corinthian War' which seems to have remained unchallenged ever since; but there does seem to be an inconsistency in P's account which they failed to remark. In column xiv P, in contrast with Xenophon (*Hell.* iii. 5. 3 ff.) and Pausanias (iii. 9. 9 ff.), says that the Phocians began the dispute, at the instigation of Ismenias and Androclidas, by invading Locris when the Locrians had retaliated after a Phocian raid on some sheep in a disputed area near Parnassus. This is accepted without question by Grenfell and Hunt, and no doubt it is at least possible that careful intrigue would enable the Thebans to find men in Phocis who would be prepared and able to precipitate a dispute which was likely to bring the Boeotians against their country; for the Lacedaemonians were still considered capable of enforcing the peace. On the other hand, P gives as background to the whole affair some details which provide a more likely explanation.

He states that both the Phocians and the Locrians were in the habit of grazing flocks periodically on the disputed land, and that when this was done the normal procedure was for the other side to gather in force and raid the sheep (the word *πολλοί* suggests that the owners of the sheep would be prepared for trouble), whereupon both sides would resort to legal proceedings or discussion, although there had been occasions when war had ensued. Surely then the first unusual act here was the retaliatory raid by the Locrians, which would automatically provoke the Phocians to further retaliation. There is, of course, no doubt that both grazing sheep on the disputed area and raiding them were provocative acts capable of precipitating a war, but since they normally failed to produce such a serious result the really decisive act must always be the next one in order—usually a more or less peaceful approach, but here a resort to force. This being so, it would be the Locrians who were approached by the Thebans, who were, indeed, their allies; and further, it would make the plan more certain in that it was the Locrians who made the initial move of grazing their flocks on the disputed area. Pausanias' account agrees with this reconstruction, for he states that the Locrians caused the trouble in a raid which despoiled corn as well as cattle. Xenophon also says the Locrians were the aggressors, but he makes them the Opuntian instead of the Hesperian Locrians, and uses the phrase *χρήματα τελέσαι*, which must surely be corrupt, unless a satisfactory meaning of the verb can be discovered. Schneider's *ἐλάσαι* is quite attractive if emendation is necessary. The general term *χρήματα* does not necessarily preclude the sheep of P's account, and it suits very well the Locrian aggression after the sheep on the disputed land had been attacked.

If the above is correct, it would appear that Xenophon and P each had heard an incomplete or inaccurate account of the intrigue (and this is probable unless they had access to the secrets of the intriguing parties), and each filled it out with what he thought necessary. Xenophon was content with little more than the bare statement that some disputed land provided the pretext, and was so little concerned about detail that he named the wrong Locrians. It should be noted also that he does not mention Sparta's call for arbitration, which P shows was rather formal than urgent; for the Spartans did not at first treat the complaint seriously. P, on the other hand, gives a great deal of detail, both of the background and of the intrigue itself, but produces an inconsistency in stating at what point the incident became an act of aggression. It is worth noting that even in the fragments we have of his work P is proved guilty of introducing false details into the battle scene at Sardis (col. vi). It is just possible that the Thebans went to the trouble of suborning a few Phocians as well as their Locrian friends, in which case Xenophon and P are both right, but it is very likely that the affair could be handled quite adequately from the Locrian side alone, and unlikely that it could be done from the Phocian side without a good deal of helpful coincidence.

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OVID, *ARS AMATORIA* i. 147¹

at cum pompa frequens $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{certantibus} \\ \text{caelestibus} \end{array} \right\}$ ibit $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ephebis} \\ \text{eburnis} \end{array} \right\}$,
tu Veneri dominae plaude fauente manu.

MOST editors, relying on manuscript authority, read *certantibus ephebis*.² I postpone consideration of the manuscripts to examination of the sense.

The scene is the circus. The lover is sitting next to his prospective mistress, whose attention he is to engage by various devices (vv. 143-6). At the entry of the procession he is to applaud Venus, that is, he is to single out for his applause (making sure, of course, that his fair neighbour observes him) the deity on whom his success or failure depends. The procession is the *pompa circensis* which heralded the start of the games, and we know from various sources that statues of the gods were carried in it:³ it is then the statue of Venus whose appearance is to be the lover's cue. If there is to be no mention of statues, i.e. if we read *certantibus ephebis*, the reader is left to infer this for himself. This would present less difficulty for a Roman reader, especially one of Ovid's day, but it is not Ovid's manner to avoid the obvious—his precepts are admirably clear. Furthermore, he mentions the procession elsewhere twice: *F.* iv. 391 *circus erit pompa celebr numeroque deorum*, where mention of the procession evokes its most characteristic feature, the statues, and *Am.* iii. 2. 43 ff. In the latter passage the various gods are described in some detail, but the point to be made is exactly the same as in the present passage. One might surely expect that here, where that point must be made within the limits of one couplet, the statues should be mentioned. So much in favour of *caelestibus eburnis*.⁴

¹ I am much indebted to Professor R. A. B. Mynors for his help and advice in the compilation of this paper.

² I have not scrutinized all the editions, but the chief exceptions are N. Heinsius,

Burman, the Delphin and Bipontine editions, and C. H. Jahn.

³ See Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, iii.² 509.

⁴ Ivory statues of the gods were of course

It will hardly be denied that *certantibus ephebis*, whatever it be taken to mean, is irrelevant. Apart from its irrelevance it is positively objectionable on two counts: (1) it is impossible to assign a satisfactory meaning to *certantibus*; (2) the word *ephebis* itself is intolerable.

1. The presence of youths at the head of the *pompa circensis* is attested for Republican times by Dion. Hal. vii. 72, who bases his account on that of Fabius Pictor (ibid. vii. 71. 1). These youths have been identified since Mommsen with those who took part in the *Troiae ludus*¹ and Brandt accordingly glosses *certantibus* 'im Trojaspiel'. This is open to several objections: (a) it involves construing *certantibus* as if it were *certaturis*, for the game and the procession were not simultaneous; (b) mention of these boys is out of place here, for the sense requires something which was a regular feature of the *ludi circenses*, which the Troy game was not; (c) *ephebis*, even if it were not objectionable on other grounds, does not accurately describe the participants.² The only tolerable sense for *certantibus* is something like that suggested by Burman in his note ad loc., meaning 'vying with each other', i.e. showing off. But it is not clear how much scope there was for this in a solemn procession, and the words of Dion. Hal. loc. cit. *ὡς εἰς διδασκαλεῖον πορευόμενοι* perhaps suggest that ostentatious behaviour would have been frowned upon.

2. The word *ephebis* is suspect. The material in the *Thesaurus* (v. 2. 655) shows conclusively, I think, that apart from the present passage *ephebus* is used by Latin writers of the classical period³ only (a) of Greek (or sometimes foreign) youths, usually as an exact equivalent for the t.t. *ἐφηβος*, (b) pejoratively with a suggestion of effeminacy. In verse it is very rare before the Silver Age, and Statius and Martial are the first poets to use it at all extensively. Its use here as a synonym for *iuuenis*, applied to Romans, is quite unparalleled.

These objections, and the authority of Heinsius, would have sufficed to dethrone *certantibus ephebis* long ago, were it not for the testimony of the manuscripts, which was thought to uphold it. From editions one gathers that the only manuscripts offering *caelestibus eburnis* are the ninth-century Oxford fragment Bodl. Auct. F. iv. 32 (S.C. 2176) (O), a fourteenth- or fifteenth-century

fairly common in temples, and the statue of Julius Caesar which was carried in the *pompa circensis* in his lifetime was of ivory (Dio xliii. 45. 2), as were those carried in honour of Germanicus and Britannicus after their deaths (Tac. A. ii. 83. 2; Suet. Tit. 2). At Am. iii. 2. 44 the procession is called *aurea*, but I take this to refer to its general appearance = 'brilliant, glittering'. *Aureus* in Ovid often seems to have a double meaning, as at A.A. i. 214 *quattuor in niveis aureus ibis equis*, where *aureus* refers both to the triumphal garb of the young general (see e.g. Ehlers, R.E. 2. R. vii. A. 1. 505. 19 f. s.v. *triumphus*) and to his beauty (cf. *aureus Amor*, *aurea Venus* with Greek χρυσή Ἀφροδίτη, and see Thes. ii. 1491. 61 ff.). In fact the *tensae* used in the procession may have been of ivory: cf. Titinius ap. Fest. p. 554 Lindsay. The statues themselves were sometimes gold: Hist. Aug. Marc. Ant. 21. 5.

¹ See e.g. Marquardt, op. cit., pp. 525 f. and notes. Merula also in his note ad loc. under

stood *cert. eph.* to refer to the Troy game; 'certantibus ephebis uel pueris in ludo troiano pugnantibus uel digladiantibus inter se cybeles sacerdotibus: qui (ut Apuleius scribit) erant semiuiri effoeminati cinedi', etc. This latter interpretation, absurd as it is, at any rate gives a possible sense for *ephebis*.

² Cf. for (b) and (c) Suet. Aug. 43. 2 'Troiae lusum edidit frequentissime maiorum minorumque puerorum' (cf. Iul. 39. 2). I do not know where in common parlance one draws the line, especially in poetry, between a *puer* and a *iuuenis*, but clearly a *minor puer* is not an *ephebus*. I have not seen it suggested that the reference is to the *nobilissimi iuuenes* who performed at Caesar's games (Iul. 39. 2), but this would still be open to objections (b) and (c).

³ And post-classical writers tend to observe the distinction still. There is nothing to commend *ephebus* as a synonym for *puer* or *iuuenis* except its metrical convenience at the end of a hexameter.

Florentine manuscript Nat. Stroz. VII. 966, and two Heinsiani.¹ The 'best' manuscript,² the ninth-century Paris 'Regius' (now Bibl. Nat. fonds latin) 7311 (R), and most later manuscripts give *certantibus ephebis*.³ The most important exception⁴ is the neglected witness St. Gall 821 of the eleventh century, containing only A.A. i. 1-230 (S). This fragment was used by Tafel in his dissertation⁵ on the history of the text (he calls it G), but he does not discuss the present passage. He proves, what is incontestable, that ROS have a common ancestor (pp. 13-14). That OS here disagree so markedly from R he apparently did not know. This state of affairs is most readily explained by the hypothesis that R, or an intermediate ancestor, has been tampered with.⁶ All perplexity is dispelled by the merest glance at the actual manuscript: what now stands in R is the work of a second hand. All that remains of m¹ are the letters *ce el*: the letters *rtantibus hebis* have been substituted for the original reading by a cramped hand not very like m¹ and in a lighter-coloured ink. The change is clumsy, although generations of collators have missed it. The final letter of *certantibus* is *s* and not *f*, which is the form consistently used by R's scribe, and *ephebis* emerges as *efhebis*, the vertical stroke and part of the cross-stroke of the *f* being in m¹, while the kern at the top is in m² (that is, m¹ seems to represent what remains of an original *b*). The vestiges of m¹ are then consistent with *caelestibus* (or rather *celestibus*) *eburnis*, and I think it would be perverse to deny that this was in fact the original reading. The erasure seems to have been performed fairly skilfully, but the substitution should not have deceived anyone for a moment: even in a photograph it is obvious. (Possibly Tafel's silence is due to the fact that he *did* detect it.) The hand m² seems to be contemporary with that of the additions at i. 331, and 466, and may be eleventh century.

Thus *caelestibus eburnis* may now be reinstated in our texts with the full concurrence of both reason and authority, being supported by our three best manuscripts, and *certantibus ephebis* is seen in its true colours as an interloper. This has some importance for the text in general. R has long had the credit of being free from interpolation,⁷ and this claim is on the whole tenable if we take it as referring to R¹. The usual interpretation of this passage involved assuming that the tradition of either O or R was interpolated: in fact as we have seen

¹ I take the report of the Florentine manuscript from Marchesi's edition. The two Heinsiani are the *Iureti liber* and the *Comelinianus*. The former I have not been able to identify: the latter is Leiden Univ. Periz. Q. 16, of the 13th century, where *caelestibus eburnis* is a variant.

² I imply no disrespect: it is the best manuscript, but it has been handled by editors with insufficient circumspection, as will be seen.

³ With occasional variants *gaudentibus*, *plaudentibus*, *cantantibus*.

⁴ There are a few others: Antwerp Mus. Plant. O.B. 5. 1 (formerly Lat. 68, anc. 43), 12th/13th century, the *Moreti liber* of Heinsius, has *cael. eb.* as a variant. Wolfenbüttel Bibl. Aug. 4260 (Gudianus 313), 13th/14th century, the *Rottendorphianus* of Heinsius, has *certantibus eburnis* in the text and *ephebis* added by a second hand. These may not be all.

(Marchesi notes that Neapolitanus Nat. IV F. 13 has *celestibus ephebis*.) I have since discovered that Tours 879 (12th/13th century) has *celestibus eburnis* in its text and the fragment Bodl. MS. Rawl. Q. d. 19 (S. C. 16044, 13th century) has *certantibus ephebis* *telestibus plaudentibus* and in the margin the note 'imaginibus celestium ex ebone factis'.

⁵ S. Tafel, *Die Überlieferungsgeschichte von Ovids Carmina Amatoria verfolgt bis zum 11. Jahrhundert*, Tübingen, 1910.

⁶ The possibility that OS have a common intermediate ancestor does not commend itself: S is on the whole closer to R than to O (Tafel, p. 16). Only at one passage have OS a common error, at i. 218, where both omit *que*. Elsewhere the discrepancies between R¹ and OS are due to simple error in R¹.

⁷ Merkel, praef. vi-vii; Tafel, p. 16; Marchesi, praef. ix; Bornecque, praef. viii.

certantibus ephebis is the work of R². The credit of R¹ is now therefore, if anything, strengthened, and this passage joins the ranks of those, such as i. 255, 389,¹ which the false reading of R² has supplanted what was (presumably) the truth of R¹. The moral is that we must be even more inclined to distrust R² and must accept its readings only on their merits. This is not to say that R¹ is always sound, nor are its falsifications always due to mere error: at i. 328¹ *placere* is clearly, I think, an interpolation and it is the reading of R¹. (This consideration is important in dealing with Books ii and iii of the *Arts*, where O fails us.) O itself is not free from suspicion (Tafel, pp. 15–16), but in the present passage at any rate it is vindicated from the gravest charge. S would be an invaluable witness if there were more of it, but its complete sincerity may be doubted, for at i. 126 it displays a resounding interpolation *et patuit multis tunc timor ipse dei*.²

The most puzzling problem, for which there is no ready answer, is how and why *certantibus ephebis* got into the text at all. It cannot be an author's variant, for the reasons given above, and does not support any theory of a double recension.³ It supposes some degree of curious learning, especially if the reference is to the Troy game (I have attempted to prove above not that this cannot be the reference, but that it does not suit the context): it is not, as Burman observes, the brain-child of an unlettered scribe. This would seem to indicate a date in late antiquity. I hardly think that its author could have hoped for such a long and honoured life for his creation, whoever he was and whatever his motives.

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SOME REMARKS ON THE AUGUSTAN CONSTITUTION

THE purpose of these remarks⁴ is to assemble what seem to me to be the main reasons for rejecting Professor M. Grant's view of the Augustan arrangements—abolition of *imp. maius* in 27 B.C. and government henceforward by *auctoritas*.⁵

1. Dio liii. 32. 5. Over this we need not linger except to repeat what Chilver has already made clear,⁶ that ἐπέτρεψεν implies something formally bestowed in a particular year, and that Dio's assertion is not therefore reconcilable with Grant.⁷ But it needs also to be seriously considered whether, as a matter of historical method, statements of an ancient authority can be overthrown by

¹ Here, as at i. 147, Tafel was badly misinformed about the readings of the manuscripts (p. 15). Even so he issued a warning (p. 74) against 'blindes Vertrauen' of R (meaning, presumably, R¹). Knoche, *Gnomon*, viii. 522, warned us that *all* manuscripts of the *Amores*, including R and P, are interpolated.

² Cf. Tafel, p. 16, who suggested that *deo* for *Syro* at i. 76, 416 might be a Christian interpolation.

³ Cf. Kraus, *R.E.* xviii, 1933, 51 on A.A. i. 321 f.

⁴ They formed the substance of a paper read to the annual meeting of the Classical

Association at Reading, 1952.

⁵ Expressed in his book *From Imperium to Auctoritas*, 1946; repeated with modifications and additions in *Greece and Rome*, xviii, 1949; supported by further points in 'Aspects of the Principate of Tiberius', *Num. Notes and Monographs*, 1950. The most important comments on Grant's thesis, from the constitutional point of view, have been made by H. M. Last in *J.R.S.* xxxvii, 1947, 157 f. and G. E. F. Chilver in *Historia*, i, 1950, 408 f.

⁶ Op. cit. 430.

⁷ As Grant himself would have it, *From Imperium*, 427.

any amount of negative evidence—especially in the case of a power which, if Augustus did hold it, was intended only as a safeguard, not for regular employment.¹

2. *Imperator*. If any result may be said to emerge from the many discussions about this title, from Mommsen² onwards, it is that *imperator* was not a constitutional title of the holders of *imp̄erium*, but an expression of personal *auctoritas*. At the end of the Republic its scope was undoubtedly enlarged;³ the ‘dynasts’ used it as a *Herrscherbezeichnung*. Grant wishes to regard it as the constitutional title of their *imp. maius*, as he thinks ‘Augustus’ was of the ‘régime of *auctoritas*’; but he is well aware that after 27 B.C. *imperator* was, as originally, a title of esteem.⁴ It seems more sensible to see the word in the same light throughout its history, and to assume that IMP on the coins of the war-lords is equally a symbol of their *auctoritas*. Changes in the fashion for the use of *imperator* will tell us interesting and valuable things about the sides of their activity that the *potentes* chose to advertise, but nothing about the constitutional basis of their power, nor about what it was that was abolished in 27 B.C.

3. *Auctoritas*. Recent literature, concentrating on the ‘charismatic’ significance of this word, has neglected its practical, everyday senses.⁵ *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, s.vv. *auctoritas* (Münscher) and *auctor* (Bögel), needs to be consulted. Münscher gives *auctoritas hominum* as: ‘1. fere id quod praestantia, dignitas; 2. aliquo modo declarata vel expressa, qua alii commoveantur, sive verbis (fere i.q. voluntas, sententia, testimonium, consilium . . .) sive actione, fere i.q. exemplum.’ ‘Fere i.q. sententia’ is the point to consider;⁶ phrases like ‘Caesaris auctoritate ex s.c.’, ‘ex s.c. auctore principe’ mean, not ‘as a result of Caesar’s quasi-numinous prestige’, nor even ‘on the authority of Caesar’, but simply ‘on the motion of Caesar’. Bögel, *auctor* ii. 2, has ‘de eo qui senatui auctor est, i. primus sententiam dicit’, and rightly quotes under this heading all the cases of *auctore principe* and the like.⁷ One passage of Cicero is of prime importance here:⁸ ‘(M. Antonius) dictaturam . . . funditus ex re publica sustulit; de qua ne sententias quidem diximus: scriptum senatus consultum quod fieri vellet attulit, quo recitato auctoritatem eius summo studio secuti sumus’.⁹ Attention should also be drawn to the *s.c. de aquis* quoted by Frontinus,¹⁰ in which the *curatores aquarum* are those ‘quos s.c. Caesar Augustus ex senatus auctoritate nominavit’, i.e. on the proposal of the Senate.

Grant uses these phrases as justification for talking about ‘coinage by *auctoritas principis*’ and ‘the régime of *auctoritas*’; but they do not suggest anything of the kind. And in his progression ‘tribunicia potestate—*auctoritate Caesaris*

¹ See Last, op. cit. 163.

² *Staatsrecht* i.³ 124.

³ See, *inter alios*, Momigliano in *Bull. Com. Iviii*, 1930, 42 f.; M. Levi in *Riv. Fil.*, n.s. x, 1932, 207 f.; de Francisci in *Atti della Reale Accad. Italiana, Mem. d. classe di scienze morali e storiche*, Ser. vii, vol. ii, 1941, 9–11.

⁴ ‘Aspects of the Principate of Tiberius’, 48.

⁵ Note that it required a host of Greek words to capture the varying significances of *auctoritas*, and sometimes only a transliteration would do.

⁶ Cicero several times couples *sententia* and *auctoritas*.

⁷ Cf. *Res Gestae* 8. 5, ‘legibus novi[s] m[e] auctore l]atis’, where the Greek has simply εἰσαγαγὼν καινοῦς νόμους.

⁸ *Phil.* i. 1. 3.

⁹ Naturally, where proposals are not in question, *ex auctoritate Caesaris* may mean ‘on the Emperor’s authority’; it probably does so, for example, in the case of the *ius respondendi ex auctoritate Caesaris*.

¹⁰ *De aquaed.* 104. 2. The unratified *s.c.* was called *senatus auctoritas*; this is in all probability different from the common prestige sense of *senatus auctoritas*, and means the sum of the senators’ *sententiae*, their combined *sententia*.

—*senatus consulto*', which he regards as the basis of all Augustus' civil rule, the middle term is superfluous. The Emperor proposes a *motio* by virtue of his *trib. pot.*, and there results a *senatus consultum*. When Antonius proposed to abolish the dictatorship, and all the senators '*auctoritatem eius secuti sunt*', he was consul, bringing a motion before the Senate by virtue of his consular *imperium*; but no one has suggested a progression '*imperio—auctoritate—senatus consulto*'. It would make just as much, or as little, sense.

4. *Imperium* and *auctoritas*. Chiliver has wisely emphasised that they are not antithetic concepts:¹ *potestas* is one of the things that give a man *auctoritas*.² Their relation can be envisaged by thinking of *imperium* as a circle inscribed in another circle, which is *auctoritas*. The relative size of the circles may vary a great deal, and *Res Gestae* 34. 3 is a comment on this relation, not an attempt to contrast 'rule by *auctoritas*' with 'rule by *imperium*'.³

5. Augustus' position in the early years. Grant assumes that he could afford to drop *imperium* in 27; but even in 23 this was not so. The trial of M. Primus shows the nature of the difficulties. Primus alleged in justification the *instructio* (unofficial instructions) of Augustus, who had, as consul, only that *imp. maius* which a consul technically had over proconsuls⁴—not merely limited to the 'safeguarding role' of Type A, but hardly more in practice than a distinction of precedence—and could therefore claim no official standing in the case. Hence the embarrassing situation, the interrogation by a hostile defending counsel, the lame answer; and it is clear from other connexions, such as his behaviour in the Senate, that Augustus was always anxious to avoid the embarrassing and revealing passage-of-arms in public. It was bad for his *auctoritas*.

But since we are only to claim for Augustus after 23 an *imp. maius* of Type A, in what way was he better able to deal with such situations as these afterwards than he had been before? In the first place, he was at least not worse off. Without *imp. maius* he would always be in an unofficial and awkward position, and if governors could appeal to his *auctoritas* they might as likely deny it—the danger was not purely academic. And secondly, he was probably in practice better off. The *maius* relation inherent in the consulship was merely implicit, and by long custom was of hardly any practical significance. But a specific grant of *imp. maius* was explicit, and not linked with nearly so strong a constitutional tradition of its use; and it could be employed *in absentia*, at a distance. It was a stronger instrument of official control.

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¹ Op. cit. 425.

² The phrases *consulium auctoritas*, *proconsulis auctoritas* are common, and Livy more than once has *auctoritas imperatoris*.

³ *Auctoritate praestiti* is abl. of respect, not of cause; see Last in *J.R.S.* xl, 1950, 120 (the whole of these remarks, a review of Magdalen's *Auctoritas Principis*, are of great value and importance).

⁴ Dio liv. 3. 2-4. See Volkmann, *Zur Rechtsprechung im Principat des Augustus*, 53 f.; Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, 333, 341; Grant, *From Imperium*, 83 f. I know of no evidence for the name Antonius, which Grant (misled perhaps by McFayden or the index to the C.A.H.) gives to Primus.

⁵ See Last in *J.R.S.* xxxvii, 1947, 160.

ANTH. PAL. v. 244 (245). 3-4

ὄμοσα τὴν δυσέρωτα κόρην, τρισὶν ὄμοσα
πέτρας,
μήποτε μελιχίοις ὄμμασιν εἰσιδέειν.

Κόρην, τρὶς ἐπώμοσ', ἐταίρην Eichstaedt.
Ποιῶις Lennep (cf. Sittl. Geb. p. 140, n. 8).

THE piece consists of four elegiac couplets; this couplet is the second. The whole thing is a protest addressed to a woman by a man who complains that she entices him but refuses to gratify him. *δύσεως* normally means *lovesick*, but here the context determines its sense as *unsatisfactory lover*.

'I swore', so runs the text, 'I swore by three stones never to cast a tender look upon this heartless creature.'

Nothing is known of an oath by three stones. There was a recognized custom of swearing while *standing upon* a sacred stone; it is referred to four times by Pausanias, and is embodied in the word *λιθωμότης*. But that is of course another affair. The only true example of swearing *by* a stone would seem to be the rite indicated by the well-known phrase *Iouem lapidem iurare*,¹ and that was peculiar to the Roman *fetiales*. Other rites could be mentioned in which stones played some part; but these² are all equally irrelevant.

The difficulty has naturally been recognized, and the above two conjectures represent attempts to eliminate it. Neither of them has any transcriptional plausibility whatever, and neither of them seems to me to give good sense or good idiom.³ The latest edition known to me, that of Waltz and Guillon (Budé, 1928), does not mention these, and attempts to explain the text as a travesty of various oaths in all of which the person concerned swore by three divinities, namely Zeus and two others which vary. They call it 'an amusing hyperbole', but I can only say that I for one am not amused.

I suggest that *τρισὶν* was a misreading of *φύσιν*, and that *πέτρας* was a consequential accommodation of the gen. sing. *πέτρας*. At this rate there is no stop after *πέτρας*; *φύσιν πέτρας* is object of *εἰσιδέειν* and stands in

apposition to *τὴν δυσέρωτα κόρην*, strengthening that description. This very expression, but with *πέτρων* in place of *πέτρας*, is used with a personal denotation in Sophocles: *O.T.* 334-5 *καὶ γὰρ ἂν πέτρων φύσιν σύ γ' ὀργάνειας*. Our phrase may quite possibly be a conscious echo of the ancient classic, for these late poets are mostly bookish writers. This one is Macedonius Thessalonicens 'the consul', who is dated vi cent. A.D.; he quotes from the classics elsewhere,⁴ and has an elegant style. Hard-hearted people are called stones or rocks frequently in Greek,⁵ but with the periphrasis of *φύσιν* only in that Sophoclean passage. (The periphrasis itself is common in philosophic prose, and examples are given in Jebb's note there.)

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LUCAN iv. 457 ff.

huc fractas Aquilone rates summersaque
pontus
corpora saepe tulit caecisque abscondit in
antris;
restituit raptus tectum mare, cumque
cauernae
euomuere fretum, contorti uerticis undae
Tauromenitanam uincunt feruore Charyb-
dim.

459 tectum *codd.* *plerique*: effectum Ζ¹,
(?) M¹: tetum C.

Tectum is printed in all editions which I have seen, and modern editors (including Housman) accept it without question; but what exactly does it mean? The Berne scholiast (C) has the gloss in *spelunca*; early commentators (Sulpitius, Beroaldus) explained it simply as equivalent to *latens*. Haskins translates 'the o'erarched sea renders back its spoils', but, if this is the meaning, *tectum* is a somewhat otiose epithet, for the fact that the sea is covered by the cave is *per se* no reason why it should yield up its plunder. Duff renders it slightly differently as 'beneath the rocks'. It might, with equal reason, be argued that *tectum* means 'covered with corpses and debris', as in iii. 566 (*tectis stetit aequore bellum*) it means 'covered with ships'. But I do not believe that it is what Lucan wrote, for, on any of these suppositions, no explanation is forthcoming of the origin of the curious, though impossible, variant, *effectum*, in at

¹ Cic. *Fam.* vii. 12. 2; cf. Warde Fowler, *Roman Ideas of Religion*, p. 39.

² e.g. Hdt. iii. 8; Livy i. 24. 9 *saxo silice* (a stone knife).

³ I owe my acquaintance with these solely to the app. crit. of Stadtmüller (Teubner, 1894), and to the statement in the Didot ed. that Lennep was refuted by Passow, *Script. Misc.* p. 219.

⁴ e.g. in the next piece but one, from Theocritus.

⁵ Cf. particularly in the following piece (Paul. Sil.) *ψυχὴ δ' ἐξ ἀδάμαντος*.

least one important manuscript and probably in two.

Grotius was evidently puzzled by the line, for in his first edition he altered *raptus*, against the manuscripts, to *rupes*, an unhappy conjecture which he did not explain but condemned in his second edition. In the eighteenth century, serious doubts began to be entertained about *tectum*. Oudendorp queried it, adding that he would have expected some word like *repulsum*, but perversely tried to emend *raptus*, or to explain it (after Gronovius) as a participle, with *pontus* supplied, i.e. 'the sea, carried back by its tide, restores the waves hitherto covered by the rocks'—an impossible contortion. Burman very tentatively suggested *rediens* for *tectum*, but gave the problem up ('haereo in hoc loco, et Grotium sequor, donec quid melius proferatur'). Bentley proposed to read *iustum*.

What is required is a word meaning

'sated' or 'teeming', and I therefore suggest that what Lucan wrote was *fetum*. Misread as *tetum*, which *C* faithfully preserves, it was altered to the nearest word, *tectum*. But fortunately (though wrongly) *fetum* had elsewhere been explained by a gloss as equivalent to *effetum*, which was corrupted into the *effectum* of Z^1 and (probably) M^1 . Another instance of this self-same corruption appears in the apparatus at iv. 593, where the correct reading is *effeta* but U^1 gives *effecta*. *Fetum* would satisfy the sense (only when thoroughly sated does the sea yield up its prey), and it suits the following equally vigorous metaphor, *euomere*. *Fetus* is commonly used of inanimate things; generally, it is true, with a following ablative (Virg. *Aen.* i. 51; Stat. *Silv.* iii. 2. 17; *Anth. Lat.* 415. 19, etc.), but absolutely in Prop. iv.9. 22.

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REVIEWS

THE ODYSSEY

REINHOLD MERKELBACH: *Untersuchungen zur Odyssee*. (Zetemata, Heft 2.) Pp. viii+241. Munich: Beck, 1951. Paper, DM. 18.50.

IN the preface to this book Dr. Merkelbach, who was a pupil of Professor Snell and now holds a post in the University of Cologne, expresses his whole-hearted admiration for Professor von der Mühll's work on the *Odyssey*, and especially for his article 'Odyssee' in Pauly's *Realenzyklopädie*, Suppl. vii (1940), which has perhaps been prevented by the date of its publication from becoming quite as well known here as it should be. Von der Mühll claims to have identified three main strands in the fabric of our *Odyssey*: an earlier poem about the return of Odysseus ('A') and a poem about Telemachus ('T'), both of which, he argues, can be distinguished by the usual processes of Homeric analysis from the rest of the poem, the work of a vastly inferior artist ('B'), who hideously mutilated A and T in the process of incorporating them in his own *Odyssey* (which von der Mühll obviously assumes to have been substantially the same as our modern texts). It should be noted that von der Mühll's analysis had been in large measure controverted in advance by F. Focke, whose brilliant and outstandingly important book *Die Odyssee* (Tübinger Beiträge z. Altertumsw. xxxvii) had been completed in 1938, although it did not appear until 1943. Focke argued, in answer to earlier *Analytiker* (especially Kirchhoff, Schwartz, Wilamowitz, and Bethe), that, except in the *ἀπόλογοι* (where an older *Abenteuereidichtung*, not necessarily concerned with Odysseus, has been used), only two main elements have to be distinguished in our *Odyssey*: the earlier version of the story ('O'), to whose existence our own *Odyssey* testifies, and the later version which we know and in which the *Telemachia* is an integral part ('T'). Focke avoids using 'B' as a symbol for this second, expanded

Odyssey, because for Schwartz and other German scholars that letter signifies 'Bearbeiter', and to Focke T, though perhaps inferior as a poet to O, is an excellent craftsman who is far from deserving the abuse which the analysts heap upon B. Focke's argument for the integral importance of the *Telemachy* to our *Odyssey* was reinforced in 1944 by F. Klingner's essay (*Ber. sächs. Akad., Ph.-hist. Kl. xcvi. 1*) 'Über die vier ersten Bücher der Odyssee'; and it is remarkable, in view of the clarity and manifest good sense of Focke and Klingner, that Merkelbach, who mentions both works in his bibliography, does not see that anyone who wishes to take von der Mühl's results as a starting-point is now bound to explain why he does not accept the arguments of Focke and Klingner.

In his first chapter (1-15) Merkelbach examines the recognition scenes in Books xix and xxiii, and argues that von der Mühl's recognition of two hands at work is inadequate; there are really three, the dull B, who puts in all that irrelevant conversation in xxiii. 96 ff., and two first-class poets, one of whom put the recognition-scene before the killing of the suitors (hence the choice of that particular day for the *Bogenprobe*), while the other made Odysseus return secretly and take vengeance on the suitors in a spear-fight before revealing himself to Penelope. So we have not only A ('ältere Odyssee') but R ('Rachedichter') to deal with, as well as B ('Bearbeiter'). The second chapter (15-36) painstakingly enucleates the beginning of R from von der Mühl's T, in which B had involved it. T suffers considerable losses in the process, but is still recognized as an originally independent poem (chapter iii, 36-58). Chapters iv-vi (58-141) analyse the respective shares of R, A, and B in the second half of the *Odyssey* up to the killing of the suitors, and chapter vi ends with a summing-up (135 ff.) in which R is identified with the author of the *Iliad* and dated before Archil. 68 D, i.e. before 650, and an excursus (138-41) in which the names of the early epic poets are very superficially discussed. (Hellanicus is not mentioned, and the bearing of his ascription of the *Little Iliad* to Cinaethon on the validity of post-Ptolemaic tradition about the authorship of the cyclic epics is passed over in silence.) In chapter vii (142-55) Merkelbach argues that the *Telegony* was already known to B; chapters viii and ix (155-99) are devoted to dissecting out A from B, and B is incidentally dated about 550 (p. 195); the last chapter (199-236) deals with the sources of A, including A's relation to R, his debt to a 'Pontic *Argonautica*' and to other adventure poems. A final summing-up dates A between 700 and 650, later (but not much) than R.

Much of what Merkelbach has written is of great interest to students of the sources of the *Odyssey*, and his observations on points of detail are shrewd and often illuminating; but his cavalier treatment of opposing views—besides the work of Focke and Klingner, he utterly disregards U. Hölscher's excellent monograph 'Untersuchungen zur Form der Odyssee' (*Hermes*, Einz. vi, 1939), in which some of his points about the incompetence of B are already conclusively answered (Merkelbach mentions Hölscher in a footnote, but never replies to him)—is inexcusable, even on the score of youthful intolerance, and his main conclusions are hopelessly vitiated by his failure to realize either the kind of poem which our *Odyssey* is, or the conditions under which the composer was working. He needs a period of additional study, which might well be devoted to serious work on the books of Milman Parry, so that he may learn what it is that modern *Unitarier* believe; he might also inquire what it was that Pindar, Aristotle, 'Longinus', Dr. Johnson, and Goethe (to give a few examples)

saw in 'Homer', when it was apparently B's hideous botcheries that they were reading.

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ALCMAN'S *PARTHENEION*

DENYS L. PAGE: *Alcman, The Partheneion*. Pp. xii+180. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951. Cloth, 21s. net.

SINCE Egger first published the Paris papyrus of Alcman in 1863 it has provoked acres of more or less profitable discussion in learned periodicals and commentaries, but no one has ever been bold or thorough enough to give us a really satisfying discussion of all the puzzles set us by this document. All who have used Professor Page's earlier works know his courage, thoroughness, and originality of thought; and the news that he was to devote a whole book to the Alcman papyrus roused hopes that the full-scale discussion which we have so long needed was to appear at last. Page himself expects to be told that 'enough has been written about the *Partheneion*' (p. v), and has a crushing answer ready for this silly objection; in fact, as it seems to me, the main criticism to which he is open is that he has written too little, since his treatment of several aspects of his subject is disappointingly cavalier.

The book has three main sections, on the text (pp. 1-25), interpretation (26-101), and the dialect (102-63); there are two appendixes, on Alcman's date (164-6) and birthplace (167-70), a full index of Greek words and a very short 'English index', in which all the references are to Greek mythology, except for one to Sosibius (perhaps to make up for his absence from the papyrus?); an excellent short-title bibliography is also provided (ix-xi). The section on the text begins with a full description of the papyrus; the text of Alcman is then transcribed in full, with notes on the transcription, including variant readings by Blass and W. S. Barrett. The transcription might legitimately claim unrivalled authority—Page, Lobel, and Barrett have all inspected the papyrus, and the differences between them are very slight. Considering the bad state of col. iii, it is remarkable that with four exceptions the readings which underlie Diehl's 1925 text are confirmed: at v. 70 *ταί* rightly replaces Diehl's inexplicable *και*; at 77 Page and Lobel agree on *τείρει*, where everyone else reads *τηρει*; the ends of 93 and 95 are declared to be illegible. With the section on the scholia, which follows, this transcription is a fine achievement, and provides us at last with a firm basis for our study of the text. A critical text of 'Ἀλκιμᾶνος μελῶν α̃ 1?', with full *testimonia*, comes next; rightly cautious in its admission of supplements, it has either too many or too few metagrammatisms (*θ* for *σ* as in 34 *πάθον*; *η* for *ει* and, at times, for *ε*; digammas freely inserted; 'Doric' accents retained, as 73 *φασεῖς*, but other accents changed without warning, as 61 *φάρος* for *φᾶρος*); 77 *τείρει* is printed, and the line is translated 'it is Hagesichora for whom we pine'. The translation, printed after the text, is apt to take too much for granted, especially in the fifth and eighth stanzas, and must be used with caution; apart from the unwelcome appearance of 'enoplion' on p. 23 and an apparently irrelevant appeal to Maas, *Responsionsfreiheiten*, on p. 24 (at (iv)), the section on metre is unexceptionable.

'Interpretation' has four headings: Legend, the Choir, the Religious Ceremony, and Supplementary Notes. The section on legend is perhaps the best in

the book, and can be read with profit by specialists in Alcman and non-specialists alike. The sections on choir and ceremony contain the kernel of of Page's interpretation, and call for fuller treatment than is possible here. Page believes that Hagesichora, Agido, and the eight girls named in vv. 70-72, 74-76 make up the 'ten' of v. 99, that Agido is 'Second-in-Command' of the choir, that the Peleïades ('Doves') are a rival choir, that our choir is not divided into semi-choirs, that Aotis is the moon (perhaps to be identified with Ortheia), that the correct reading at v. 61 is ὀρθρία φάρος (translated 'the plough to the Goddess of the morning twilight'), and that the Peleïades have nothing to do with the Pleiads. I believe the suggestion about Aotis to be new, and very possibly true; but all the rest of Page's opinions have been held before, and have been controverted by reputable scholars, who have put forward other opinions at least equally plausible—and I do not feel that Page always does justice to the arguments of his opponents. He sometimes lumps together under one heading several divergent theories (e.g. 'the theory' at pp. 54, 55 seems to include the very different opinions of Smyth, van Groningen, and myself); he treats an explanation of a metrical point, where reference is made to the regular practice of Greek poets (including Tyrtaeus), as if it were an appeal to Tyrtaeus alone, and disallows it (p. 77); yet at p. 132 he appeals to Tyrtaeus alone on a metrical point, and at p. 147 he appeals to Alcaeus alone on a linguistic point; he even combines opinions from different sources into a single self-refuting whole and jeers at the result as 'Triballian' (pp. 50-51). Nor are his positive arguments always sound: he holds that the Peleïades, as a rival choir, 'fight' metaphorically against Hagesichora's choir, and notes (p. 55, n. 2): 'For μάχη in such contests see Kukula [viz. *Philologus*, lxiv, 1907], p. 216'; Kukula there writes 'μάχη und νίκη gebrauchen auch Pindar und Bakchylides von Wettkämpfen (Pind. Ol. v 58; Isth. vi (5), 60; vii (6), 22; Bacchyl. ii 5; vgl. Strab. x 483)'. The first reference is false (read 'Ol. viii 58', where μάχας refers to the pancratium), the second and third support the truism about νίκη, Bacchylides has μάχας θρασύχειρ(ος) . . . νικαν (μάχας again l. 144, for the same victory—Snell suggests boxing, Körte thought of the pancratium), and Strabo's μάχη is Cretan, ἀγέλη against ἀγέλη, and blows are exchanged with hands and weapons (cf. the Libyan girls in Hdt. iv. 180, quoted by Page). Kukula thus does nothing to support Page's interpretation, particularly as Page extends the sphere of metaphorical μάχη to musical contests. In 1938 (*Hermes*, lxxiii, p. 449) I remarked, in reference to this very passage in Alcman, that 'it seems that μάχεσθαι can only be used of competitions which involve fighting, e.g. boxing and wrestling'. I have not since found any early instance to the contrary, or any early evidence that μάχη and μάχεσθαι can be used of any contest between human beings not involving physical violence. If then the Peleïades are a rival choir, they must be forerunners of 'la colombe qui fait "Boum!"', and the Spartan ceremony resembled nothing so much as an inter-house hockey-match at St. Trinian's—which is absurd. So the Peleïades are perhaps not a rival choir after all. The Supplementary Notes help with many points of detail; the most remarkable is perhaps that on p. 91 in which Page admits that he cannot understand τείρει in v. 77 (no more can I). In general, Page's interpretations differ so radically from my own that even if they were convincingly argued I should probably find it hard to accept them at once; but having already discounted most of his old arguments and not finding his new ones particularly cogent, I cannot yield that instantaneous assent to his propositions

which he at times enjoins (e.g. p. 55, 'The opinion that the *Peleiades* are the Pleiads . . . must now be finally abandoned').

The section on the dialect 'is not a study of the Laconian dialect, . . . it cannot even be a study of the dialect of Alcman'; its aim is only 'to observe and record, so far as possible, how far the extant fragments are in harmony with the common opinion of antiquity that Alcman composed in the Laconian vernacular' (p. 102), and the papyrus is taken as representing 'adequately enough, despite a few superficial errors, the Alexandrine edition of 100 lines of his text' (this assertion of superficial errors apparently justifies the metagrammatisms mentioned above). Page argues (103-4) that the quotations are seldom of value, but fails to mention here that it is only quotations which enable us to detect the 'superficial errors' in the papyrus (e.g. *πεληγάδες* for *πελειάδες* is confirmed by 'the grammarian tradition'—p. 138). The observation record occupies almost fifty pages (104-53), and very few noteworthy points in the papyrus, the quotations (of which Page has made a new recension), and the relevant inscriptions (especially those written in the old Laconian alphabet) have escaped the net—a possible exception is the failure, at p. 156, n. 1 (c), to relate the spelling *φοίvais* (fr. 71. 1) to the form *φορφαία* (*I.G.* v. 1, 252b, s. vii/vi). Page's systematic collection of detailed information will be most valuable, and contains many good notes (particularly, perhaps, the exposure of Villoison's *πρώφοves* in fr. 58. 2—pp. 106, 128). A summing-up under three heads (pp. 153-62) leads Page to the conclusions (163) that Alcman's dialect is 'basically and preponderantly' vernacular Laconian, that the only 'alien' dialect from which it is 'contaminated' is the epic, and that, with the exception of fr. 58 (his interesting study of which in pp. 159-62 leans perhaps too heavily on Bernert, *Philologus*, xciv, 1941, 229-31), epic features occur '(a) sporadically throughout the extant fragments, but especially (b) in passages where metre or theme or both are taken from the Epic, and (c) in phrases which are as a whole borrowed or imitated from the Epic'. These conclusions seem acceptable as a working hypothesis, but they require a detailed examination for which there is no room here.

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PLATO'S *CHARMIDES*

T. G. TUCKEY: *Plato's Charmides*. Pp. ix+116. Cambridge: University Press, 1951. Cloth, 12s. 6d. net.

THE general purport of the *Charmides* is clear enough: that without objective standards or 'values' ('the knowledge about good and evil') there will be no benefit to be gained from the other forms of 'knowledge', including all sciences and techniques, however 'efficient', and including even the 'self-knowledge' which was recommended by Delphi and sometimes identified with *sophrosyne*, the ostensible subject of the dialogue. The arguments by which this moral is brought out are, however, very unappetizing; and few writers on Plato have considered them worthy of detailed study. The bulk of the present work is devoted to an analysis of the most difficult part of the dialogue (165 c-176 a), and is much more thorough than any previous attempts of the same kind. The decision to publish the book, after some revision by other hands, is clearly justified by its merits; we have here no mere 'pious tribute' to the memory of

its author, whose death on active service in 1944 is much to be deplored by all serious students of Plato.

The preliminary discussion of the various meanings of *σωφροσύνη* owes much to Nägelsbach and more to Jaeger. Consequently the indebtedness of Plato's ethical doctrines to 'the historical life of the nation' (of which they are a mere 'translation') is, though real, very much exaggerated. But Tuckey is right in emphasizing the aristocratic bias of the precepts in favour of this virtue. Hence the choice of Charmides and Critias as Socrates' respondents. Critias in particular 'illustrated perfectly for Plato the dangers of breaking up old prejudices without replacing them with something new and positive'. Tuckey returns to this point more than once (cf. p. 100), and, though he regrettably does not develop it, he seems to think, in view of the later career of the two aristocrats, that there was much substance in the accusation that the effect of Socrates' elenchus upon the young was the reverse of wholesome.

The section dealing with the first five definitions again strikes me as derivative and insufficiently critical. For example, Tuckey follows Lutoslawski in finding an 'undistributed middle' at 159 d (here '160 b' in p. 19, n. 1 is wrong for 159 c). But this mechanical 'paralogism' is got by ignoring the comparative (*σωφρονέστερον*), and forgetting that the context distributes the middle term ('fine') of the alleged syllogism by maintaining that no instances of slowness are fine. Nor is it correct that the first definition is rejected for the reason that it stresses only 'the externals of conduct'; the whole section on quickness of mind contradicts this view. Again, it is no part of Plato's argument that *αἰδώς* represents 'a merely negative aspect of virtue'; this is to gloss over a typically sophistic mishandling of a quotation from Homer. Elsewhere also the sophistic pattern of the argumentation seems to escape notice. Not enough justice is done, for example, to Critias' characteristic equation of *τὸ γινώσκειν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ* with the truncated version *τὸ γινώσκειν ἑαυτόν*. Due attention to this common trick of whittling down the predicate might have helped in dealing with the 'state of considerable muddle' which naturally results later in the dialogue.

It is in coping with 'the knowledge of knowledge' that Tuckey, with due acknowledgements to Schirlitz, shows his distinctive merits. He brings out well the bearings of the argument on the false claims of encyclopedic and technical 'knowledge' to be reckoned as virtue; and argues convincingly that the dialogue is intended to support the definition (obtained by combining two passages) of *sophrosyne* as 'doing what is good with the knowledge that it is good', and therefore to create a demand (largely met in *Rep.*) for a more careful consideration of the meaning of 'good'. But the exposition is so much a matter of details that a synopsis cannot be attempted here. Tuckey scores some valid hits upon the efforts of his predecessors, notably upon Taylor's interpretation of 170 a-b. Some few obscurities and repetitions are no doubt more than excusable in the circumstances in which the book was produced. If I have some criticisms to offer, they are made, like those already suggested above, because their scope passes beyond the immediate subject of this review. In general, it would seem to me an advantage if the admittedly necessary process of 'reading between the lines' (Tuckey is fond of this expression) could be kept separate from the analysis of the text itself. Again, the paraphrase ought not to be more difficult than the Greek. The ambiguous expression 'to know what (*ᾧ*) one knows and what one does not know' (*passim*) has an extra ambiguity in English

because of the danger that 'what' will be taken as interrogative. (Sometimes at least this expression would be better translated 'to distinguish between states of ignorance and states of knowledge'.) Nor again should the text be made to bear an inordinate weight. At 170 c too much is made of the substitution of the plural (*ἐπιστημῶν*) for the singular which one would naturally expect; the plural ('instances of knowledge') does not necessarily mean 'all the special sciences'. At 173 d 6 an emphatic 'you' is imported into a sentence which contains nothing of the kind (p. 76). And at 174 b 11-c 3 (pp. 59, 78) there is the over-elaborated translation 'with knowledge *that one knows* the other branches of knowledge'; 174 d 4-5 seems to me to tell against this interpretation, which is in any case unnecessary to Tuckey's argument.

The dialogue reads as if the speakers were uneasily edging past a number of themes which Plato had very much at heart, e.g. the unity of virtue, and the unique character of the knowledge which *is* virtue. It is only fitting to conclude this review with a tribute to the strong and subtle intelligence which Tuckey brought to bear on such implications of the text, and to the patience with which he sought with so much success to open up this 'nest of puzzles'.

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A COMMENTARY ON THE *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS*

H. H. JOACHIM: Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*. A Commentary. Pp. vi+304. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951. Cloth, 25s. net.

THE late Professor Joachim's lectures on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which are here published, were given regularly at Oxford between 1902 and 1917. It appears that they were not revised thereafter, although Joachim lived till 1938. The views which he had put forward obtained currency through the teaching and lecturing of the next generation, but no major publication on the *Ethics* appeared, with the single but important exception of Ross's translation (1925). The original lectures, embodying not only Joachim's own thought but, as he acknowledges again and again, a good deal learnt from Professor J. A. Smith, who himself published comparatively little, are now offered to the world. No one could expect that the resulting book would be a full or systematic commentary. In fact, Joachim does much by supplementing or correcting Burnet, whom he does not attempt to supersede. There are many good corrections: the notes on *εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολὺκοῖνον* at 1099^b18 (p. 57) and *ποιητόν* at 1139^b1 (p. 189) and the discussion of Burnet's view that *ὑπόθεσις* sometimes means the 'Q.E.F.' of a problem (p. 191; cf. Burnet, p. 258) may be selected as examples. More could have been done in this way, especially where Burnet is wrong and the matter is of philological rather than philosophical interest. Some points of this kind are quite serious. It is disconcerting to find Burnet's unreasonable and unhistorical view that the *μεγαλόψυχος* is drawn satirically apparently approved (p. 125) and Diels's old interpretation of *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* as non-Aristotelian works, which Burnet accepted, used without comment in the running summary at 1102^a. This second point anyway is not Joachim's fault. He shows no use of Jaeger. But it would seem to be an antiquated position, of no particular relevance to the argument, which his editor would have done well to suppress.

Joachim was giving his audience pretty well their first experience of Aristotle, and he introduced liberal digressions on various key topics. He was a master of such exposition. The introductory section on Aristotle's classification of the sciences, the discussion of the kinds of cause (pp. 176 ff.), and that of *μεταβολή* (pp. 270 ff.—largely again in correction of Burnet) are all excellent. The claim of the editor and publisher that the book provides a serviceable introduction to Aristotle is thoroughly justified. So long as there are students who begin with the *Ethics* it will retain this special utility. And after all this is a better way of getting to grips with Aristotle than by means of extracts or handbooks. There is another permanently useful feature also—the excellent, though not complete, running paraphrase. This form of exposition is the staple of Aristotelian commentary, ancient as well as modern. Here Joachim is clear and accurate, and often very subtle.

Not much can be said here about separate parts of the work. The treatment of *δικαιοσύνη*, largely based on J. A. Smith, will certainly attract attention. It is a detailed attempt, and a successful one, to use the known facts of Athenian law to explain dianemetic and diorthotic justice. Something in this line had already been done by Vinogradoff in an article which Joachim cites and more recently by H. D. P. Lee (*C.Q.* xxxi (1937), 129 ff.). Lee's work is not mentioned; neither is Heath, *Mathematics in Aristotle*, pp. 272–6, a short but useful discussion of some points in v. 3–5. The treatment of *δικαιοσύνη* is one of the best things in the book. The handling of Book vi is a good deal less successful, though full of interest. (No mention is made of the separate edition by L. H. G. Greenwood, Cambridge, 1909, which is useful on many points.) The trouble is, partly at any rate, that there is uncertainty about the view which Joachim holds of the relation between the account of *φρόνησις* and that of the *ἡθικαὶ ἀρεταί*. Generally, he appears to believe that Books ii–v describe forms of goodness in abstraction from the intellectual element which they always involve; but there are traces of a different and, it would appear, inconsistent doctrine in a general discussion of the whole scheme of the treatise (pp. 111–13), where Aristotle is said to be in effect describing the good qualities of the private citizen or soldier or minor magistrate in Books iii–v, and 'the qualities required for the great legislator and great statesman' in Book vi. It is hard to see how this view fits in with the general notion of the 'provisional abstraction' of the whole account of *ἡθικαὶ ἀρεταί*.

In preparing these lectures for the press, Mr. D. A. Rees has done a difficult task well. Nothing short of complete rewriting with much amplification would make a systematic commentary or an up-to-date discussion of the main problems out of the material. What he has done is to add numerous well-chosen references to other works of Aristotle (Joachim, not having publication in view, had been lax about this sort of documentation) and to give brief notes referring to more recent discussions. This second practice is open to criticism, not so much because it tends to repetition (e.g. the same references on pleasure—Festugière, Léonard, but not Taylor, *Timaeus*, pp. 446–62—are given on p. 233 and on p. 262, on Book viii and on Book x) as because the references are unavoidably too general to be much use. One cannot help feeling that the problem of bringing Joachim up to date would have been more easily solved by means of a book-list, or better still a sketch of the literature on the *Ethics* since 1917, by way of introduction or appendix. This would have done all that the present system does without giving an illusory impression that Joachim's approach has so much

in common with that of more recent continental scholars that he can be corrected in detail by reference to them.

It is really unreasonable to complain of Mr. Rees's skilful editorial work. But what was the point of trying to make the book usable by readers who do not know Greek? It is difficult to imagine who the beneficiaries of this decision may be, but they would not have an easy time of it. However, if there are any, one cannot grumble at the very slight untidiness which their convenience requires. And the English equivalents are good and helpful: 'dignity' is an excellent choice for *μεγαλοψυχία*, and *μελαγχολικός* is well rendered 'excitable'.

There are a number of small errors and misprints, most of which will mislead no one (e.g. the trouble with brackets, p. 140, paragraph (1) and p. 158, n. 1). The reference to Aspasius on p. 53, n. 5 is to p. 21, 8 Heylbut. P. 185. 1: for 'through' read 'though'—possibly confusing. P. 31, n. 1 and p. 261, n. 1: to say that 'explanatory' *καί* 'means i.e.' without indicating the connexion of this with other uses is dangerous to beginners; cf. Bonitz, *Index* 357^b13, for a more accurate account. The punctuation of 1144^a31-32 (*οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοί, τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες, εἰσιν κτλ.*) can hardly be right. Presumably Joachim means: 'the syllogisms, containing as they do the principle of what is to be done, run as follows: since . . .' (Or is it 'the syllogisms which contain . . .')? This would surely be *οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ οἱ τῶν πρακτῶν κτλ.*) The traditional view, according to which *τῶν πρακτῶν* depends on *συλλογισμοί*, and *ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες* are taken together, seems much superior in point of sense and language.

These are minor blemishes. There are more, but if there were many more, it would still not be serious. One could have wished for a more complete, a more up-to-date, and a tidier commentary, but these lectures will be a serviceable addition to Grant, Stewart, Burnet, Ross's translation—the indispensable books on the *Ethics*. They will provide a good basis for profitable discussion: they have indeed been well tried for a generation. Changed philosophical fashions are no doubt going to make a good deal of difference to the interpretation of Aristotle, while from the other side Jaeger has already accomplished his revolution. But Joachim's careful tracing of intricate argument, and the lucidity and breadth of his exposition of the key terms of Aristotle's philosophy, are proof against unpopularity.

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ARISTOTLE'S *METAPHYSICS*

JOSEPH OWENS: *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*. A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought. Pp. xii+461. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951. Paper, Can\$5.

DR. OWENS's work gives ample evidence of thorough scholarship; but he covers much ground, and it is not easy to hold the threads together, so that a summary of his initial approach should be helpful:

How did Aristotle conceive the function of metaphysics? It included for him both the examination of the characteristics of being in general and that of the separate substances in particular (as also of the presuppositions of scientific knowledge); but how are these related? The former was emphasized by the

Greek commentators; Dr. Owens traces it to Theophrastus and Eudemus. Then he surveys fully the modern interpreters; no one till Natorp realized adequately the difficulties which the two strains in Aristotle involved, but his solution by excision was unacceptable, and Zeller (*Arch. Gesch. Phil.* ii (1889), pp. 264-71) urged that the conflict was inextricably rooted in Aristotle's own thought. There, on the whole, the matter rested till Jaeger suggested a shift from a more Platonic to a less Platonic phase. But several scholars have argued that the disparity is not as great as he holds; Hamelin had already maintained that the Aristotelian form was primarily individual, and universal only by analogy, and similar views have been propounded by von Arnim, von Ivánka, and Robin. Though he allows Jaeger's work its place, Dr. Owens's view tends to follow this latter pattern.

On the character of the metaphysical treatises he summarizes Jaeger (*Ent. Met. Arist.*), claiming rightly that their title goes back before the Christian era and is not purely fortuitous (see now P. Moraux, *Les Listes anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote* (1951), pp. 314-15, who thinks it goes back at least to Aristo of Ceos, c. 200 B.C.). Jaeger's view of the Aristotelian λόγος is now fairly well established, and Dr. Owens points out its importance for interpreting the treatises, stressing their dialectical character and their care to presuppose only what the hearers could be expected to have grasped.

Next he distinguishes two ways of ordering the treatises, the chronological and the 'methodical': while we may ask in what order they were written, we may also ask how Aristotle finally intended them to be grouped. The evidence for this, says Dr. Owens, can only be internal (p. 35); but this is not entirely true, for from the series of λόγοι he distinguishes there are four books excluded (*a*, *Δ*, *K*, *Λ*), and we know that there was in antiquity an edition containing ten books instead of fourteen (*Catal. Anon. Menagii*). In the methodical sequence, according to Dr. Owens, *A*, *B*, *Γ*, *E*. 1 form one group, and *E*. 2-*Θ* another looking back not to it but to *Δ*, while some books which follow *Θ* look back to both and so unite the two series. The result is as follows: *A*, *B*, *Γ*, *E*. 1; (*Δ*) *E*. 2-4, *Z*, *H*, *Θ*. 1-9, *Θ*. 10; *I*, *M*. 1-9, *M*. 9-10. Of the remaining books (*a*, *K*, *Λ*, *N*), *Λ* seems to depend on *N* (pp. 34-38).

Turning to questions of chronology, Dr. Owens discusses the views of Jaeger, von Arnim, Nuyens, and Oggioni. His conclusions in general are perhaps hypersceptical; but with Jaeger and von Arnim he thinks *Λ* early, while he adopts Oggioni's view that *K*. 1-8 is later than *BΓE*, of which it is a summary. Of Oggioni's arguments I have no knowledge, but it seems unplausible that Aristotle should have troubled to do this without (apparently) introducing new ideas (Natorp, *Arch. Gesch. Phil.* i (1888), p. 180), and Natorp, Jaeger, and Ross have all pointed out the Platonic character of *K*. At pp. 195-6 it is argued that *Z* is earlier than *Γ* and *E*. 1.

Dr. Owens discusses admirably what he calls the Aristotelian 'equivocals'; Aristotle's assumptions differ from those of the critics who accuse him of disastrous ambiguity in the use of terms (e.g. 'substance'), since for him not words but things are synonymous, and linguistic usage reflects them. He then proceeds to an analysis of all the books except *a*, *Δ*, and *K*, in varying degrees of detail, with what amounts to a partial commentary which supplements Ross at various points. But the whole direction is towards the elucidation of form and of οὐσία, and towards the discovery of some unity in Aristotle's views of them. Only partial success is possible, but he does make it clearer how the

various doctrines could appear to Aristotle somehow to hang together. Essence and existence were not set apart as in modern philosophy, and Dr. Owens argues that in *An. Po.* ii the difference between $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$ and $\tau\acute{\iota}\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$ is simply that the latter makes more specific 'a quasi-generic knowledge of the thing sufficient to establish it as a Being' (p. 172). To this he adds the cursoriness with which contingent existence is treated in *E.* 2-4 (p. 184), and his argument culminates in Aristotle's $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$: 'There is . . . no problem of reconciling the *this* and the *what*. The two notions are originally one, the $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$, namely the form which is prior to both singular and universal' (pp. 402-3). Finally 'the sensible form is of itself individual. . . . While actually individual it is potentially universal, and so is the principle of universal cognition' (p. 276). But Dr. Owens recognizes that the treatment is both desultory and perplexing.

Dr. Owens's book thus contains much that is suggestive and valuable, however many problems it necessarily still leaves over; but it treats Books and topics with uneven degrees of fullness, and it is anything but easy to keep the argument before one's mind. Among the best things, in fact, are such notes as those on Scholastic *intentio* and on Aristotelian philosophy *vis-à-vis* modern (pp. 337-9), on Aristotle's ethics and Kant's (p. 349, cf. p. 85), on $\tau\acute{o}\ \tau\acute{\iota}\ \eta\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ (pp. 353-7), $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$ (pp. 398-401), the unmoved movers (pp. 411-13), and causation (pp. 420-3). The book contains a wealth of useful references; but nevertheless all this has its other side. In some ways it almost parodies the conventional picture of the thesis: an abundance of material not always reduced properly to form, and the piling up of references and quotations for their own sake. We read, for example, that Thomas Taylor remarked on the difficulty of the *Metaphysics*; he was both a bad scholar and a crank, so why record the fact? The bibliography of 500 items contains much of value: it also includes Goodwin's *Greek Grammar* and the *O.E.D.*, and it even gives, where the author has been able to find them, the full Christian names of the scholars mentioned.

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ANCIENT THOUGHT IN TRANSLATION

RODOLFO MONDOLFO: *Il Pensiero Antico. Storia della filosofia Greco-Romana esposta con testi scelte dalle fonti*. Pp. vi+644. Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1950. Paper, L. 3000.

FIRST published in 1927, this book has since passed through two Spanish editions at Buenos Aires, and on these this, the second Italian, edition has been based. Mondolfo's plan resembles the well-tried method of Ritter and Preller; he sets out the history of Greek and Greco-Roman philosophy, from the beginnings down to Proclus, in a series of extracts from original sources and the writings of the philosophers. But there are differences. The extracts are in Italian; notes and introductions are much more extensive; and there is a 60-page synthesis at the end. It is thus intended not merely to illustrate and assist, but to provide an exposition of ancient thought which shall be 'complete in itself'. The selection of passages has been admirably done. The translations are clear, containing all those small additions which are required for explicitness. The themes and theses into which each philosophy is analysed follow one another in as 'logical and organic' an order as could well be expected. A

comprehensive bibliography points the way to more specialized study; and there is a useful index.

The notes are very helpful, and often bring out interesting points of detail which are neglected (but ought not to be) in less general treatises, e.g. the difference between 'having a harmony' and 'being a harmony' in the treatment of the Pythagoreans, or the question how a 'form of evil' can receive its reality from Plato's form of good. I believe that Mondolfo might with advantage have increased his own contributions of this kind to replace, for example, some at least of the extracts from the doxographers, which are not always to be taken literally. A critical section on the nature of these sources is in any case a desideratum. In the case of those authors who do not need to be studied in fragments it is perhaps questionable whether the method of fragmentation provides the right approach for the student. But at least every effort has been made to keep the presentation as complete and as balanced as possible; though I have noticed a slight tendency to telescope two passages which are not really on the same subject, as the intervening matter would show if it had been supplied. Sticklers for chronology might object to his order of passages from Plato. They might not care to see extracts from *Crito* and *Laws* set down under the same heading. On the other hand, these documents have some remarkable resemblances; and it is right that these should not be ignored. Some minor figures, like Archelaus, have been omitted. But by way of compensation there are items which do not appear in Ritter and Preller: e.g. the section on the Sophists contains extracts for Prodicus, Antiphon, Critias, Thrasyarchus, and Callicles. These help to make the picture fuller. Similarly there are extracts to cover the earlier stages of Aristotle's development.

Mondolfo does more justice than has for some time been fashionable among British scholars to the conceptual content of Oriental and Greek myth, and to the 'scientific' spirit of much of the mathematics and astrology of Egyptians and Babylonians. He does not neglect the cosmic speculations and ethical doctrines of early Greek poetry or the 'mythical vesture' of much early Greek philosophy. He perhaps insists too much on the 'anthropomorphic' character of Ionian 'physics'; this is a strange feature in one who follows Burnet in finding these thinkers influenced by meteorology rather than biology. Not everyone will agree that Heraclitus taught the doctrine of cyclic universal conflagration or that he learned it from Chaldaic-Babylonian astrology; or that the 'forms' begin to move and live in Plato's *Sophist*; or that there is an 'evil cosmic soul' in *Laws* x. These are the only exceptions which I have observed throughout the book to the practice of providing sufficient warning when the preferred interpretations have been called into serious question.

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STUDIES IN PROPERTIUS

ANTONIO LA PENNA: *Properzio*. Saggio critico seguito da due ricerche filologiche. (Studi di Lettere Storia e Filosofia pubblicati dalla Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, xxiii.) Pp. ii+200. Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1951. Paper.

THE notes of this book display a wide knowledge of Propertian literature, particularly German and Italian, but the text avoids re-treading the familiar ways;

it is the work of an original and independent scholar who is not content to repeat the stock judgements, although he finds himself in general agreement with those critics who insist on the literary and conventional elements in Propertius' poetry. The first chapter maintains that there are many passages that Propertius intended to be thought 'clever' and 'amusing': in such poems as i. 4, ii. 5, 14, 28 he plays round a sentiment that is in itself genuine enough; the motive of ii. 26 is not one of pathos (for we know that the shipwreck is but a dream), but to entertain by clever fancies; similarly Gallus would smile to find his amour compared (i. 13) with those of the 'Taenarian god' and Hercules. (Elsewhere La Penna plausibly maintains that the mythological element in Propertius is usually no mere ornament, but integrated into the poem.) With this light tone the half-epigrammatic *sententia*, of which Propertius is so fond, is perfectly in keeping. The note of sentiment and self-pity, a more familiar element, is considered by La Penna to be in large measure conventional, rather than the compulsive expression of the poet's own emotions. Profound feeling is not to be looked for any more in the moralizing that becomes prominent in the third book. The abrupt transitions, however, that characterize much of Propertius' work, particularly in the second book, reproduce the confused emotions that were part of his experience; yet, having begun with their roots in reality, they end by being nothing more than a literary device. La Penna has a fairly short chapter entitled 'The more genuine elements': the most important, to his mind, are a 'mythical idealization' of Cynthia, who reminds him of Laura and of Beatrice, and a 'cosmic note' that 'turns man's joys and sorrows into the joys and sorrows of the universe'. Whether this carries conviction or not, it is the fruit of a serious attempt to distinguish, so far as is possible, Propertius' poetic individuality from his literary originality. The same attempt characterizes two chapters, marked by many interesting observations, on the development of Propertius' poetry and on the poems of the fourth book, among which he admires 8 (*Disce quid Esquilias . . .*) for its objectivity, the mark of artistic maturity, more than 11, whose heroine Cornelia he finds somewhat cold and incompletely realized. In another chapter he suggests that Propertius, having a vague consciousness of what is the fundamental weakness of Roman elegists, the narrowness of their experience, attempted to widen the range of his poetry, but to little effect, because this was putting the cart before the horse.

The second part of the book contains two chapters entitled *Ricerche filologiche*. In the first La Penna examines in some detail i. 20 (with a long excursus on its source for the myth, which he finds in Callimachus), i. 16, and iii. 15, believing them all to be early work, although the last has been revised. i. 20 and 16 are both marked by deliberately strained language; i. 20 and iii. 15 put inside a personal frame a mythological story told in the manner of Alexandrian elegy, just as i. 16 frames a παρακλαυσίθυρον. He then discusses the origins of Latin elegy, insisting that we can grant the Romans originality of content without supposing that they felt themselves to be creating a new literary form. Hermesianax and Antimachus made their own experiences the occasion for mythological elegy; this type of poetry is reflected in i. 20 and iii. 15. Theognis, and presumably Mimnermus, had mixed with gnomic poetry the expression of personal emotions. The Roman poets therefore develop a subjective element that already existed in Greek elegy. For Propertius the most important influence in this development was that of the epigram (and *παίγνιον*),

which had been regarded by the Alexandrians as a form distinct from the elegy. La Penna's second chapter shows how motives from elegy and epigram are combined in Propertius' poetry; and although, as is rightly said, it would be absurd to derive all his pathos from one source and all his wit and cleverness from the other, yet these two principal elements in his work correspond to his two literary models. The argument might have been strengthened if La Penna were less unwilling to admit that the second book contains a number of poems that are nothing but epigrams. He will not follow the editors who dissect the long 'poems' into which they have been agglutinated in transmission. He maintains, for example, the unity of ii. 15, but his exposition of the alleged train of thought gains any plausibility it may have by neglecting vv. 7-10.

Another way in which La Penna errs, as it seem to me, is that he is too ready to find in Propertius a deliberate use of strained language, and a deliberate search for variety of expression. Thus he sees intention in i. 1. 11 ff. (*modo . . . et*), and does not even allude to the weighty reasons for believing that a couplet, containing a second *modo*, has fallen out. In the whole of his approach to this subject he underestimates two factors: one is the pressure of metrical necessity or convenience, the other is that subconscious activity, to which so many poets have testified, that presents the writer with ready-made lines, often endowed with a peculiar magic through their collocation of words and of sounds. To me it seems probable that Propertius' subconscious mind presented him with much that was strained in language and that he did not care to 'lick into shape', being enamoured of its other merits. There is an analogy in metre. After he had adopted the rule of disyllabic pentameter endings, he occasionally begat a line with a polysyllabic ending that he would not give up, either because he liked it too much or because he was too lazy to change it; and if he wrote *uinceris aut uincis*, *haec in amore rota est*, it was not because he thought that this metrical anomaly ought to appear at least once in his collected works, but because he preferred to put up with the anomaly rather than sacrifice what was otherwise perfect.

Speaking of anomalies, I do not like 'Riccardo Reitzenstein' (p. 28, but 'Erich Reitzenstein' on p. 61) and 'Pietro Giovanni Enk' (p. 111), nor 'Cantabrygae' (p. 30), nor *nuga* (p. 165) as a Latin word. These trivialities may argue an insensitivity to words as such, and that is perhaps the main deficiency in what is otherwise a stimulating study.

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NEW EDITIONS OF TACITUS

(1) P. Cornelius Tacitus; *Annalium ab Excessu Divi Augusti Quae Supersunt*. Edidit HARALD FUCHS. Volumen I (i-vi), pp. vii+252+6; Volumen II (xi-xvi), pp. vii+249+6. Frauenfeld: Huber, 1946, 1949. Cloth and boards, 5, 6 Sw. fr.

COMMENT upon this Swiss edition of Tacitus' *Annals* may first be directed to its format. At the head of each page the year of the Christian era is given, and the annalistic structure of the work is emphasized by leaving a space at the end of each year's narrative. The type is distinctive, clear, and carefully set up; the only errors I have noted in the text of vol. ii are: p. 2 l. 11 *sunt* omitted; p. 15

l. 15 *trado* (for *tradam*); p. 37 l. 20 *pueri* (for *puerili*). Most valuable of all is the extensive index (vol. i 47 pp., vol. ii 68 pp.) and the twelve pages of genealogical tables. The apparatus criticus is placed after the text, but as some compensation for this awkward arrangement various typographical devices are used in the text to indicate where the manuscript reading is altered. Whether such a procedure is an acceptable one depends largely upon the degree of corruption in the manuscript. If this is large, it will give rise to such a mass of typographical symbols that the uniformity of the page of type is destroyed. The danger is greater in *Annals* xi–xvi; e.g. contrast iii. 74 with xv. 74: in the latter case it may well be felt that the tolerable limit has been exceeded. The apparatus is printed in small type and is highly compressed; at times one would like more information about the source of emendations, though it is only fair to say that Fuchs disclaims any intention of giving a complete apparatus. He pays close attention to punctuation: xiii. 15. 2 *unde orta miseratio, manifestior quia* may be right, as xiv. 61. 4 *consuleret securitati iusta ultione. et . . .* (rather than Andersen's *securitati. iusta* etc.) almost certainly is: xiv. 16. 2 *tempus impertiebat, post epulas utque . . .* is arguable. At times there is an excessive use of commas; e.g. xiii. 31 fin. (*et edixit Caesar . . . propugnant*). Fuchs has six commas where C. D. Fisher uses only two, and in general there is much to be said for the English practice of omitting them in defining relative clauses.

The first volume, containing *Annals* i–vi, was published in 1946 and has received a full investigation from Professor R. Syme (*J.R.S.* xxxviii (1948), pp. 122–31). The examples that follow are accordingly chosen from vol. ii only; they represent only a small selection of the alterations that are made in that volume. The most striking feature of Fuchs's text is the frequency with which he makes or accepts deletions and insertions of words or word groups, and alterations and transpositions of letters (often with additions or deletions) in individual words.

Among his deletions are xii. 41. 1 *Orfito* (after Ritter, but cf. Syme, *op. cit.*, p. 126); xii. 69. 3 *iniuria et* (dittography and corruption: but though *iniuria* may look like *invidia*, it makes a very different, and a very Tacitean point of its own); xiii. 57. 3 *magis* (after Acidalius; doubtful in view of Eriksson, *Studien zu den Annalen*, 1934, p. 93; xiv. 8. 1 [*ut*] *ad gratandum* (Urlichs; but *ut* notes their show of joy—another Tacitean point); xiv. 14. 3 *nam . . . delinquerent* ('sententia, in qua delinquendi uocabulum, cum de ignominia agatur, non quadrat, male conficta est sec. sequentis sententiae exitum, cuius uim praeripit' Fuchs).

Among the passages where Fuchs adds one or more words are: xi. 4. 1 *<duos> equites*; 6. 3 *tenerentur <rei>*; 18. 2 *reduxit, <praedicto>*; 30. 1 *id <ei> paelici nomen*; 30. 2 *<a Silio> reposceret*; xv. 34. 1 *<profectus est>, <petiturusque>*; 45. 1 *uocantur <direpti>*; 63. 1 *aduersus praesentem <mortem> fortitudine[m] mollitus*; xvi. 8. 1 *isdem quibus . . . Torquatam <criminibus>*. All these are unnecessary, most of them improbable. In xiii. 56. 3 (*defend<ere abnu>entibus*) and xiv. 61. 1 (*repetit<as rit>u uenerantium*) the same mechanics of emendation are used less unreasonably—since some emendation is obligatory—but the results are not very convincing.

In many further passages Fuchs accepts or adapts previous emendations where a conservative editor will probably not depart from the manuscript reading, e.g. xi. 15. 3 *quae <agenda essent ad> retinenda<m> firmanda<m>que haruspicum <disciplinam>*; xiv. 6. 1 *remedium esse <sensit>, si*; 32. 1 *adesse <Romanis> exitium*. In xv. 36. 3 the insertion of *<apud se>* may be right, but both emphasis and palaeography make Halm's *ita <apud se>* better than Fuchs's *Romanum <apud se>*.

In a different category are those cases where all editors admit that the manuscript is corrupt. Here Fuchs's suggestions include xi. 35. 3 (*nam his quoque*) *cupido maturaec necis fuit*; xiv. 16. 1 *insignis notitia erat. hi considerare*; 54. 4 *tot per annos (exer)citum (summi) fastigii regimen*.

Alterations in single words suggested by Fuchs include xii. 3. 1 *etenim* (ms. *ad eum*) . . . *tum* (ms. *iam*), *ubi sui matrimonii certa fuit*; 19. 2 *p(rae)cipuum* . . . *amicitiam*; xiv. 45. 1 *min(it)ante*; xv. 14. 1 *iam locum tempusque*; 35. 2 *quin in officiis*; 63. 3 *quae in vulgus edita (m)eis uerbis inuertere supersedeo*. Most interesting, perhaps, is the simple change suggested at xiv. 32. 1 *submersae* (ms. *subuersae*) *coloniae*, supported by Dio Cassius lxiii. 1. 2 οἰκίαι τέ τινες ἐν τῷ Ταμείῳ ποταμῷ ὑψυδροὶ ἐωρωντο, but even here one may suspect that Tacitus chose the more unusual *subuersae*.

It is not possible within the limits of this review to illustrate further the alterations that Fuchs makes by transpositions, the marking of new lacunae, and the acceptance of other scholars' emendations of single words. Many of the latter are individually possible, sometimes even attractive, but cumulatively their acceptance raises grave difficulties; if there really is corruption in most of the cases where Fuchs suspects it, far-reaching conclusions would follow for our assessment of the reliability of the Medicean codices, and the whole trend of Tacitean scholarship during the twentieth century would be reversed. In fact, few scholars will believe that our manuscripts of the *Annals* require such widespread alteration. It is salutary, by way of contrast, to note that in the few cases where Fuchs, as against Fisher's Oxford text, has reverted to the manuscript reading, he has scored probably more hits than on the occasions, possibly twenty times more numerous, where he has accepted or made emendations. So he is almost certainly right in xi. 25. 5 *adactus* (Fisher *adactus est*; cf. Eriksson, p. 125); xii. 26. 2 *in ludibria* (Fisher *in ludibrium*; cf. Sörbom, *Variatio sermonis Tacitei*, 1935, p. 177); xiii. 54. 4 *quasi impetus antiqui et bona aemulatione* (Fisher *aemulatio*; cf. Sörbom p. 77).

(2) Cornelii Taciti *De Vita Iulii Agricolae Liber, Dialogus de Oratoribus*. Recensuit M. LENCHANTIN DE GUBERNATIS. (Corpus Scr. Latinorum Paravianum.) Pp. xxxi+48, xxvii+64. Turin: Paravia, 1949. Paper, L. 360, 420.

SPECIAL interest attaches to Lenchantin's *Agricola*, for it is the first critical text (the preface is dated 1945) to be produced since the publication (R. Till, *Handschriftliche Untersuchungen zu Tacitus' Agricola und Germania*, 1943) of a complete photographic reproduction of the codex Aesinas, which contains the extant portions (*Agricola* cc. 13-41) of the codex Hersfeldensis (Hf), the Carolingian archetype of Tacitus' minor works.

Lenchantin's text reflects the careful conservatism that has characterized the last half-century of Tacitean textual scholarship. This can be illustrated by a comparison with J. G. C. Anderson's text (Oxford, 1922). In about 50 places Lenchantin reverts to the reading of Hf; in about 20 of these cases Koestermann (Teubner, 1949) also rejects Anderson's text and prefers the manuscript reading. These instances include 6. 20 *fecit* (Hf, Koestermann, Lenchantin): *effecit* (Anderson); 11. 11 *superstitionum persuasione: ac superstitionum persuasiones* (Anderson); 18. 17 *insulam cuius: insulam a cuius*; 31. 20 *laturi: bellaturi*; 33. 7 *nostra: uestra*; 42. 21-22 *usum: usum nisi*; 43. 6 *adfirmare: ut adfirmare*; 44. 17 *graua:*

grande; 45. 7 *uisus*: *uisus foedauit*; 45. 25 *compositus*: *comploratus*; 46. 19 *obruet*: *-it*. In each case Anderson's text gives a more easily intelligible or a more regular reading. In view of Tacitus' love for asperity, asymmetry, and the unusual, an editor should start with a prejudice in favour of the manuscript reading. *Fecit* (6. 20: simple for compound verb), *graue* (44. 17), and *compositus* (45. 25: Tacitus avoids the more usual phrase)—these are cases where Hf is probably right and Anderson wrong. In most of the other examples the manuscript reading can be retained with varying degrees of conviction. In 31. 20 and 45. 7, though emendation can be only tentative, the ellipse which the manuscript reading involves seems to exceed the limits even of Tacitean possibility. In 33. 7 I cannot believe that *nostra* gives any adequate sense.

Of the 30 or so instances where Lenchantin, but not Koestermann, reverts to the manuscript reading only a small sample can be quoted. At 21. 5 *honor et aemulatio* (though *honoris aemulatio* is by Hf²), 22. 15 *narrabatur*: *ut erat*, and 25. 9 *siluarum montium* (conjunction omitted *uariationis causa*) are clearly tenable, and at 34. 11 *extremo metu corpora* ('h.e. *Britanni qui tamquam corpora animo amisso iudicantur*') is conceivable, but there remain a large number where the manuscript reading (or at least Lenchantin's explanation of it) does not convince: 5. 10 *intersaepti*; 14. 6 *ut uetere . . . haberet* ('subiecto ἀπὸ κοινοῦ e praecedenti pop. Rom. subaudito'); 19. 4 *primam* (cf. Anderson ad loc.); 28. 6 *uno remigante* ('sc. uno e gubernatoribus remum a tergo nauigii positum regente qui gubernaculi uice apud antiquos fungebatur'); 32. 7 *sanguinem commendent* ('h.e. tradant'); 32. 8 *metus ac terror est* ('sc. quo coercentur'); 33. 6 *octauus* ('Agricola aestate a. 77 Britanniam ingressus (*R.E.* x, 129) a. 83 septimum annum legationis impleuerat, octauum incipiebat'!); 43. 13 *animo uultuque*; 45. 20 *excepissem* (in spite of Tacitus' love of *uariatio*, the singular is scarcely possible in the middle of a highly rhetorical passage—*sed mihi filiaeque eius . . . noster . . . nostrum . . . nobis . . .*).

Lenchantin accepts emendation only in passages demonstrably corrupt. His own suggestions, mostly on lines already tried, have not anywhere that felicity which wins conviction. In 46. 6 where Lenchantin breaks new ground with *<his> temporibus et* ('sc. *temporibus libertatis a Traiano instauratae*') the restriction of time implied by *his temporibus* is quite inappropriate to the general tone of the passage where the contrast is between the transient (*imbecilla ac mortalia*) and the immortal (*aeternitate temporum*).

Though the paper is not of a high quality and the type occasionally indistinct, the format is pleasing and the text is set up with great accuracy. As Till's war-time volume is unlikely to be obtainable again, it is most useful to have the full and careful account of the readings of Hf which Lenchantin gives. The following corrections are to be made in the apparatus criticus: p. 10 l. 4 *unde et . . .*; c. 23. 6 *proprior* H [tb: *propior* a]; c. 28. 8 add *secum* H; 29. 14 *uirens* H²mg. [tmg. amg.]; 34. 11 *deprehensi s* H (not *deprensi s*).

Lenchantin's text of the *Dialogus* is constituted with the same cautious respect for manuscript tradition. He rarely rejects manuscript authority where any modern editor accepts it, and occasionally he supports it alone. He refuses to delete 5. 11 [*et*] *ego enim*, 16. 33 *uester*, 20. 8 *dicentem*, 23. 11 *oderunt*. He refuses to add letters, syllables, or words: 5. 17 (various supplements); 10. 21 *<te> ferat*; 10. 21 *adeptu(ru)s*; 13. 14 *<non> praestant*; 14. 24 *<improbare>* (uel sim.); 15. 16 *<ab> A*; 21. 14 *quo<minus>*; 25. 21 *<prae <se>> ferunt*; 25. 34 *<Aper>*; 26. 1 *op<t>imo*; 31. 8 *<de utilitate, in laudationibus>*; 32. 31 *<a> uobis*; 37. 29 *fu<er>it*; 39. 1 *uide<bi>tur*.

He refuses the easy correction: 5. 23 *ferat* (-as); 12. 21 *concedis* (-es); 21. 10 *hominum* (*omnium*); 34. 21 *sudibus* (*rud-*).

In some of these cases Lenchantin is almost certainly right (e.g. 5. 23; 16. 33; 25. 21); in few of them could one suggest with certainty that he is wrong (5. 11; 26. 1?). More difficult cases where Lenchantin retains the manuscript reading are: 8. 4 *minus* ('aduerbium praedicatium *minus* pro adiectiuo *minores* tutatus est Lenchantin'); 11. 9 *in Neronem improbam . . . potentiam*; 26. 18 *plus uis* (but the objection is not only to the form of the genitive singular but to the sense); 33. 20 *uis eloquentiae* (*uis* seems doubtful, but the emendation *usus* is by no means certain, either).

In places where the manuscripts are universally agreed to be corrupt, Lenchantin accepts or makes emendations: 7. 10-11 *tum adire quod, si non in auio oritur* ('h.e. in secessu ut decet poetas'); 25. 9 *cominus repugno, si fatetur* (transposition of *cominus*); 35. 2 *in sinus scholasticorum* (but cf. 35. 6 *ut dicere institueram, deducuntur in scholas*); 40. 11 *sine obsequio, sine seruitute iuris* ('coll. Quint. II, 16, 9 *ut se ipsi homines ad seruitutem iuris adstringerent*').

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WORDS AND BELIEFS

RICHARD BROXTON ONIANS: *The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate*. New Interpretations of Greek, Roman and Kindred Evidence, also of some basic Jewish and Christian Beliefs. Pp. xvii+547; 2 figs. Cambridge: University Press, 1951. Cloth, 45s. net.

By these 'origins' Onians appears to mean an early stage in the development of thought from which all subsequent philosophies and theologies derive their 'genesis'. In this 'primitive culture' he finds 'a remarkable *system* of beliefs, *coherent* in itself', 'largely shared by other peoples', as well as by the Greeks and Romans with whom he is chiefly concerned. The words which I have italicized distinguish Onians from most other investigators of this field; indeed, that archaic man should be coherent and systematic in his concrete and pictorial ways of thinking is the last thing that one should expect. The exaggeration is perhaps due to the single-minded enthusiasm which Onians has brought to the task of reconstructing ancient beliefs from the words, gestures, stuffs (food, drink, etc.), and customs by means of which they found expression; for he is strongly convinced that, since these things clearly supply important material elements to subsequent stages of thought, his analysis of them will shed a salutary light on later and apparently more intellectual and spiritual ways of thinking. Thus he promises to 'explain', for example, the basic doctrines of Christianity on the hypothesis, itself surely a trifle archaic by now, that every new belief is completely conditioned by the context in which it arose, and in particular that the study of etymologies will recall such teachings from even their highest flights to a comfortably pedestrian and readily intelligible form.

With those lofty claims the present review is not concerned, beyond recording the fact that the results for the history of Greek philosophy are meagre, and perhaps illustrate the limitations of the standpoint above described. For example, that Thales chose water as his primal stuff is by no means the important

item in his achievement; otherwise Aristotle and, still more, the historians of philosophy have been sadly mistaken in him. But it is at least of antiquarian interest to find that he chose something which in earlier thought was associated with the processes of life, and which could be regarded as somehow indwelt by life-principles or *ψυχαί*. Onians is no doubt right in rejecting Burnet's view that Thales' choice of water was due to observations of the weather. Some other suggestions—they are few and largely tentative—for the history of philosophy will be mentioned in what follows.

The first part deals with 'mind and body'. The Homeric expressions for the living body are not discussed; for these see B. Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, pp. 19 ff. It is argued that the seat of consciousness for Homeric man was the heart and lungs, and that *φρένες*, as Justesen suggested in 1928, means 'lungs' down to the time of Aeschylus. They are 'blackish' and they 'hold the heart' (though also the liver). They are *πικιναί*, but this refers to their 'intricate tracery' (not to impenetrability). The heart also is 'bushy' (*λάσιον*) because of the veins and arteries; there was therefore nothing distinctive, it would seem, about the 'bushy heart' of Patroclus. When 'dry' (if that is the meaning of *πενκάλιμαι*) the lungs are wide-awake and efficient; intoxication and sleep which, with pain and grief, is conceived as liquid, remove consciousness and intelligence. Hence Heraclitus on the 'dry soul' (but that is *ψυχή*), and Diogenes of Apollonia on dry air in the chest as necessary for efficient understanding. For the Romans also the chest and the lungs (the suggested sense of *praecordia*) were the abode of consciousness. Wine, and water, went to the lungs, not to the head; 'watered', *lymphatus*, means 'frantic'. I find it disconcerting that wisdom also is moisture, the wise man is 'juicy' (*sapiens*), and the dry is ignorant (instead of 'wide-awake'); and that such locutions as '*fons*' and '*vena ingenii*' are among the proofs of the wetness of wisdom. May one suggest also that there is here some confusion between consciousness and intelligence? Glaucus, for example, did not lose consciousness when Zeus removed his *φρένες*. The soul of Teiresias has intelligence because it has *φρένες*; Onians deduces that his body cannot have been burned. But the soul of Patroclus before his burning had no 'lungs'; and yet it was conscious. There are other puzzles.

The *φρένες* contain *θυμός* (which is found also in the limbs, liver, and veins). *θυμός* is wet enough; it comes from the blood and the air we breathe. There seems some wavering on the question what it is: it is breath (the examples, I should say, seem to prove the contrary), breath-soul, blood-vapour, the stuff of consciousness or (more boldly) consciousness, intelligence. Thoughts, emotions, words are living creatures moving or troubling the *θυμός*; and unspoken words are unwinged, and hence 'perhaps' the aviary in Plato's *Theaetetus*. It is also troubled by, for example, bile (*χόλος* is 'bile'), and the 'saffron drop' in *Agam.* 1121–2 is bile (cf. Fraenkel ad loc.). Here some poetic expressions are taken very literally: 'so shall my lungs coin words' (Shakespeare); and Love is 'perched upon the liver' in Moschus. Popular expressions like 'to get it off one's chest' also bear their testimony. As *θυμός* is vapour it is subject to inspiration, the breathing-in of various powers, which can also be obtained by drinking blood, water, or wine. Persius' 'gathering clouds on Helicon' is apparently referred to the inhalation of vapour for inspiration (and not to the inflations of the grand style). *Animus* is the Latin equivalent of *θυμός*, and the 'goat-skin bellows' of Horace, *Sat.* i. 4. 19 surprisingly attest 'the breath that was consciousness in the chest', and the vehicle of inspiration. The instrument of perception

is *θυμός*; one hears with it, one (for detailed anatomical reasons) feels and sees with it. Hence Pythagorean theories of vision, the *ἀπορροαί* of Empedocles, and the Stoic account of the senses (*πνεύματα*). The view of Rohde (and, one may add, of B. Snell) that *θυμός* is not a thing but a function is emphatically rejected.

The word *νόος* receives only brief notice and, I suggest, for a significant reason. It does not lend itself to this treatment. It is not material, not a bodily organ, not pierced by weapons, not identical with *θυμός*.

The second part deals chiefly with *ψυχή*, which unlike *θυμός* survives death and seems to have no part in ordinary conscious life until the fifth century. It too is 'gaseous', the 'life-soul', or 'stuff of life', source of bodily movement, strength, and procreative power. It is identical or connected with the breath, the head, the brain (cf. Alcmaeon), the marrow, seed, knees, thigh-bones, synovial fluid, tears, sweat, nails, hair, horns, and hooves. Plato's *Timaeus* on soul and marrow represents 'original popular belief' as transmitted by the Pythagoreans. The Roman counterpart of *ψυχή* is the *genius*, which is the *anima* and (against Wissowa) survives death. It too is in the head and active in procreation; *cerebrum* is connected with *creo* etc. (which 'helps to explain Ennius' *cere comminuit brum*) and with *cornu* (hence 'the horn of plenty') and *cera* (wax), all generative substances. It has prophetic powers, and its motions, such as nodding (*numen*), sneezing (an involuntary nod), blushing, and spinal shudders, portend something, perhaps a need for placation. Hence rubbings of the forehead. Or in distress it may need awakening. Hence smittings of the thighs. Various ceremonies—marriage, emancipation—involved the head. The knees were holy for the same reason; they are called 'generative members' by Euripides (*γόνυμα μέλεα*, actually 'limbs that gave us birth'). Kneeling is 'primarily an affair of the knees'. One grasps the knees in supplication, and also the chin and beard; they all—and the jaw too—show the same root, *gigno*, *genius*, *gena*, *γόνυ*, *γενύς*, *γένειον*, etc. The 'loosening' of the knees is not a feeling of weariness but a loss of vital fluid, which could be restored by baths (ceremonial and other), anointings, fomentations. For oil is the liquid of life. So is water. And life is also wine—did not Trimalchio say so? The word *αἰών* also means procreative fluid; hence it is applied to tears shed for a lost conjugal partner but to no other kind of tears. It also means 'time' because this fluid diminishes with advancing years. Hence, apparently (unless this illustration is completely irrelevant), the water which measured time in the *κλειψύδρα*.

To let the *ψυχή* depart completely the corpse needs to be dried. Hence customs of incomplete cremation; *ταρχύειν* referred to this drying of corpses—it is akin to *τέρσομαι*, *torreo*, and *Tartarus* and 'explains' the 'unhappy dryness' of Hell-fire. The bones survive this cremation; they are plural, and so the plural *manes* is explained—though in Virgil, *Aen.* v. 743 it means not bones but 'underworld agencies'. Emotions like love blaze in the bones during life; after death they are wrapped in fat that they may live again. Bones and fat (as offered to the gods) were 'the very stuff of life'. *Unctus* as opposed to *siccus* in Horace means 'having plenty of life-fluid'. Electra's body was *ξηρόν*, 'thin'—so we must be wrong who think Euripides meant that she deliberately refrained from the use of cleansing materials.

The third part, on fate and time, has little definite on the thoughts behind the words discussed. For example, Onians begins by finding pure 'fatalism' in Homer, but later says that 'freedom' is 'not excluded'. Neither is moral responsibility; but on these matters one should consult W. C. Greene, *Moirai*,

especially ch. ii, for a more extensive, and more sober, display of the evidence. Onians is concerned mostly with 'a single image' which 'explains' for him a multitude of expressions. The image is of all kinds of 'binding'; *πείραρ* is a bond or band or boundary, giving rise to the *πέραλιντα* of Philolaus fr. 1 and the *πέρας* of the Pythagoreans and Plato, and so a snare or clothing, from rings and chains to magic caps and clouds. The various kinds of fates (including some good ones) are bonds put about a man by the gods who spin them. Hence the expression 'on the knees of the gods', for, it is conjectured, the gods sat down to spin. Even *μοῖρα* is a bond; it is the *pensum*, the weight of wool allotted for spinning. Hence the weighing of fates by Zeus; they are *βαρεῖαι* and therefore have weight (but why should the lighter fate be the better one?). Zeus, like a housewife, weighs the wool, spins it, attaches the resulting cord or bond to the individual (or city or army), and then re-weighs it for a check. The word *τέλος* (akin to *τελαμών*) also means a (circular) band or wrapping. Hence Ixion's wheel, engagement rings, kingly and priestly crowns, and mayoral chains of office. All such things are for Onians either 'vehicles of magic power', or else, in their degenerate days, 'mere badges'. It is characteristic that these two possibilities exhaust his universe of discourse.

The above selection of items, ranging from the helpful to the purely fanciful and arbitrary, gives, I believe, no misleading impression of the contents of the book, though I have omitted most of the 'parallels', in which Onians is very prolific, and passed lightly over the more enterprising of his philological speculations. It need hardly be said that Onians has failed to achieve his impossible aim of making a 'coherent system' of those 'gaseous' materials which are present or absent, which mingle or do not mingle, for reasons which he does not attempt to conjecture. Nor has he achieved his further aim of synthesizing that archaic 'system' with the great philosophies and religions. There are many doors which cannot be unlocked by the combination of philological fancy and the sadly overworked hypothesis of sympathetic magic; there are many facts, customs, and convictions which will not yield their significance to the kind of speculation which surrounds, appropriately enough, the tail of the October horse.

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J. TATE

MYTHOLOGY CONDENSED

PIERRE GRIMAL: *Dictionnaire de la mythologie grecque et romaine*. Pp. xxxi + 577. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1951. Paper, 2,400 fr.

THIS promises to be an extremely handy and useful volume. Into comparatively little space is packed an amazing amount of information, generally very accurate, made more usable by sundry genealogical tables and two indexes, one of proper names, the other, yet more welcome, of mythological themes—a capital starting-point for future researches. Each article is accompanied by a list of the classical passages which tell of or mention the subject: of modern literature there is a small selection, not always judicious, e.g. under 'Acca Larentia' Mommsen's famous essay, *Die echte und die falsche Acca Larentia*, is not mentioned, and more than once the author reveals a certain credulity, as on pp. xvii and 277, where respectively a wild theory of Marie Delcourt and a rash

conjecture of Carcopino are spoken of as proved. Dumézil likewise is given more credit than he deserves. But the author insists, and rightly, that his main business is to give the facts, i.e. to report the stories as the ancients told them, and he is careful to distinguish earlier and later forms of the legends and to point out those which seem to be due to the fancy of some writer later than the great age of Greece. Every article has after its heading the Greek name, where such exists, of the subject; the printer has had a hand in this, making the Leukippides masculine and misplacing their accent (one of many accents wrongly placed or omitted) and transforming the Hesiodic *Φιλότης* into *Φιλω-τᾶς*. The introduction is prefaced by some remarks of Ch. Picard and includes a curiously narrow definition of the meaning of 'myth' (p. xiv), which is certainly not *convenu* among all mythologists.

Knowing from experience how impossible it is to keep such a work free from mistakes, I give a list of some which appear at a first reading, not in any carping spirit but as suggestions for future editions. There are some small slips, as p. xi (my *Handbook of Mythology* is published in London, not Oxford), 25 (Alkinoos' wife was not called *Ἀρετή*), 26 (*Ἀλκμέων* rather than *Ἀλκμαίων*); but the following are rather more serious. P. 39, art. 'Aphrodite', the implication that her name can have a Greek etymology is wrong. P. 65, the name *Bia* means rather Power than Violence, considering its date. P. 70, Hemberg, who is cited, shows that the Samothracian gods were not called Kabeiroi by their worshippers there. P. 128, Dis Pater was not early identified with Pluto, but is and always was simply the Latin translation of his name; similarly in the arts. 'Furies', 'Proserpina', which are respectively a bad translation and a mispronunciation of Erinyes and Persephone. P. 139, it is not Plutarch but the trifling author of the *Parallela Minora* who tells the tale of Entoria. P. 160, the assertion that Fors is the masculine principle of chance (despite Ennius' *era Fors*) should at least be given some sort of proof. P. 230, the whole art. 'Indigetes' must be rewritten, for it repeats Peter's exploded notion that they are the *Sondergötter*. P. 244, art. 'Juno', the statement that every woman had her *iuno*, corresponding to a man's *genius*, lacks pre-Augustan evidence. P. 245a, line 6, the *flaminica Dialis* was not priestess of Iuno. P. 277, the evidence for Mater Matuta being a dawn-goddess is negligible. Incidentally, here and elsewhere, including the article which deals with her, Carmentis is called Carmenta, which is not the true Latin form of her name. P. 301, art. 'Momos', I do not know how that deity becomes a goddess. P. 314, Nerio is Mars' cult-partner; he has no wife. P. 329, Ops is the associate of Consus, not of Saturn. P. 410, the only attested name for the evil power which causes rust in wheat is Robigus; *robigo* is the rust itself.

Some slight additions would improve several articles. For example, in treating of Anna Perenna, Athena, Hyakinthos, and Ianus, the author might have added a line or two stating the original nature of these deities, which is quite well known. P. 80, art. 'Carna', it should be mentioned that Ovid confuses her with Cardea. P. 89, two or three words would add the information that Charon in Etruria is called Charun. P. 96, the wife of Agamemnon is properly called *Κλυταιμῆστρα*. P. 101, the statement that there are two heroes called Kreon does not do justice to the prevalence of that stopgap name. P. 158, art. 'Faunus', the derivation from rt. of *faucere* is no longer that most in vogue (see Walde-Hoffmann s.v.), and his connexion with the Lupercalia is a vain imagining of sundry *grammatici* ancient and modern.

In conclusion, I repeat that the work is valuable. Such errors as those cited vitiate only small parts of the whole, and to point them out is to do what the modest author himself requests, p. xxviii.

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‘ADULT’ MYTHOLOGY

C. KERÉNYI: *The Gods of the Greeks*. Pp. xvi+304; 16 plates, 26 figs. London: Thames and Hudson, 1951. Cloth, 18s. net.

THIS is apparently the first volume of a series which is to comprise ‘the principal mythologies of the world’ (these seem to include the beliefs of Hayti) and to be ‘designed for the adult lay reader who desires to enjoy and understand the symbolic language of mythology’. The ‘blurb’ on the jacket from which the above words are taken further informs us that in the present volume ‘for the first time the findings of recent research, which have rendered archaic such earlier classics as ‘The Age of Fable’ by Thomas Bullfinch, have been co-ordinated and prepared for the adult reader’. Bullfinch’s little book was scientifically a degree or two above Hawthorne’s *Tanglewood Tales*; the words ‘for the first time’ blandly ignore such popular nursery collections as Preller–Robert, Roscher’s *Lexikon*, and the relevant parts of Pauly–Wissowa; and there are indications that an ‘adult’ is one who is prepared to swallow without criticism or modification the latest, or nearly latest, theories of the psychology of the day. It is a relief to turn from this nonsense to the author’s own work, which at least has behind it wide reading and knowledge of the relevant material, whatever one may think of his interpretations. The translation, it may be remarked, is for the most part workmanlike English, presumably faithful to the original, which the reviewer has had no opportunity to see, but marred here and there by a strange lack of knowledge of the most ordinary terms relating to sex; a favourite solecism is ‘beget by’. The printing has been well done, but at the top of p. 110 something has been left out and the sentence becomes unintelligible in consequence. The illustrations are clear and good.

The author has confined himself entirely to myths, explicitly omitting sagas or mentioning them only in passing, and saying nothing of *Märchen*. After a short introduction which gives very briefly Kerényi’s views on mythology and its relation to the psychology of the unconscious, he proceeds to tell the tales, and mostly to tell them well, in close paraphrase or occasionally actual translation of the originals, to which a long series of notes refer the reader, although I doubt if the layman who consults the book will often search such sources as the scholia on Homer and other poets and the writings of Clement of Alexandria and Hippolytos. The order is strange, for ninety pages pass before we are told of Zeus and in that time sundry quite obscure myths of goddesses have been related, an arrangement explained by certain theories of the author. Setting this aside, we have one glaring and all-pervading fault. With little warning (now and then the reader is told that this or that version of a story is ‘later’) Kerényi jumbles together well-known myths belonging to the normal stock of all poets and other tellers of their native traditions, late and suspect variants from obscure sources, local tales belonging perhaps to some minor temple mentioned in Pausanias, and, again and again, the wholly abnormal mytho-

logy which goes under the name of Orphism and cannot be traced back earlier than about the sixth century B.C. If this sort of thing is suitable for adults, I prefer the presumably childish methods of those writers who have striven to give us a picture of the historical development of the myths and how they were on occasion modified by grammarians, philosophers, theologians, and Alexandrian or post-Alexandrian poets. Here and there some most extraordinary conclusions are drawn from simple texts. Homer says (*Il.* xvi. 779) that the sun μετενίσσετο βουλυτόνδε, i.e. noon was past and the afternoon was drawing to the time when ploughmen unharness their oxen. This is actually used (p. 190) to indicate that the Sun-god's chariot was 'originally drawn by bulls'. On the next page the common modern phrase ὁ ἥλιος βασιλεύει is made out to be somehow connected with the belief that the sun at night went to visit his family ποτὶ βένθεα νυκτὸς ἐρεμνᾶς (Stesich. fr. 6 Diehl). It is indeed the product of popular imagination, as the old tale presumably was; the setting sun puts on his splendid royal robes. But connexion it has none, nor has any other modern Greek belief about the sun which I know. Astral interpretations obtrude themselves in a way almost reminiscent of Max Müller's days; Io, for instance (p. 112), becomes a 'wandering moon-cow', and apparently Kadmos' cow was of the same illustrious, if non-existent, breed. The Daktyls are something of an obsession; e.g. not only is Demeter's lover Iasion declared to have been one 'to judge by his name', but our old acquaintance the Daktyl Herakles is made out to be the original form of that hero (pp. 108, 111). Much is said also of the Kabeiroi, although Kerényi seems not to have read Bengt Hemberg's monograph *Die Kabiren*; it may of course have come out too late (1950) for him to use it. Much significance is attached, throughout the book, to groups of gods who make up a triad, or single figures which have (e.g. pp. 36-37) something like a triple function. These and many other oddities spring naturally from the author's own theories, which he can hardly be blamed for assuming in a semi-popular work; but they continually hamper any reader who wants to know what kind of stories were usually believed by classical Greeks (e.g. in the time of Perikles) about their gods. More objectivity, more sense of what was normal in classical thought, belief, and imagination, and less prepossession with recent ideas of what myths originally are, would have greatly improved the work.

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DE SANCTIS ON GREEK HISTORIANS

GAETANO DE SANCTIS: *Studi di Storia della Storiographia greca*. (Il Pensiero storico, Vol. 34). Pp. viii + 198. Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1951. Paper, L. 750.

THIS selection of five papers and an appendix by Professor De Sanctis (but the fourth comprises three, and why is the last an appendix?) has been made (by Professor Momigliano) in honour of his eightieth birthday and the fifty years of his university teaching. They deal with Hecataeus, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon. In the first the bold rationalism of Hecataeus is likened to that of Xenophanes and contrasted with the piety and timidity of Herodotus when facing the same problem: for example, De Sanctis is inclined to see Hecataeus as the author of the theories of Dionysus and Pan which Herodotus rejects

(ii. 146); but I find the resulting picture of the latter unconvincing, especially in the light of his one explicit reference to his predecessor. The next two essays are on the composition of Herodotus' history, particularly in relation to the *prooimion* and the *logos* of Croesus; this last is one of De Sanctis's best known and most valuable works of analysis; one can, however, regret that he did not carry his argument further and consider the view, best put by Macan, that the Persian War was the part of his work which Herodotus designed first. J. E. Powell's book was of course not published when this paper was written (1936).

The next three are *postille tucididee* (of 1930): (1) the Melian dialogue, (2) the treaties between Sparta and Persia—the three documents in Bk. VIII, and (3) the oligarchy of 411. De Sanctis recognizes that in the dialogue Thucydides is not the apologist of the doctrine of force; but apart from that, I find this essay the least convincing of all—it is 'self-evident' that the Athenians never expressed themselves in this manner, either at home or to others, and that this must be Thucydides' own analysis of the situation; it is almost certain that it was written after 404 (his answer to Momigliano on this, based on the 'prophecy *ex eventu*' of v. 91. 1, is by no means decisive); and De Sanctis can write of '*la gioia con cui aveva assistito* (Tucidide) *alla conclusione ideale del dialogo dei Meli, lo sfacelo dell' impero ateniese, la caduta nella polvere di quelli che avevano voluto farne fondamento il diritto della forza*'. In the second of these notes he argues that, clearly, the first and second of these treaties were not treaties at all, but only 'points of view', put forward the one by Tissaphernes, the other by Sparta, and only the third is the resulting treaty, with proper heading, a date, and so forth; and this is the only one that might have been formally published. This is well argued; but why, if it is all so obvious, did Thucydides not see it for himself? De Sanctis thinks that Alcibiades probably showed the historian these documents, or that they were found among his papers after his death. The last, on the revolution of 411, with its close examination of the evidence of Thucydides and Aristotle, is perhaps the most valuable of all these essays.

The paper on Xenophon deals with the genesis of the *Hellenica*. The author concludes that iii–v. 1. 35 (the campaigns of Agesilaus, to the peace of Antalcidas) was written first, c. 384–380; Books i–ii next, from perhaps 375 to 368; the rest was begun after 362, and Books vi–vii not till 358–355, and the later part of Book v was revised (as can be seen by mutual borrowing between *Hellenica* and *Agesilaus*: this revision makes the linguistic test which some scholars have used to fix the relative dates very fallible. In any case that test, however valuable to distinguish between books written c. 360 and others of 25 or 30 years earlier, cannot be used to decide between two books both written, *ex hypothesi*, after 360). This leads to the conclusion that Xenophon did not start his work as historian (distinct from his memoirs, *Anabasis* and *Cyropaedia*) with the idea of finishing Thucydides and under his influence: indeed 'he could hardly have seen the *History*, which was not published till after 399, before 386'. (What a lot we do know.) The last paper is on the battle of Notion: De Sanctis quotes the accounts of Meyer, Busolt, Beloch, and Ferrabino and, comparing them with the ancient evidence, Xenophon, Plutarch, and Diodorus, shows that they all ignore the last—he might well have added Ferguson's in *C.A.H.* v, the shortest of all, but still following Xenophon only. He thinks that Ephorus used here, as elsewhere, *Hellenica Oxyrrhynchia*, and that the

latter, with contemporary Athenian sources, was more reliable than Xenophon writing a generation later and with only Spartan reports at hand (and his own memory?).

There follows an impressive bibliography of all De Sanctis's writings (21 pp.). It is most valuable to have this, and these papers, so intelligently written, in so handy a form; and the book makes a worthy tribute to a great scholar.

A few misprints may be worth mentioning: p. 86, n., 'viii. 63' (for viii. 43. 3); p. 119 (a misplaced index number—'c fr. 69. 1' should be '69. 1' and be the reference to Thucydides, not to Beloch); p. 137, *φονή* (for *φωνή*); and p. 139, the quotation from *Hell.* v. 3. 16 is difficult to understand with a comma instead of a stop, or colon, after *ἐπολιόρκει αὐτοῦς*. It would have been proper to indicate, on p. 117, that it has been recently argued that *I.G.* i.² 105 belongs not to 411–410, but to 407–406 (Tod, No. 91; *S.E.G.* x. 138).

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AN OUTLINE OF ANCIENT HISTORY

CHARLES ALEXANDER ROBINSON: *Ancient History from Prehistoric Times to the death of Justinian*. Pp. xxiii+738; 83 maps and diagrams, 138 ill. New York: Macmillan Company, 1951. Cloth, 45s. net.

THIS is a sumptuous volume, well garnished with clear maps and excellent photographs, with extensive chronological and dynastic tables and a 'Select Bibliography' of some 500 items. The author deals briefly with constitutional and military affairs (though he lets himself go on some epic encounters of the Persian Wars and of Alexander's anabasis); he writes with evident interest on economics, on general culture, and especially on art, of which he has a keen and well-trained appreciation. His narrative is condensed and sometimes cramped, but in his descriptive summaries he allows himself sufficient elbow-room. Inaccuracies and overbold statements are not infrequent, but apart from a few startling paradoxes they are not seriously misleading; and the general impression is one of balanced thinking and correct emphasis.

The *Sturm und Drang* of the early πόλις and the emancipation of the Greek mind from tradition's fetters are forcefully described. One distinctive Greek ideal, 'government by due process of law', deserved more consideration. —Were tyrants 'necessary' to progress? And, ὦ πόποι, can it be true that 'Greek culture was always independent of religion'?

Robinson recaptures the exuberant mood in which Periclean Athens accomplished its wonders, yet without disguising the mercenary attitude of the demos to the Confederacy of Delos. A few words on the efficiency of the demos in naval and financial affairs would have been welcome here. On the causes of the Peloponnesian War the author gives a well-considered judgement in favour of Sparta. He does not mention that it was Persian gold which tipped the balance of the war. Two more queries. Had the Aeschylean drama really 'cast off all traces of its primitive beginnings'? And was the Athenian slave 'certain of his ultimate freedom'?

In his survey of fourth-century Greece Robinson does not, in the usual manner, descant on the theme of 'quantum mutatus ab illo!', but imperturbably sets gain against loss. He overlooks the gropings of Greek diplomacy

towards a *κοινὴ εἰρήνη*, but gives King Philip due credit for his *κοινὸν τᾶν Ἑλλήνων*.

The story of Alexander is written with an expert pen and an authoritative accent. We may doubt whether, in the era of the post-horse, world-conquest was practical politics, or whether Alexander's self-deification was a 'natural' way of legalizing autocracy in Greece. But we should welcome Robinson's main conclusion that Alexander's vision of world-harmony was his most fruitful contribution to politics.

The author is also well at home in the Hellenistic age. He shows good judgement in concentrating on the Ptolemaic and the Seleucid realms, and on the rejuvenated Sparta of the later third century. His sketches of the Seleucid administration and of Greek dominion in Bactria and India are particularly valuable. But Hellenistic Judaea merited at least a passing mention.

The main lesson of early Roman history, Rome's capacity to organize and compromise, is well brought out in Robinson's account of the consolidation of Italy, but less so in his story of early constitutional development, which is condensed to the point of obscurity.

Though Robinson expands on Hannibal's campaigns, he wastes no words on Rome's wars of conquest. He accepts the well-founded view that Roman foreign policy was largely opportunist. But need we father the destruction of Corinth (which was a mercantile, not a financial centre) on Rome's moneyed interests?

In his chapters on the Late Republic the author follows Mommsen's footsteps. He even maintains that a monarchical revolution was not merely desirable, but had long been desired; and he detects in Caesar not only a Napoleonic intellect but a 'warm personality'. Yet he handsomely acknowledges that Cicero deserved well of the Republic. His suggestion that Cleopatra's 'Donations of Alexandria' were, like the testament of the last Pergamene king, a face-saving surrender to Rome, leaves me dumbfounded.

Robinson is reticent about Augustus' personality, but gives his work a cool approbation. He portrays the early Caesars in sober colours, but breaks a lance on behalf of Nero, who 'perhaps stood above the average inhabitant of Rome in taste and morals'. This seems to imply that the average Roman cheerfully practised matricide, or even worse. On p. 558 he describes Caesar-worship as a 'vital force', yet on p. 627 he admits that it struck cold; on p. 604 Marcus Aurelius appears as a ruthless persecutor, on p. 629 he is indifferent to the Christians.

The economic activities and the municipal life of the early Empire are ably surveyed, and a clear and common-sense appreciation of the developed Roman law deserves a special encomium. The *ἡθός* of the Antonine age is described in somewhat lugubrious terms, as though 'failure of nerve' were already becoming general. Its distinctive feature surely was that it was an 'era of good feelings', in which, for once, the world was not full of the sound of snarling.

For the problem of the 'Decline and Fall' the author holds out no master-key. But his observation, that Greco-Roman culture did not sink sufficiently into the masses and did not evoke their active co-operation, surely goes near the heart of things.

ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY

PAUL CLOCHÉ: *La Démocratie athénienne*. Pp. 432. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951. Paper, 900 fr.

IN this important book Professor Cloché, using as a substantial foundation his many books and articles on Greek history, has presented a consecutive history of the Athenian democracy from the archonship of Solon to the death of Demosthenes. It is eminently lucid and readable. It is well documented with references in footnotes to the ancient literary sources, with a select bibliography of modern works in an appendix, and with an index. There are no illustrations and no maps, and it is clear from the general assumptions and from the critical approach that the book is intended for a knowledgeable and not an inexpert public. The main subject is the political history of Athens (both in its internal development and in its foreign policy) during the period 510–322 B.C., which is divided into two halves, that before 403 B.C. being treated in some 200 pages and that after 403 B.C. in some 110 pages. This subject is introduced by 15 pages on the years 594–510 B.C. and is concluded by a summary of some 10 pages. Between the two main halves of the political history there are placed three very interesting chapters which concern the working of the democracy during the fourth century B.C., together with its effect upon society and the criticisms advanced against it by contemporary writers. These chapters are particularly stimulating and valuable. In the main part of his book Professor Cloché has written a clear, well-documented, and impartial history of the democracy.

The great merit of the book is its fidelity to the written sources. The evidence is carefully marshalled and presented before a verdict is given on any controversial topic. This merit is most conspicuous in the chapters which deal with the intellectual opposition to the democracy during the Peloponnesian War (the views of the 'Old Oligarch', Aristophanes, and Euripides being inter-related) and with the general qualities of the fourth-century democracy. Examples are adduced to illustrate the extent to which the Boule and the Heliæa acted as a break on the democratic will of the Ecclesia, and the working of the administration is expounded with a strong grasp of such practical aspects as the rules of procedure and their effect. When the social effects of the democratic régime are assessed, due emphasis is laid on the practical instances which show that the rich were not always victimized and that the members of the Boule and of the Heliæa were not predominantly drawn from the unpropertied classes; by such methods the strictures passed by Isocrates and others on the Athenian democracy can be handled critically. In the same way the case of the intellectual opposition during the fourth century B.C. can be tested against a fairly well-established background of fact. Aristotle's views on democracy, for example, are shown to be in many cases inapplicable to the Athenian democracy; and the attitudes of Plato, Xenophon, and Isocrates are shrewdly expounded and criticized. Where Cloché is concerned with the narrative of political events—and this constitutes the bulk of the book—he keeps a close contact with the literary sources and generally puts both sides of a controversial question before the reader. One of the glories which he divines in democratic Athens is her richness in powerful personalities; this is true also of his book, for the portraits of Themistocles, Pericles, and Demosthenes are outstanding and

effective. On the whole his attitude towards the democracy is realistic and balanced. This is clear from his summary. For he concludes that the Athenian democracy is remarkable for its longevity, its foreign policy and power, and its leading statesmen; and internally for the moderation which reigned between the classes and between the organs of government, and which was also shown towards its subjects and its opponents.

In a book of this scope it is inevitable that the reader will sometimes disagree with the author in matters of judgement or of emphasis. For example, one feels that less than justice is done to the career and ideas of Cimon; that a point is being stretched in Athens' favour when her behaviour in 365-362 B.C. is said to be within the terms of the 'federal statute'; and that the label 'the patriotic party' as applied to Demosthenes and his followers may cast an unjustifiable slur on the motives of Eubulus. Nor will the defence of Demosthenes' early speeches win universal consent. There are, however, some matters which will arouse stronger criticism. Cloché does not discuss the authority of his sources. For example, the *Athenaion Politeia* is simply cited as expressing the views of Aristotle. There is no attempt to separate the chaff from the grain and no indication that this treatise contains many difficult problems for the student of Athenian democracy. Plutarch's *Lives* are treated in a similar manner. Consequently one feels that Professor Cloché does not justify himself in stating that the hektemoroi paid five-sixths of their produce despite Plut. *Solon* 13; that the three groups of Eupatridai, Georgoi, and Demiourgoi in *Ath. Pol.* 13 are unhistorical; and that the Constitution of Draco is a document of 411 B.C. Nor do we hear much of the evidence supplied by numismatics and epigraphy. The tribute-lists for 454-446 B.C. hardly figure in the book, and the Erythrae decree is dated to 'c. 465 B.C.' without reference to the alternative dating c. 450 B.C. The social and religious background of Athens is not studied in any detail; for example the 'aristocratic genos' is mentioned but not defined, Sophocles is quoted as a friend of Pericles but not for his own views, and Thucydides' commentary on the effects of the plague is not mentioned. At times one feels that Professor Cloché has limited himself too strictly to political history. Within that field one would welcome a definition of the term 'party' as applied to Athenian politics and an estimate not only of total population (incidentally on p. 209 his figures seem to disregard the disfranchisement in 322 B.C.) but also of the relative sizes of the classes. Yet Professor Cloché has given us so much that is stimulating and informative that it may seem churlish to ask for more; and even where he does not go deep he affords us the references and the data for further study. Misprints occur on the following pages: 45 'crosisante', 59 'démocratie', 118, n. 4, 148 'Hermippos', 231, n. 5, 250 'deux', 349, n. 4, 368 'amphicyonnique'.

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NATIVE NAMES OF ASIA MINOR

JOH. SUNDWALL: *Kleinasiatische Nachträge*. (Studia Orientalia xvi. 1.) Pp. 50. Helsinki: Societas Orientalis Fennica, 1950. Paper, \$0.90.

THIS book constitutes a supplement to the author's familiar *Die einheimischen Namen der Lykier* (*Klio*, Beiheft xi, 1913), and is clearly to be regarded as a stop-

gap rather than as a final addendum, since on p. 10 it is announced that this is not a *Berechtigungsliste*, and that the author reserves all discussion of detail 'für eine künftige Umarbeitung meines kleinasiatischen Namenbuches'. The present addendum consists of a general introduction of thirteen pages followed by a list of *einheimische Namen* mainly, but not entirely, from Greek documents, containing some thousand entries.

In the preface Sundwall defends himself against reviewers of his earlier work, notably against O. A. Danielsson in *G.G.A.* 1916, pp. 513 ff., and discusses the purge carried out on his earlier list by L. Robert in *Étud. épigr. et phil.* (1938), pp. 159–84. Robert showed quite clearly that many names admitted as native by Sundwall were in fact of purely Greek origin, and Sundwall accepts most of Robert's corrections, though in some instances he maintains his stand, for instance in regard to *Βολους*, *Λυσιας*, *Ρουσων*, *Κισση*, apparently on the ground that these are native names formed under the influence of local Greek names to resemble those names (p. 11).

The list, which contains entries from many post-war publications, is an essential supplement to the previous one, and will prove of great use, provided that, like its predecessor, it is used with caution. I note here a few (there will be others) possible Greek intruders.

Ἐπινησαῖος, 'kar.' This is a form inserted by Sundwall from the stone published by Robert, *Sanctuaire de Sinuri*, No. 73, who read there . . . |νησαῖωι, which Sundwall, against the advice of Robert, reads as the dative of *Ἐπινησαῖος*. The name is in fact *Νησαῖος*: see Robert, *Hellen.* vii, 1949, p. 63, where the document is re-edited. *Νησαῖος* as a proper name need cause no difficulty.

Κεραίας, 'pis. späthellenist.' Ptolemy IV had an *ὑπαρχος* of this name (not noticed by Sundwall): see Polyb. v. 70–71. It seems unlikely that such a post would have been held in the third century by a man of Pisidian extraction (*pace* Launey, *Recherches*, i, p. 474), and the derivation from *Κέρας*, likely in that instance, is possible also for Sundwall's *Κεραίος*. That *Κεραίος* could, however, also be Pisidian is shown by Robert, *Étud. Anat.*, pp. 306–7.

Κομανός, 'kar. ptol. Zeit'. A by no means uncommon name. Sundwall apparently calls it Carian because in the instance known to him, *P.Teb.* 79. 1, the bearer of it is an *Ἀλαβανδεύς*. But Alabandians did not necessarily have Carian names: see *Klio*, Beiheft xviii, p. 85. The name was also borne by a notorious Cilician, the brother of Cleon, a leader of the Sicilian slave-revolt in c. 135 B.C. (Diod. xxxiv. 2. 20 (cf. § 17)), and is particularly common in Egypt, although the ethnic of the bearer is rarely given. Most famous are the *πρώτος φίλος* of Ptolemy Philometor, probably an *Ἀλεξανδρεύς* (see *Syll.*³ 585, l. 143, which, if it refers to the same man, would justify Westermann's conjecture, *Archiv.* xiii, 1938, p. 5, that *Κομανός τῶν πρώτων φίλων* was 'born in Egypt of Greek blood'); the Ptolemaic grammarian of Naukratite origin (most unconvincingly identified with the *πρώτος φίλος* by Hubbell, *C.P.* xxviii, 1933, pp. 196–7, followed by F. Solmsen, *ibid.* xl, 1945, pp. 115–16); and (without ethnics) the hegemon who sat as a member of the dicastic board on the Hermias case in 117 B.C. (*U.P.Ζ.* 162, l. 6), the military leader (perhaps to be identified with the preceding) in Breccia (*Iscr.* 44a = *S.B.* 599, col. i, ll. 4 and 23)—and there are others (see Launey, *op. cit.* i. 458–9). It is evidently impossible to decide the origin of the name on a single instance, as Sundwall does. It may be derived from Comana, Pontic or Cappadocian (so Bechtel, *Historische Personennamen*, p. 539, and Launey, *op. cit.*, p. 484, who says

'Cappadoce ou *Paphlagonie*'), but in view of the widespread distribution of the name in the Hellenistic age, a Greek origin should perhaps be sought.

Μίνδιος, 'lyd.' A good Roman name (see *R.E.* s.v.), and the coin from Sardis of the reign of Nero referred to by Sundwall may testify to a member of the gens Mindia. The fact that the name appears by itself—ἐπὶ Μινδίου—does not necessarily speak against this. (For Roman gentile names used by themselves as magistrates' names in local coinage in the East in the Imperial age see, for example, *B.M.C. Lydia*, p. 95; p. li, cf. p. 74; p. 92; pp. 347-9; p. xcii; *ibid.*, *Phrygia*, pp. 42, 56-57, 61, 350.)

Φύρσων, 'kar.' The reading in the inscription referred to by Sundwall (*O.G.I.S.* 214 = Welles, *Royal Cor.* 5) is uncertain. That part of the stone containing the name in question is lost, and one copy (that followed by *O.G.I.S.* and Welles) reads *Φρύσων*. If *Φύρσων* is right, it may be a form of *Πύρρων* (for $\phi = \pi$, and $\rho\sigma = \sigma\sigma$, see Bondesson, *De sonis et formis titulorum Milesiorum*, pp. 96-97, § 36, and 106-7, § 44).

Among other uncertainties I note *Πάσπαρος* (for possible Greek derivations of this v. Oppermann, *R.E.* s.v. 'Paspáros', col. 2091); *Πάριοι*, the Rhodian deme on the island; and *Τήμνος*, the well-known Aeolic city, disguised by Sundwall as 'mys. Ort'.

These stray remarks, if they serve no other purpose, will perhaps show that that the list has not been compiled with the greatest care.

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RACE IN ANCIENT EGYPT

S. DAVIS: *Race-Relationships in Ancient Egypt, Greek, Egyptian, Hebrew, Roman*. Pp. xiii+176. London: Methuen, 1951. Cloth, 21s. net.

IN this book Dr. Davis, who is Senior Lecturer in Classics at the University of the Witwatersrand, believing that 'the problem of race-relationships is the most outstanding and interesting one confronting the world of today', sets out to study the contacts between Greeks, Egyptians, Hebrews, and Romans, especially as they were worked out in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt. It is a programme that involves the crucial themes of ancient history. Davis starts from the breakdown due to Alexander of the exclusive self-centred Greek attitude to outsiders, and traces the effect of replacing the mutual admiration of Greeks and Egyptians, real if not deep on the Greek side, half-grudging on the Egyptian since it involved an admission of weakness, by a system which put the latter under the subjection of a minority of the former. The re-emergence of the original strains and dilution of the immigrants is interestingly paralleled from the Spanish conquest of Mexico and Peru. Perusal of the documents in *B.G.U.* viii might, however, have modified the statement (p. 56) 'that in the 1st and 2nd centuries the letters, ordinances, and circulars issued by *high* officials [my italics] are drafted in a pretentious, incorrect, and hopelessly involved style'. Davis then discusses the Hebrews, their immigration into Egypt, and the complications following the Roman conquest. After reviewing the evidence (his discussion of the word *Ἀλεξανδρεὺς* overlooks the implications of the term *ἐγγενὴς Ἀλεξανδρεὺς* in *O.G.I.* 669. 33) he holds that some Jews were citizens of Alexandria, though the majority were not. He then

endeavours to disentangle the strands of the contention which set Jews and Greeks at each others' throats, and puts the whole conflict into the context of the Roman attitude to race.

This bare summary is unjust to the richness and variety of Davis's subjects. His approach *per ignis suppositos cineri doloso* is scientific and self-abnegating: 'we must beware of transporting modern attitudes of mind to ancient times'. He shows admirable detachment in analysis, judgement in selection, and care in establishing the evidence on which to build. Had he made up his mind whether he was addressing the general reader, the scholar, or a lecture-audience of undergraduates, a useful *Beitrag* might have turned out a notable book. Greece and Egypt from Homer to Byzantium, Hebrew history from Joseph to Josephus, Rome from the Latin League to Caracalla cannot easily be compressed into under 200 pages, or made the subject of original work by a single investigator. Davis has perforce to lean heavily on earlier scholars, resorting to extensive quotation, and this makes it doubly a pity that he has not been in a position to quote any work done since 1942. Inevitably pronouncements are made which seemed clear of the battle when written, but are now being contested inch by inch. Such is the case, for instance, in the statement (p. 45) that Philadelphus' marriage to his sister 'was a union quite contrary to Greek custom and a big concession to native ideas'. The discussion, again, of the *Acta Alexandrinorum* loses in perspective when it contains no references to Sir Idris Bell's papers of 1941 and 1950, the Heraeus- and Maximinus-*Acta* of P.Oxy. 2177 and Schubart, *Gr. Lit. Pap.* 42, and the Titus-*Acta* published by C. H. Roberts in *J.R.S.* 1949. For a similar reason the apparent fullness of the bibliography is illusory. There are a number of odd misprints, notably on p. 103 'explicably' for 'explicitly'.

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CITY-STATE AND WORLD-STATE

MASON HAMMOND: *City-state and World-state in Greek and Roman Political Theory until Augustus*. Pp. x+217. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (London: Oxford University Press), 1951. Cloth, 25s. net.

PROFESSOR MASON HAMMOND's book is based on a series of lectures delivered under the auspices of the Lowell Institute of Boston and is addressed to the student of general political theory rather than to the specialist in ancient political theory. Although the original lectures have been enlarged and rewritten, the writing retains the vigour and the vividness of the spoken word and the text is free from footnotes; at the end of the volume are appended the notes to each chapter which include detailed reference to modern works and discussion of debatable points, together with a select bibliography and an index. The book is essentially readable and business-like, and the historical background of the Roman Republic is drawn with firm, clear, and concise lines. The central theme is not the historical evolution of city-state and world-state as forms of organized political life, but the attempts and the failure of ancient political thinkers to pass from the concept of the city-state to a theoretical justification of a world-state. The conclusion is that classical civilization entered the doldrums of stagnation when orthodox political theory was unable to orientate

itself afresh under the stimulus of changed political conditions. And, as is pointed out in the first and last pages, such a conclusion has a topical interest for the modern world. There is perhaps a danger in over-emphasizing this topical aspect of the situation. Even in its context on p. 3 the statement, that the society of Greece and Rome during three centuries wrestled with the problem of achieving 'one world', is hard to accept as a statement of fact. Perhaps the political thinkers of those centuries should have wrestled with that problem, but it is open to doubt whether any speculative solution could have been more than utopian under the prevailing conditions of practical politics.

The opening chapters are concerned with the political experience of the Greek and Hellenistic world, both for its own sake and for the influence it exerted upon the political thought of Rome which forms the main topic of the book. The Greek city-state is not defined in precise terms. No clear distinction is drawn between the Homeric state, the classical city-state, and the city-foundations of Alexander; and the Rome of Cicero's day is also described as a city-state. Here it might be wise to differentiate between the constitution and the political form itself; for the former may be common to the states considered in this book (and to other states as well), but the latter—the *polis* as an exclusive independent community—can hardly be the hall-mark of the Homeric state, of Alexander's city-foundations, and of the Roman state in the days of Cicero. It is indeed mainly with constitutional theory and practice that Professor Mason Hammond is concerned, because the link in continuity between primitive Sparta, early Rome, and Augustan Rome, and between the political thinkers—Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, and Cicero—is found in the maintenance of the balanced or mixed constitution.

The first chapter, summarizing Greek political experience before the time of Plato, is unduly compendious. Cleisthenes, for example, receives the following notice: 'he appears to have been concerned primarily with limiting the power of the magistrates, making them responsible to law, and rendering them accountable to the assembly—in short, for what the Greeks called "isonomia", equal obedience to law by all, including magistrates.' The second chapter gives an interesting summary and analysis of the ideas of Plato and Aristotle and of the theory of the mixed constitution. In the third chapter the point is well made that the Hellenistic Leagues left no lasting mark on the history of political theory (although it is not true, for instance in the case of the Aetolian League, to say that the general assembly represented communities rather than, directly, all the individual citizens), and in this and the following chapter the experience of the Hellenistic monarchies and the philosophical concepts of monarchy are ably expounded and discussed. The second and longer part of the book deals with the interplay between Greek political theory and Rome's constitutional development. Polybius is the outstanding figure in this interplay: his view, that Rome enjoyed 'the balanced form of mixed constitution in which control rested with the wise aristocrats', was justified in his own day and exercised a deep influence on later thinkers. Five chapters are concerned with the age of Cicero and with Cicero's philosophical and political thought. These are the core of the book, well written, interesting, and provocative. Cicero's failure is found not in any deficiency of personal qualities but in his inability 'to see beyond the traditional political ideas which he derived from Greek thought, Roman history, and his own career'. His political theory in the three main treatises is closely related to his own political career. In the last chapter

the constitutional settlement by Augustus and the political principles inherent therein are studied in a most interesting and realistic manner. The powers and the titles of Augustus, the extent to which the Republic was restored, the preservation of Roman privilege, and many other points are expounded with fine judgement and with a sense of practical considerations. The link in political theory between Cicero and Augustus is, in Professor Mason Hammond's view, the result of direct influence. Although he puts the case well, many will disagree, especially when the use of such phrases in the *Res Gestae* as *per consensum universorum*, *auctoritate omnibus praestiti*, and *princeps* or *principibus viris* is said to recall Cicero's concept of government with the support of the *consensus bonorum* and with *auctoritas* vested in the *principes*. But even where one differs one does so with gratitude for so clear, honest, and attractive an exposition. It is in short an excellent and stimulating book of lectures.

The printing is clear but contains some errors such as 'democarcy' on p. 25, 'concilate' on p. 158, 'furor' on p. 78, and 'was' omitted on p. 105.

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CHILD-EMPERORS AND THE *HISTORIA AUGUSTA*

WERNER HARTKE: *Römische Kinderkaiser*. Eine Strukturanalyse römischen Denkens und Daseins. Pp. xi+487. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1951. Paper, DM. 49.

THE problem of the authorship of the *Historia Augusta* still eludes a decisive solution. Since Dessau's fundamental study in 1889 critics have taken up every kind of position from the extreme conservatism of Klebs and De Sanctis to the scepticism of Seeck and Dessau himself, who argued that the collection was a fourth-century forgery; and in 1926 Baynes gave this scepticism a positive direction by his theory of an *H.A.* written at the time of Julian to further his cause and propaganda. Sixteen years later Professor Hartke published his *Geschichte und Politik im spätantiken Rom* as a *Beiheft* of *Klio*; the war limited its circulation and it has not, I believe, been noticed in this country. In it Hartke argued that Julian remained a symbol of the pagan reaction and its ideal ruler long after his death, and that consequently Dessau's dating of the collection to the last decade of the fourth century could stand. More precisely he tried to demonstrate that the author was in close touch with the circle of Symmachus, and was in fact probably the younger Nicomachus Flavianus, known to us as an emendator of Livy.

The present volume takes up and expands the earlier argument, though its author would no longer press the claims of Nicomachus (p. 413). His object is now wider. The character, scope, and purpose of the *H.A.* are a peg on which he hangs a bewildering succession of discussions on the ethos of the fourth century, and how men of that age thought. By isolating and disclosing the ideas which were accepted as common currency, and so taken for granted by the forger of the *H.A.*, Hartke hopes to establish his date and milieu, despite his own efforts at concealment. The result is a book to which a short review cannot possibly do justice. Where the argument moves rapidly from a consideration of changes in Greek art between the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. to an analysis of a Plautine canticum or the structure of the *Fourth Eclogue*, the reader con-

fesses himself overwhelmed and confused. The reasoning is in itself intricate and the arguments novel; they are rendered more difficult to follow by an omnivorous diffuseness.

For example, Hartke argues that the *H.A.* is the product of an age which has developed a special attitude towards time and space. This attitude can be traced in the sculptured groups of the fourth century which (like the Greek statues of the fifth century B.C.) look out towards, and involve, the spectator. Similarly time as something objective and external to the observer has been lost. Past and present are both identified in a timeless 'now'—a feature which can be traced in the *H.A.* in the constant linking up of past events, buildings, institutions, etc., with the present. Thus the whole of the past is drawn into the present. 'Die Zeit ist Nicht-Zeit geworden'. When, asks Hartke, did this trend of thought begin? The answer is (rather strangely), with Virgil, who in the *Aeneid* makes the whole of the past lead up to the present. The words *Imperium sine fine dedi* take all change and movement out of history, which is henceforth 'zum bildlichen Sein gefroren'. It was because he realized that he had led the Romans (like Andromache in the *Aeneid*) 'out of history' that Virgil on his death-bed asked for his work to be destroyed. This kind of argument either bewitches the reader or enrages him: in either case it does not make for the critical and dispassionate study due to a book which contains both careful thought and sharp observation.

The theme from which the title is taken, that of the hostile attitude of the *H.A.* towards child-emperors, is cleverly developed. The issue of the child-emperor, Hartke argues, could scarcely have arisen under Julian or indeed before the seventies, after which we have Gratian's succession at sixteen in 375, Valentinian II's at twelve in 383, and that of Arcadius and Honorius at seventeen and ten in 395. On the other hand, a formulation which has to take account of the special treatment accorded in the *H.A.* to Severus Alexander, Gordian III, Commodus, Diadumenus, and Heliogabalus may seem somewhat elastic.

Another argument raised in favour of its composition in 394 after the Battle of the Cold River is the frequent appearance in the *H.A.* of the title *parens*, which appears to be in reality a development not earlier than Valentinian I. Further, Hartke claims that the special treatment of the Flavian name as a mark of legitimacy is only comprehensible after the accession of Flavius Theodosius; for it is from the time of Gratian and Theodosius, after the real dynasty of the later Flavians had been extinguished with Julian, that the name comes to be loaded with the idea of legitimacy. In this context Hartke relies on a very dubious argument that to the fourth-century mind the 'virtue of the name' could go backwards as well as forwards. Thus in giving the name Antoninus to his son Diadumenus (*V. Diadum.* i. 2 ff.), Macrinus is being made to take measures to legitimize himself; similarly Magnus Maximus strengthened his position as usurper by naming his son Flavius Victor and making him co-regent as a first step towards his own inheritance (backwards!) of the same title (cf. Dessau, 787, where he is Flavius Magnus Maximus).

In fact, the author's inability to exercise some censorship over his own arguments is a source of weakness in the book and of discouragement and lack of confidence in the reader. An example of this is the fine-spun argument on pp. 207 ff., which seeks to show that Octavian's *Autobiography*, published in 23 B.C., deliberately attempted to make his career run parallel in detail to that

of Julius Caesar, and that to this end Caesar's birth was shifted from 102 to 100. There is no space here for all the details of this fanciful argument, and two points must suffice. Hartke believes that the centurions who brought their demands on Octavian's behalf to the Senate in 43 quoted as precedents not only Dolabella, Pompey, and the concessions already made to Octavian himself (Appian, *B.C.* iii. 88), but also—Caesar. In 43 B.C. before the Senate; this seems to need no comment. Secondly, if what Velleius says on the early careers of Caesar and Octavian is compared in a full text rather than in the extracts quoted on p. 211, it is clear that there is no real parallel. For after all everyone is *genitus familia*, and reaches certain ages in due succession; and there is no genuine connexion between Caesar, elected *pontifex maximus* and 'ad sacerdotium ineundum . . . festinans in Italiam', and Octavian, honoured on one occasion 'pontificatus [*not maximi*] sacerdotio', and hurrying to Rome on quite a different occasion and for quite another purpose.

I mention this passage (not essential to the main theme, but contributing to it) as one instance of what is liable to appear whenever Hartke's arguments are tested in detail. Another instance is the suggestion (pp. 337-43 and Beilage II, pp. 440-64) that a reference in *V. Gallien.* 18. 2 to a proposed colossus to be erected by Gallienus 'in summo Esquiliarum monte' is really a hint at Theodosius' bronze equestrian statue in the Forum Tauri at Constantinople; for the Esquiline, or at least the Fifth Region, had once contained 'Horti Tauriani', and later in the Middle Ages, or even in the sixth century, possessed a gate called, for quite different reasons, the Porta Taurina (Pta. S. Lorenzo) and a 'Forum Tauri'. Yet there is no resemblance between the two statues, and there seems no reason to think that any contemporary reader would have taken a point so abstruse.

By thus including all arguments, strong or weak, the author has obscured the solid merits of much of this book. It is frequently exasperating, but never dull, and its last chapter on the development of the Roman nobility and the parallel attitudes displayed inside the new church hierarchy (e.g. in their views on slavery) is fresh and salutary. On its nominal theme, the dating of the *H.A.*, there are several arguments that will need careful consideration, though none which puts the issue beyond controversy. We can, however, look forward to a new discussion on this topic, with Hartke's book as its centre. It ends on a contemporary note. 'The true task of humanism today is not to restore—that is as little possible as it was in the late Empire—but to renew.' That may be so. But one feature of the old classical training was to create canons of clarity and relevance, and to discipline the writer. If Professor Hartke hopes to reach a general audience this is a matter to which he should give some thought; for in *Römische Kinderkaiser* he has written a Jungle Book.

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THE WORLD'S BIGGEST *FESTSCHRIFT*

Studies presented to David Moore Robinson on his Seventieth Birthday. Volume I. Pp. lix+876; 111 plates, about 100 figures. St. Louis: Eden Publishing House, 1951. Cloth, \$25.

PROFESSOR D. M. ROBINSON has made a mark in Classical Archaeology, particularly by his unlimited energy and enthusiasm and his financial liberality.

His *Festschrift*, of which this volume is the first instalment, is an appropriate tribute such as he himself might have planned. After a panegyric by G. E. Mylonas, the lists of Robinson's successful pupils, and a bibliography of impressive length, there follow the tributes of almost a hundred archaeologists, conveniently classified by subject—Prehistoric Greece (14), Egypt and the Far [= Middle] East (7), Architecture and Topography (26), Sculpture (42), Paintings and Mosaics (3): vase-painting, coins, inscriptions, literature, history, and thought are reserved for the next volume.

Space allows the mention of only a few contributions. H. D. Hansen (54–63) offers some useful data for prehistoric Scyros. G. E. Mylonas (64–105) argues cautiously against a cult of the dead in the Greece of the Bronze Age. P. Verzone (272–94) with perverse ingenuity infers bronze prototypes of various features of classical Greek architecture. H. Riemann (295–308) is interesting but too clever on the development in the proportions of the Doric peripteral temple. W. B. Dinsmoor (309–30) on the theatre of Dionysus at Athens in the main supports Dörpfeld; the paper is valuable for its summaries of the various theories so far put forward. R. Hampe (336–50) writes good sense about the Idaean Cave of Pindar, *O.* 5. 18: it was not at Olympia, and Dörpfeld's grotto there is a demolished treasury. C. Roebuck (351–5) describes again an unusual bridge in Messenia, which seems to be of the fourth century B.C. H. Koch (356–9) gallantly claims for Theseus the 'Theseum' at Athens, since the shrubbery round it had no religious connexion with Hephaestus. E. Sjöqvist (400–11) makes valuable comments on the Comitium at Rome and suggests a derivation from the Pnyx of the mid fifth century. E. Gjerstad (412–22) has rediscovered an Attic r.f. sherd of the early fifth century from the 'Servian agger' at Rome, apparently the most precise evidence we have for the date of that fortification: it suggests either that the agger is later than Servius Tullius or (as Gjerstad prefers) that the orthodox date of S.T. is too high. A. Maiuri (423–9) illustrates Vitruvius with an *oecus Aegyptius* from Herculaneum. A von Gerkan (499–508) summarizes recent work on the church of St. Gereon at Cologne: the dating in the fourth century A.D. is confirmed and there was no Frankish rebuilding. C. Weickert (519–24) produces a remarkable late archaic marble lid surmounted by a Gorgoneion. A. W. Lawrence (532–6) tries to trace down the ages an archaic Greek trick in carving drapery. S. Karouzou (565–87) on Attic mirrors contributes some valuable illustrations and doubtful theories. E. Langlotz (638–47) speculates rashly but usefully on marble sculpture in Magna Graecia. E. Kunze (736–46) adds to our knowledge of Etruscan exports to Greece. F. E. Brown (761–4) reveals his important marble head of Pompey, which looks of late Republican date. W. Hahland (781–93) offers another remarkable head: this, in Smyrna, is colossal, female, of the earlier fifth century A.D., and perhaps as he claims from a Theotokos. W. Kraiker (801–7) makes an instructive analysis of a Pompeian painting.

All in all this is a disappointing and indigestible miscellany, displaying with exaggerated clarity the regular fault of the *Festschrift*. Too many contributors have at hand nothing good of the right length, yet feel that they must contribute something. It would be better when a distinguished scholar is honoured with a commemorative volume either to select articles instead of authors or even to put the hard-won space at the disposal of the 'Jubilar' himself.

GRAMMATICAL THEORY

(1) R. H. ROBINS: *Ancient and Mediaeval Grammatical Theory in Europe with particular reference to Modern Linguistic Doctrine*. Pp. viii+104. London: Bell, 1951. Cloth, 8s. 6d. net.

(2) A. G. DE MAN: *In Grammaticis Veritas*. De noodzakelijke Vernieuwing van het Onderwijs in Latijn. Pp. iv+136. Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1951. Paper, f. 3.90.

MR. ROBINS makes no claim that his history of grammatical theory is to replace earlier, more detailed treatments of the subject. He gives a concise and well-balanced account, intelligible to those who are not specialists in the field, and keeps constantly in view both the general systems of ideas in which grammatical thought had its place and also the principles and methods of modern linguistic description. The Greek, Roman, and Medieval doctrines have a chapter each, followed by a Conclusion of which the aim is 'to summarize the principles on which formal grammar is based to-day, as part of the technique of descriptive linguistics'. Mr. Robins's purpose is in general successfully realized. To the Greeks is allotted almost half the book; this is proper, if the author's intention was to treat each period at a length proportionate to its originality and importance. It is strange, however, that to the comparatively static and derivative doctrines of the Roman grammarians as much space is given as to the interesting if misguided Medieval *rapprochement* of grammar and philosophy.

In a book of this scope it is not easy to avoid mentioning points which, to be of full advantage to the non-specialist, would require more extensive discussion. On p. 2, for example, it is stated that 'the language of grammar is a "second-order" language', because grammar is 'language about language'. Apart from the fact that a difficult ambiguity is involved in these uses of the word 'language', it may be maintained that all special languages, not only that of grammar, are 'subsequent both in temporal and logical succession' to the matters that constitute their subjects, and that the second-order language is not the language of grammar but language as the subject-matter of grammar. It is justifiable to ask whether so difficult a problem need have been introduced simply in order to demonstrate that grammar is an empirical study and must use empirical methods.

In his preface the author disclaims the intention of discussing specific points of detail. We are thus deprived of his opinion on many interesting topics, and must hope that he will find another occasion to deal with them in full. For example, it might at first sight be supposed that the Stoics, in systematizing and naming the Greek tenses, applied a finer appreciation of the Greek system of verbal aspect than is shown in the more formally 'linguistic' treatment of Dionysius (see pp. 35-36, 40). Yet the considerations which led them to their formulation seem to have been not linguistic but philosophic. Is there here no more than a coincidence, or was the Stoic theory of time influenced, perhaps unconsciously, by the structure of the Greek tense-system?

On p. 44, line 22, 'undertaking' is presumably a slip for 'understanding'. Accents on Greek words are not always where they should be: e.g. *σῆμαυνον* (p. 26).

Mr. Robins stresses (p. 92) the harm of forcibly applying Latin grammar to

the description of other languages. Dr. de Man's plea for a reform of Latin teaching in the Netherlands shows how this harm is reflected on to the teaching of Latin itself, as the result of fostering a perverted idea of the relation of Latin to the mother tongue. The situation in Holland is not indeed the same as in Britain, where composition forms part of Latin teaching in its advanced as well as in its elementary stage, and the reading of connected texts is introduced earlier; where, moreover, the influence of the Direct Method has produced general modifications showing in some degree many of the features recommended by Dr. de Man in his sketch of his new method, the detailed exposition of which is to follow in another book. Still, there is much which the British reader finds familiar, particularly the way, strongly condemned by the author, in which the mother tongue is misused and distorted to 'explain' Latin usage; sufferers from 'to be about to do' and 'meet to be done' will be amused to recognize their Dutch equivalents.

The first two sections of the book contain a lively, often provocative discussion of more theoretical matters as a preparation for the practical suggestions in the third part. Dr. de Man rightly protests against the common practice of confusing functional categories with their formal expressions, but overlooks the possibility of distinguishing formal categories from the particular morphemes which express them (see especially pp. 40-41). The fundamental question which he here omits to ask is: how (traditional grammar apart) do we know that *rosa*, *filius*, *rex*, etc., all exemplify the same case? Can this be known without reference to function? He is moreover unwilling to allow that a single form such as *bellum* or *mensae* can represent now one case, now another, and prefers to deny the existence of the case-distinction for the declension in question. Against his view one may perhaps in lieu of argument cite the analogy (he is not averse from analogies) of enharmonic modulation. He insists that from the earliest literature onwards the independent values of the Latin cases were progressively weakened to such an extent that their maintenance in the classical and post-classical literary language was largely artificial. Consequently, he argues, fluency in reading Latin cannot be attained by a method which is concentrated on inflexions and their functions to the exclusion of other means of expression—especially word-order and phrasing. This conclusion is to a great extent justified; it is certainly deplorable, and not entirely due to the difficulties of the language itself, that most students' early experience of Latin resembles decoding rather than reading. We may join with Professor P. Gerlach Royen (who contributes the Preface) in hoping that Dutch teachers of Latin will review their methods in the light of this book; others, if they have no Dutch, may gain a fair idea of its argument from the French summary.

SHORT REVIEWS

FREDERIC G. KENYON: *Books and Readers in Ancient Greece and Rome*. Second edition. Pp. viii+136; 7 plates, 2 figs. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951. Cloth, 8s. 6d. net.

SIR FREDERIC KENYON's excellent little book has ever since its first publication been familiar to everybody interested, as all classical scholars must be, in the methods by which literature was disseminated in the ancient world. This new edition will therefore be very welcome. Changes are not numerous but are sufficient to show that the author (whose lamented death has occurred since this review was first written) had kept abreast of current work bearing on his theme. The discoveries of Ras Shamra, the Dead Sea rolls, Giabbani's recent list of literary papyri (supplementing Oldfather's older one), later work on the Chester Beatty papyri, the British Museum Gospel, and the Rylands St. John, are all put to advantage; and a few sentences are modified here and there, a few small additions or deletions made, in consequence of later research or further reflection. For the rest, the bulk of the volume, including the illustrative passages at the end, is as it was.

Some readers will perhaps feel less confident than Kenyon that papyrus was probably known to Homer; and against the view (p. 61) that 'when a roll had been read it was left with its end outside', though accordant enough with human indolence, has to be set the fact that ends of literary rolls are oftener found than beginnings, which suggests that the latter were more often outside.

H. I. BELL

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HANS JOACHIM METTE: *Der Pfeilsschuss des Pandaros*. Neue Untersuchungen zur 'homerischen' Ilias, mit einer Übersetzung von Ilias 3-7. Pp. 108. Halle (Saale): Niemeyer, 1951. Paper, DM. 5.60.

DR. METTE, who is probably best known to readers of *C.R.* as the editor of the useful *Supplementum Aeschyleum* in Lietzmann's *Kleine Texte* (de Gruyter, 1939; *Nachtrag* 1949), is now on the staff of the Hamburg *Archiv für griechische Lexikographie*, and is editing the lexicon of the epic dialect which

is now in preparation there. So far as my knowledge goes, this interesting pamphlet is his first published work on Homer.

Most of the space in the pamphlet (pp. 31-94) is taken up with a straightforward translation into German prose of *Iliad* iii-vii, omitting vii. 323-44 and 433-82. The narrative is divided by cross-headings into four main sections (we might perhaps call them 'Acts') and twenty-three scenes: I. Menelaus' duel with Paris (seven scenes, iii. 2-iv. 223); II. The *Aristeia* of Diomedes (seven scenes, iv. 224-vi. 72); III. Hector's visit to Ilion (six scenes, vi. 73-vii. 16); IV. Hector's duel with Ajax—final rejection of a peaceful settlement (four scenes, vii. 17-322, 345-432). The translation is preceded by a short introduction (pp. 7-30) and followed by an elaborate and most valuable series of indexes.

For the scholar the whole weight of the book lies in the introduction, the purpose of which is to show that the passages of the *Iliad* which are here translated constitute an independent narrative 'Block', which has been taken over practically unchanged by the 'Redaktor' of the *Iliad*; that this 'Block' is one of the earliest monuments of Western literature; and that from it we can come to know what Mette defines in his preface (p. 6) as the 'ältester Typus eines europäischen Menschen'. The argument is worked out in the classic style of German analytical criticism, with enormous erudition (there are few pages on which the footnotes occupy less than one-third of the space, and note 6 to page 11 covers half p. 11, almost the whole of p. 12, and about one-third of p. 13) and the usual reluctance to admit that there can possibly be more than one explanation for the observed phenomena. On the other hand, Mette is more courteous to the 'Redaktor' than most of his countrymen are inclined to be, and he shows much more extensive acquaintance than is now usual in Germany and Switzerland with the non-German literature of his subject; his index of 'moderne Autoren' should be an object-lesson to future students of Homer (the only major omissions are Caer, Gilbert Murray, and Severyns).

It is not easy to see for whom this book was written: the translation is expressly designed to make this 'älteste Dichtung des Abendlandes' available to 'weitere Kreise'; but the point of the translation is obscure unless one studies the introduction, and the introduction is such stiff reading, even for a Homeric specialist, that it hardly appears that those

who can understand it are likely to need the translation.

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INGRID WAERN: *ΓΗΣ ΟΣΤΕΑ, The Kenning in Pre-Christian Greek Poetry* (Inaugural Dissertation). Pp. 156. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1951. Paper Kr. 15.

STUDENTS of what the Germans call *Anglistik* are more familiar than classical scholars with the technical term 'Kenning', although the phenomenon which the term denotes is by no means uncommon in Greek poetry. In this Uppsala dissertation Miss Waern studies the kennings in pre-Christian Greek poetry (from which she excludes comedy). The passages collected by Miss Waern as a basis for her study form the last chapter of her work, which acts to some extent as an *index locorum*.

The first chapter (pp. 5-18) is devoted to the classification and definition of the kennings used in Greek poetry; they may be either descriptive kennings (i.e. merely periphrastic) or 'image-kennings' (i.e. metaphorical). Since descriptive kennings appear too simple to need special study, the bulk of the work (chapters ii-v, pp. 19-59) is concerned with the study of image-kennings under three headings: colloquial-affective (e.g. *Il.* iii. 57 *λάϊνον ἔσσο χίτωνά*), colloquial-denominative (e.g. *Hes. Op.* 571 *φερέοικος*), and artistic (e.g. *Aesch. P.V.* 803 *Ζηρός ἀκραγείς κύνας*). The fifth chapter, explicitly described as negative (pp. 60-78), discusses three theories of the religious origin of the kenning (from oracles, cult-language, or taboo), and decides that the Greek kenning is completely neutral and that religious ideas have played little or no part in its development. The sixth chapter (pp. 79-113) deals with the history of the Greek kenning from Homer to the first century B.C.; Miss Waern finds two main peaks in its use—the 'heroic baroque' of Aeschylus, and the 'kenning mannerism' of the later fifth and fourth centuries (e.g. *Ion* of Chios, *Timotheus*, *Aeschrio*).

Even within her self-imposed limits Miss Waern's collection of material seems incomplete (she omits, for example, *Alcm.* 59 (D.), *Sapph.* 121 (D.), *Pind. Pyth.* iii. 48), and her judgements are inevitably immature at times, but her work shows great promise and will certainly be useful to students of Greek poetry.

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G. AMMENDOLA: *Euripide, Medea*. Introduzione, testo e commento. (I Classici della Nuova Italia.) Pp. xxii+190. Florence: 'La Nuova Italia', 1951. Paper, L. 650.

THIS edition is well adapted to fill the needs of learners who have sufficient Greek to begin reading Euripides. The text is a more conservative version of Méridier's, in which there is nothing to object to except the printing of certainly spurious lines without brackets; it is hardly conceivable that 1062-3 are genuine there as well as at 1240-41.

The commentary, which is printed below the text, is the most valuable part of the work. Ammendola succeeds in making clear just how he thinks the words should be construed, and a large proportion of the Greek is rendered into Italian in the process. Textual problems are rarely mentioned, and when there are various ways of taking a passage the alternatives not adopted are passed quickly over; the views of other editors are seldom given in detail, and of English scholars only Elmsley and Paley are referred to; indeed Ammendola appears to have made less use than he might of more modern English work. But in general the commentary is well constructed for the end in view. It is, however, less successful at bringing out dramatic than linguistic points; entrances and exits are not noted as fully as they should be in the absence of stage directions. The work would be easier to refer to if more use had been made of typographical aids; in the large blocks of unbroken print it is often hard to pick out where comment on a particular passage begins.

The account of the play given in the introduction would be both too schematized and too nebulous for English requirements. If it be true that there are to be found in the play two tendencies of the spirit 'che si polarizzano intorno al generoso impulso verso i puri ideali e al freddo calcolo di bassi interessi egoistici', the first is hardly in sufficient force to balance the second, and it is rather a forbidding way of putting the idea. But it may be that Italian students take kindly at an earlier age than ours to the abstract presentation of a subject.

D. W. LUCAS

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ERVIN ROOS: *Die tragische Orchestik im Zerrbild der altattischen Komödie*. Pp. 302; 34 ill. Lund: Gleerup, 1951. Paper, Kr. 20.

THIS book, sub-titled 'Die Tanzburleske des Philokleon in der Exodos der "Wespen"', consists of an inquiry into the nature of Philocleon's dance, from which Roos concludes that he danced 'reine Hetären- und Komastentänze', followed by a consideration of the views that the dance was (a) an old tragic dance, (b) a modern tragic dance, (c) the Cordax, (d) the Sicinnis, as a parody of old tragic dances (Festa) or Euripides' *Cyclops* (van Leeuwen).

Roos is an exceptionally industrious and well-read scholar; but his industry exceeds his judgement, and he lacks the ability to select what is best in his material, with the result that the book is of excessive length and uneven quality. Its most valuable portion is perhaps the second half, where Roos does a real service to scholars by showing how flimsy is the evidence for some current theories on Philocleon's dance, e.g. the views that he dances a Cordax, or parodies the *Cyclops*. At the same time he often supports conjectures as uncertain as those he refutes, as when he sees a parody of the *Cyclops* in the exodos of the *Thesmophoriazusaë* (p. 185), and is sometimes inaccurate, as when he quotes schol. *Eq.* 1321 for the statement that Aeschylus' *Τροφός* was Aristophanes' model for the rejuvenation of Demos. His own conclusion that Philocleon's dance is a 'Komastentanz' is plausible; but his treatment of Aristophanes in general lacks dramatic imagination (as in his discussion of *κρόνους*, *Vesp.* 1480, pp. 110 f.), and he fails to take into account the basic structure of Old Comedy, within which Aristophanes worked, and the individuality of its component sections. For him the exodos of the *Wasps* is above all didactic: but, in fact, as in most Aristophanic comedies, it is a *κῶμος*; and Philocleon is its hero, not a dreadful example of 'Liederlichkeit, Trunksucht, und geistige Nichtigkeit' (p. 137), any more than Dicaeopolis in the exodos of the *Acharnians* is a monster of conjugal infidelity.

The first part of the book contains some good discussions of Greek dances, though Roos's arguments vary in value, and he is inclined to be uncritical of his sources; for instance, he seems to accept statements about the indecency of the dances from the Christian Fathers, who are neither well informed nor impartial witnesses. In matters grammatical he is less sound, e.g. he mistranslates *τῆς νυκτός* (*Vesp.* 1478, p. 18, n. 1) through failure to see that the accusative of duration of time is regularly replaced by a genitive of 'time within which' in negative sentences. (Incidentally he might have added Bentley

and Cornford (*Or. Att. Com.*, p. 12) to the list of his opponents on this point.)

The standard of mechanical accuracy is very high, the illustrations well chosen and presented, and the indexes admirable. There is a full—indeed too full—bibliography, which is made somewhat inconvenient by the practice of mentioning editions only under the name of the editor, not under the author.

Though not without its defects, this book contains much useful material on a difficult and neglected subject, and deserves the attention of students of Aristophanes.

D. MERVYN JONES

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ERNST HOFFMANN: *Griechische Philosophie bis Platon*. Pp. 184. Heidelberg: Kerle, 1951. Cloth, DM. 7.50.

THIS work, which is designed for beginners in philosophy, was first published in 1921. In this edition there appears to be little change, except in the sections devoted to the Sophists and Socrates.

The opinions expressed often seem surprising, partly owing to the lapse of time since the work was written, but to a greater extent owing to characteristic differences between German and British scholarship. It is assumed, for example, first that *all* the Sophists, accepting the principle of Protagoras, denied the objectivity of knowledge (p. 120); and then that the derivation of Protagoras' views from those of Heraclitus, which Plato propounds in the *Theaetetus*, is intended not merely as a logical, but as an historical one. Thus, in fact, Hoffmann regards *all* the Sophists as Heracliteans (pp. 127–8), though, as he says, the tendency of their education was in general conservative rather than subversive. Few of us, in this country, would be inclined to attribute such unanimity to the Sophists. The expression *die Sophistik*, which sounds innocent enough to German writers, has been a stumbling-block to their English critics since the time of Grote. And when the *Theaetetus* is taken at its face value, it seems unfair to pass over the *defence* of the relativist thesis which, in the same dialogue, is ascribed to Protagoras.

German scholars, again, seem to agree with the Neoplatonists in supposing that Socrates taught a regular doctrine of the *daimonion*. While Hoffmann warns us against supposing that the *daimonion* is the same thing as we should call 'conscience', he nevertheless represents Socrates as proclaiming

that every man has this divine higher self within him; this, however, is refuted by *Republic* vi. 496 c.

In his exposition of Plato's system, Hoffmann appears to me to exaggerate both the relative importance of the doctrine of Ideas, and its influence upon later philosophy ('Seit Platon ist die Philosophie Wissenschaft von den Ideen; in seiner Lehre ist die Philosophie sich ihrer selbst bewusst geworden'). He proceeds to ascribe to Plato a supreme triad composed of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful: surely this is, at most, a variation on a Platonic theme? He ignores all that has been written by English scholars about the Line and Cave, and simply assumes that both similes depict four stages of intelligence through which every man passes in the process of education. In speaking of the form of the Good, he declares that it 'transcends all dialectic and can only be explained in a Myth, as Plato undertakes to do in the *Timaeus*' (p. 164). This seems to be a fundamental misconception of the purpose for which myth is used by Plato.

In brief, though the tone is always decisive and interesting, what is said is sometimes very risky; and this is an introduction which I should not like to offer, without much caution, to beginners in philosophy.

D. J. ALLAN

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WILHELM BRANDENSTEIN: *Atlantis: Grösse und Untergang eines geheimnisvollen Inselreiches*. Pp. 105. Vienna: Gerold, 1951. Paper, ö.S. 32.

PROFESSOR BRANDENSTEIN, of Graz, deals in this brief but learned volume with the old problem of Plato's Atlantis. It is a problem which has long vexed men's minds; and all sorts of fantasies have been spun round the idea of a sunken continent somewhere in the Atlantic Ocean—fantasies which range from the island of Avilion off the coast of Cornwall to the Mexico of Aztec times, which is said to show a symbol of a square within concentric circles singularly like Plato's description of the chief city of his Atlantis. Brandenstein brings a whole apparatus of scholarship to bear on the problem: beginning by a distinction of *Mythos*, *Sage*, and *Märchen*, he reaches the conclusion that Plato's story of Atlantis is a *Sage* with an historical core, that Atlantis is really Minoan Crete, and that Plato is dealing with a half-forgotten but real tradition of the old historical relations between ancient Athens and

Cnossus. If he has not actually proved his theory, he has at least made it highly probable—though he perhaps carries it to an extremity when he suggests that the earthquake which according to Plato overwhelmed Atlantis and caused the inundation of much of Attica was an actual eruption, about 1470 B.C., of the volcano of Santorin (seen by many Hellenic travellers during the course of a Greek cruise), which 'indubitably annihilated Cretan sea-power' and probably had disastrous effects in Attica.

We may accept the gist of Brandenstein's view; but we have to add that the view had already been put forward in England, with cogent evidence in its favour, as long ago as January 1909, when a correspondent suggested, in an article in *The Times*, that Plato's story of Atlantis was partly based on misunderstood records of events in Minoan history. The correspondent was Mr. K. T. Frost, who afterwards published a long essay on 'The *Critias* and Minoan Crete', in volume xxxiii of the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (1913). In this essay, of which the reviewer learned from his friend and neighbour Professor A. B. Cook, Mr. Frost used many of the arguments which Brandenstein now uses to support his view—e.g. Plato's reference to the hunting of the bull in the temple of Poseidon in Atlantis 'without weapons but with staves and nooses', which must be a description of the bull-ring at Cnossus. Mr. Frost's theory and arguments were summarized by J. Baikie (on the basis of the *Times* article of 1909) at the end of his book *The Sea-Kings of Crete* published in 1910, and may thus be said to be matters of common knowledge. Professor Brandenstein mentions Mr. Frost—but only in one brief reference in his text (p. 60), and in a note (p. 103) which dams his article with faint praise and then adds that he only learned of its existence after he had written his work. The fact remains that Mr. Frost *ante nos nostra dixit*: in other words, he had stated the essence of Professor Brandenstein's view, and used some of his essential arguments, over forty years ago.

ERNEST BARKER

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FRIEDRICH ZUCKER: *Plotin und Lykopolis*. (Sitzungsberichte der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst, 1950, Nr. 1.) Pp. 20. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1950. Paper, DM. 1.50.

IN this interesting short paper Professor Zucker discusses the light thrown by papyri upon the probable social and cultural background of Plotinus, on the assumption that he was born, as Eunapius and other late authorities state, at 'Lycopolis', and that this place is to be identified as *Λύκων πόλις* in the Thebaid. Not a great deal is known about Lycopolis itself, but Zucker shows that there is reason to suspect the existence of an old Greek settlement in the neighbourhood, going back to the time of Ptolemy Euergetes I. In any case the inscription in honour of Aelius Aristides proves that a generation or so before Plotinus' birth there were still people in Upper Egypt who called themselves 'Hellenes'. Zucker thinks it likely that Plotinus' family would be among these, although the name is Roman. (In support of this view he might have quoted Porph., *vit. Plot.* 10, where Porphyry twice designates as *τὸν Αἰγύπτιον* the priest in whose company Plotinus visited the Iseum, with the implication, surely, that Plotinus was *not* considered an 'Egyptian'.) Zucker further shows that in 'county towns' of the Thebaid, such as Lycopolis was, Greek culture was kept alive among the educated class (*οἱ ἀπὸ γυμνασίου*) not only down to Plotinus' time but even as late as the sixth century A.D.; Plato, in particular, was much studied, as the papyrus finds prove. Plotinus will almost certainly have spoken Greek as a child, and probably in a fairly pure form; at any rate people like Apollonius and his family, in the neighbouring district of Hermopolis, were still conducting their correspondence in good literary Greek in the time of Hadrian.

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BRUCE M. METZGER: *Index of Articles on the New Testament and the Early Church published in Festschriften*. (J.B.L. Monograph Series, Vol. V.) Pp. xv + 182. Philadelphia: Society of Biblical Literature, 1951. Paper, \$2.

THE task undertaken and carried out in this book is one that certainly needed to be done; for it is undoubtedly true that much work of first-rate importance goes into these *Festschriften*, often to sink into comparative oblivion. *Festschriften* tend to be expensive and often expansive too; and the average scholar cannot afford to buy a costly volume for the sake of one essay, even assuming that he knows it is there.

Dr. Metzger's survey gives a list of almost 600 *Festschriften* devoted to or containing essays on the New Testament and the Early Church. This is followed by a numbered catalogue of essays under carefully classified heads. Each entry gives the author's name, title of the essay, page-reference to the volume in which it appears, and date of publication. Cross-references are given where necessary. The volume is completed by an index of authors; and the whole constitutes an indispensable tool, for which workers in this field may well be grateful.

T. W. MANSON

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JAMES MORTON PATON: *Chapters on Mediaeval and Renaissance Visitors to Greek Lands*. Pp. xii + 212. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1951. Cloth and boards.

IN this handsome volume we have the material for a book rather than a finished book. From the editor's preface we learn that the author had in preparation an 'extensive work on the mediaeval history and monuments of Athens', but this work was cut short by his death in 1944, when it 'can scarcely be said to have passed beyond the stage of collecting sources'. The present publication is to save what can reasonably be saved. The first chapter is a pleasant lecture on Turkish Athens delivered in 1918. Then we have twenty-one accounts of visits to Athens, for the most part taken from books; others are from unpublished manuscripts. They range in date from a very dubious Aristarchus of the ninth century down to Paul Lucas, who was in Athens in 1706. These accounts are a mine of the odd names given by these travellers to classical sites. On p. 54 I notice that by a slip we read 'Eleusis (now Lepsina or Coluri)', whereas Coluri is really a name for Salamis. But what the '-nox' of 'Lippissinox'—another name on p. 35 for Lepsina-Eleusis—can be, I do not know. Chapter iii is all about the tomb of Edward Wyche, brother of a British Ambassador to the Porte; he died in 1628, and his tomb may still be under the ruins of the cathedral of Eregli-Heraclea. Chapter iv gives an account of the career of Rinaldo de la Rue, who was an engineer in Morosini's artillery and was present at the Venetian capture of the city in 1687. Chapter v gives a description of Athens

written in 1699 by a French Ambassador to the Porte. Appendixes and an index close the book. Although no more than a collection of material, the book contains a good many things of interest. If it had been given to the author to carry out his comprehensive plan, we should have had something of the nature of Ferdinand Gregorovius' *History of the Town of Athens in the Middle Ages*, and it would have been interesting to compare the new book with what Gregorovius was able to write rather more than sixty years ago. The book is one of the series of Gennadeion Monographs, published in connexion with the library on later and modern Greece presented to the American School by the late John Gennadios, for many years the Greek Ambassador to this country. It is well worthy of its place in the series.

R. M. DAWKINS

Exeter College, Oxford

ETTORE PARATORE: *Una Nuova Ricostruzione del 'De Poetis' di Suetonio*. 2da ed. Pp. 374. Bari: Adriatica Editrice, 1951. Paper, L. 1950.

PARATORE's criticisms of Rostagni's attempted reconstruction now appear in a handsome second edition which has a different publisher and an enhanced price. Though in deference to the general—and natural—opinion that he is indulging in a polemic he has toned down the most disparaging references to Rostagni's methods of reasoning, he has withdrawn nothing substantial of his arguments, but has added slightly to them. His contentions were fully stated in the review of the first edition (*C.R.* lxii, 1948, 145–6); to summarize them, he denies that anything important of Probus' work survives, and insists that the Suetonian element in the Lives of Persius and Virgil is subject to interpolation and other alterations. He now replies to a rejoinder made by Rostagni (in *Riv. Fil. Class.*, 1947), refers to discussions with other scholars, especially A. Mazzarino, includes conclusions reached in preparing three subsequent works for publication, and makes about forty allusions to books or articles that have appeared since 1946. There are only minor changes in the chapters dealing with the Lives of Lucan, Lucretius, and Persius. For Virgil the paragraph-titles are given in the index in a fuller form, which may mislead, but the text in fact is only expanded in three places where there are longer discussions of details. The

chapter on Tibullus' Life is now much longer, both through the necessity of referring to recent work on the *corpus Tibullianum* and because there is added a 17-page refutation of arguments defending Rostagni used by Mazzarino in his *Analecta* (Turin, 1950).

This edition is no easier to read; those who dislike being turned aside by long footnotes during closely reasoned discussions will be dismayed to find how often, quite apart from new references, points are now clinched by an extra clause or sentence, while to use the Corrigenda to include last-minute thoughts seems improper. So many modern scholars are quoted that an index of them or a bibliography would have been helpful.

It is perhaps inevitable where much of the ground has been so often worked that the argumentation should turn upon small points so that conviction comes slowly, but few will fail to acknowledge Paratore's grasp of his subject.

W. K. SMITH

University of Edinburgh

REINIER BOULOGNE: *De Plaats van de Paedagogus in de Romeinse Cultuur*. Pp. 104. Groningen: Wolters, 1951. Paper.

THIS doctoral dissertation of the University of Utrecht is a well-documented study of a subject which has not hitherto received separate and detailed treatment. After a preliminary sketch (I) of certain complicating factors (e.g. difficulty of evaluating the evidence of Roman Comedy, prejudice of Roman writers against *Graeculi*, combination of functions of *paedagogus* and private tutor), the author traces the history of the practice in legend and (rather cursorily) in classical Greece (II), then much more fully in Roman times (III). Here the increase in the number of *paedagogi* in Rome is attributed to the development of interest in Greek, as they are regarded as teachers of the language; but there does not appear to be any compelling reason for assigning so important a part to them. A good chapter (IV) next discusses the sources from which the Romans drew their educated slaves and tutors, but the newest research in the book is that on terminology (V). The writer here argues that earlier authorities too readily equate such various terms as *custos*, *comes*, *rector*, *pedisequus*, etc., and particularly that the *comes* only accompanied an older youth after the assumption of the *toga virilis*; but the evidence is sometimes forced (e.g. pp.

51-52: in Livy v. 27, Suet. *Claud.* 35, comes = *paedagogus*). Finally, the duties of the *paedagogus* are considered, viz. guardianship, supervision of studies, instruction in Greek and the 'three R's', and general control of behaviour (VI). The scope of teaching-activities seems exaggerated. Under the Republic, Varro's 'instituit paedagogus, docet magister' must imply a distinction between the preliminary training of the *paedagogus* and the systematic instruction of the schoolmaster. B.'s view would make the latter merely duplicate the former's work. Under the Empire, although persons accompanying the young also sometimes gave instruction (not merely elementary), they may have been private house-tutors, undertaking general supervision as well, but not merely *paedagogi* as such. But the rather favourable general picture of the *paedagogus* is a useful corrective to some previous accounts.

The work concludes with a summary in French, a reference-list and a bibliography, (some mention should have been made of Colson's edition of Quintilian i), and is a valuable contribution to the study of Roman Education.

S. F. BONNER

University of Liverpool

Aetii Amideni *Libri Medicinales* V-VIII. Edidit ALEXANDER OLIVIERI. (Corpus Medicorum Graecorum, VIII. 2.) Pp. iv+554. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1950. Paper, DM. 37.50.

THE first four of the sixteen books on medical subjects compiled by Aetius of Amida appeared as a volume of the *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* in 1935; the volume under review, in spite of war-time disasters to the press where it was printed, does not fall below the high standard set by its predecessor. The work of Aetius is important to medical historians for its comprehensive character, its long lists of prescriptions, and its reference to certain Eastern drugs, such as cloves and camphor, here mentioned for the first time.

Not much, however, is added by Aetius to our knowledge of ancient diseases and their treatment; for these he is largely indebted to Galen and Oribasius. Occasionally the reader is both surprised and amused by childish superstition. The physician is advised (p. 488) to extract a bone from a patient's throat by saying to it: 'Come up, bone, as Jesus brought up Lazarus from the

grave or Jonah from the whale.' Or he might say: 'Blasius the martyr and servant of God says, "Come up, bone, or go down".' Aetius, it may be observed, was the first important Christian writer on medicine.

The labour involved in producing this scholarly text of a little-read author must have been every great, but it has not been wasted; in a sense the work is one for all time.

W. H. S. JONES

Cambridge

GEROLD WALSER: *Rom, das Reich und die fremden Völker in der Geschichtsschreibung der frühen Kaiserzeit*. Pp. 183. Baden-Baden: Verlag für Kunst und Wissenschaft, 1951. Paper.

THIS is a thesis cut down, one suspects, from a larger body of material. The main framework is Tacitus as an historian ('Studien zur Glaubwürdigkeit des Tacitus' is the sub-title), and the ultimate purpose of the study, as the author tells us in his Introduction, is a commentary on Tacitus taking cognizance of all the latest work on him. It is maintained by Walser that Form and Content are equally important in the present investigation, and his plan is to consider Tacitus as *Künstler* as well as *Berichterstatter*. This is the slender thread which is intended to hold together the divisions of the thesis. To avoid the controversy on Tacitus' treatment of the personalities of the emperors, Walser takes certain less central topics in which to discuss the manner of treatment, attitude of mind, and *Glaubwürdigkeit* of the historian. There are three main divisions, each subdivided: (a) Tacitus' picture of Rome (i) as a city, and (ii) as an idea. (b) Tacitus' concept of the *imperium Romanum* and its frontiers, with a discussion of his treatment of geographical and topographical information, followed by an examination of Rome's exercise of her imperial power as typified by the acts and operations of certain of her generals and governors who appear in Tacitus' narrative: Walser selects Agricola, Corbulo, and Germanicus for this purpose. (c) The third and most important section treats Tacitus' delineation of foreign peoples. Here Walser examines (i) the general concept 'foreign', with an account of the terms *barbarus* and *externus* as understood generally by the Romans and in particular by Tacitus, and (ii) Tacitus' description of foreign peoples from the standpoint of ethnography (Parthians, Rhoxolani, Germans) and of politics

(illustrated by his account of the revolts of Civilis and of Boudicca, and by his observations on Parthian affairs).

The work presents a valuable collection of material on subjects of the utmost importance. A good deal of space is naturally taken by summaries or expansions of Tacitus' narrative: this element is on occasions too full, as in the account of Agricola. The chief criticism to be made is that a general summary of the author's conclusions is lacking, though throughout the view is stressed and perhaps overstressed that Tacitus especially in his accounts of barbarian peoples lacks the objectivity which Walser seems to think he should show, and reflects strongly in narrative and speeches the rhetorical tendencies of his time. Any other clearly expressed conclusions are absent, and the reader is left with the impression that the whole is a piecemeal construction which does not really hang together. None the less it collects much useful detail, made readily available by three indexes.

R. J. HOPPER

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EUGENIO MANNI: *L'Impero di Gallieno*. Pp. 116. Rome: Signorelli, 1949. Paper, L. 300.

GALLIENUS is a very controversial figure. In the literary tradition he is caricatured, and the obvious hostile bias of the ancient authors has provoked some modern historians, notably Alföldi in the *Cambridge Ancient History*, to idealize him. A comprehensive and exhaustive monograph, which would tabulate and analyse the literary tradition, and set against it the evidence of the inscriptions and coins, would have been a useful contribution to scholarship. The slender volume under review does not perform this task. In Chapters I and II(A), on the defence of the frontiers and the military revolts, the author gives a detailed and well-documented analysis of the political and military events of the reign. But in Chapter II(B), which treats the military reforms and internal policy, he is content for the most part to summarize the results of earlier scholars without even citing the original evidence, much less analysing it afresh and testing the rather adventurous conclusions drawn from it. Two appendixes discuss certain aspects of the literary sources. The first endeavours to determine the quality and character of Dexippus' historical works, and argues that the *Vita Gallieni* derives its facts from him

(and is therefore reliable on the chronology of events), while deliberately distorting them in Gallienus' disfavour. The second discusses the biographical literature of the third century cited by the author of the *Vita* and points out its senatorial bias. An introductory chapter on the condition of the empire on Gallienus' accession rightly stresses the great prestige which the Senate still enjoyed in the third century, and the wealth and power of the senatorial order, while a concluding chapter argues that Gallienus won his place in history—and his bad name in the literary tradition—by breaking the Senate's power.

The book is both literally and figuratively rather thin. The author has some interesting ideas which it would be worth while to follow up and substantiate, but he has failed to do so. Perhaps one may hope for a more solid study of Gallienus from him at a later date.

A. H. M. JONES

Jesus College, Cambridge

ERNST BUSCHOR: *Maussollos und Alexander*. Pp. 56; 65 figs. Munich: Beck, 1950. Cloth, DM 8.50.

THIS book has many qualities, but it lacks common sense. The author accepts Pliny's story that four sculptors decorated the four sides of the Mausoleum, and attempts the familiar task of reallothing the surviving pieces. In the varied style of the remains, however, he detects differences not only of personality but of date, and concludes that on Artemisia's death in 351 the artists did not, as Pliny says, complete the work for their own glory: they left, to be gathered again after twenty years by Ada and Alexander to finish it. Thus, instead of the usual four, he has eight groups to play with, and he finds something for each of them. But the chronological premiss is surely unacceptable: the development of fourth-century sculpture is not clear enough for anyone to assert that certain pieces *must* have been carved in the late thirties rather than around the mid-century. The traditional picture, of four or five masters with assistants whose number, position, and scope of activity we do not know, would account for a greater variety of style than is found. Moreover, this intervention of assistants makes very subjective any allotment of the remains among the masters. Compare Buschor's Leochares with Ashmole's (*J.H.S.* lxxi. 13 ff.). Buschor gives his first Mausoleum workshop the head

1051 (by or near the master), charioteer slab 1037, Amazon slabs 1007/8 and 1012; his second, heads 1058 (by or near the master), 1052, and 1060, torso 1048, Amazon slabs 1018 and 1020/21. Between the two belong the Erbach and Acropolis Alexander heads, which echo his chryselephantine statue; his latest style is found in the Belvedere Apollo. Ashmole gives him slabs 1013-15 (Buschor's Scopas, as most scholars), and as later work the Acropolis Alexander (the Erbach head being a copy) and the Demeter of Cnidus. Here, one might think, are two clear personalities, one or both wrongly named Leochares; but what of the common factor, the Alexander? Similarly Jongkees's Bryaxis (*J.H.S.* lxxviii. 29 ff.) shares the Mausolus and Artemesia with Buschor's, but includes heads 1051 (Buschor's Leochares), 1054 (Buschor's Scopas), and 1055 (Buschor's Timotheus). Is it perhaps that our knowledge of fourth-century sculpture is not ripe for this approach?

MARTIN ROBERTSON

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Vermächtnis der antiken Kunst. Gastvorträge zur Jahrhundertfeier der Archäologischen Sammlungen der Universität Heidelberg. Herausgegeben von R. HERBIG. Pp. 232; 78 figs. on plates, 4 line-drawings. Heidelberg: Kerle, 1950. Cloth, DM. 12.

THIS is a collection of lectures delivered at the centenary at Heidelberg in 1948. They are printed much as they were spoken, and are the more readable for that.

R. Hampe (pp. 11-70) opens with an attractive discourse on and around Nestor. He has a fundamentalist belief in Homer and tradition. After a neat summary of Nestor's function and personality in the *Iliad* he asserts that the palace of the second-ranking Achaean ruler must have been at Messenian Pylos (Navarino), since Triphylian Pylos (Kakovatos) was too small; some of his supporting arguments are sensible, though it is hard on Telemachus to send him by chariot over southern Taygetus. Hampe thinks that Nestor's authority in the *Iliad* is probably historical, in that he was the survivor of that closer union of the Achaeans which was disrupted by the collapse of their commercial empire about 1240 B.C. The grand strategy of the Trojan War is then explained: after the retreat of the Dorians from the Isthmus

—the duel of the champions is historical—the Achaeans were free to find a new field for their enterprise in the Pontus, for which (and not for Helen) they attacked Troy. The archives of Pylos (Navarino) lead to the suggestion that it was Nestor who made the lists which Homer consulted for his Catalogue. Finally, we follow the Neleids to Athens and Ionia, taking with them, perhaps, Nestor's clay tablets and his famous cup. Hampe is often acute, but he is also uncritical.

E. Langlotz (pp. 73-99) returns to Phidias. He first examines the metopes of the south side of the Parthenon and reaches the reasonable conclusion that their differences in composition and treatment are too great to admit of a unified design for the series; perhaps, since the south was the least important side, Phidias regarded its metopes as a qualifying examination for his assistants. Langlotz then attempts to define Phidias' personal style from metope S. No. 1, which he suggests may be the master's own work, and from comparable groups excerpted by copyists from subsidiary reliefs on his cult-statues: here the argument is rather narrow and subjective. Finally, we are offered the hazardous conjecture that a small terracotta relief in Bonn is an ancient cast from the cheekpiece of a helmet made by Phidias for Alcibiades.

H. Speier (pp. 103-16) gives a preliminary publication of the fragment of the head of a horse, recognized in the Vatican just after the war. It is credible but not demonstrable that it belongs to the nearer of Athena's horses in the west pediment of the Parthenon.

L. Curtius (pp. 119-40) propounds an attractive new interpretation of a famous Roman painting, the 'Aldobrandini Wedding' in the Vatican. The commonly accepted identification of the seated male figure with Hymenaeus will not do: a marriage-scene which omits the bridegroom is an anomaly. The ivy-crowned youth is none other than Dionysus; and with the help of a r.f. crater in Corneto (c. 440 B.C.) and of a hitherto unpublished oenochoe in the Villa Giulia, Rome, by an artist belonging to the circle of the Meidias Painter (c. 380-370 B.C.), Curtius explains the Vatican picture as representing the marriage of Dionysus with the Basilinna at the Attic festival of the Anthesteria and as reflecting a possibly late-fourth-century B.C. original. But what interest would a scene from a specifically Attic festival have for a Roman householder under the early Empire? That is a question which Curtius does not consider. We can only suppose that for the

commissioner of the picture the Attic scene had lost its original, local significance and had assumed a new symbolic meaning, betokening either the harmony of married human love—cf. K. Schefold, who in 'Sinn und Form' (*Schweiz. Archiv für Volkskunde*, xlvii, 1951, 167 ff.) interprets the scene as the wedding of Herakles and Hebe and explains it as 'propaganda' for the Roman institution of marriage—or a 'mystic marriage' between the god and the soul of his devotee in the other world.

B. Schweitzer writes on an ambitious subject—the European significance of Roman art. For this purpose Roman art is equated with the art of Rome and Latium during the last century of the Republic and the early years of the Empire, the crucial period in which the Roman people suddenly became art-conscious, embraced with fervour their Greek artistic heritage, and re-stamped it with the impress of a new Roman spirit, destined to inform the whole history of post-classical European art down to the end of the Baroque period. Schweitzer has made an acute analysis of the essential features of Rome's artistic achievement—its role as transmitter of traditional Hellenic forms, its realistic factualism, its adherence, in architecture, reliefs, and paintings, to the outward, 'illusory', and 'scenic' appearances of things, its insistence on historic actuality in narrative art and portraiture, and its coupling of naturalism and fantasy in floral ornamentation. But the antithesis which he draws between Greece and Rome is excessively sharp and simple. Only in one brief parenthesis does he give any hint that nearly all the artistic trends which were developed and exploited in the Roman age with far-reaching effect had already been anticipated in Hellenistic times. The change was due, not to a radical difference between the Greek and the Roman outlook on art, but to the fact that circumstances, political, historical, and social, enabled Rome to work out on a far more extensive scale the new spiritual, intellectual, and artistic movements initiated in that Hellenistic world to which she was heir. 'Hellenismus' and Rome dovetailed into one another, and without the former the latter cannot be understood.

K. Schefold (pp. 171–95) repeats and intensifies his courageous attack (cf. *Mélanges Charles Picard*, 1949, pp. 936 ff.) upon an important problem, that of the purpose governing the choice of motives in Roman domestic wall-painting. Rightly rejecting the idea that the choice was determined by chance, caprice, or purely aesthetic considerations, Schefold notes the parallelism

between the subjects depicted in domestic murals and the subjects, particularly those of a Dionysiac character, which constantly recur on Roman funerary monuments as symbols of immortality and of the means whereby it can be won by man. Prominent among such means was devotion to the Muses, that is, to intellectual and artistic culture, in which drama would be included; and it is there that we can, perhaps, find a more natural explanation of the three famous scenes (two architectural and one rustic) in the bedroom at Boscoreale, so closely corresponding to Vitruvius' *tria genera scaenarum* (v. 6. 8), than the rather lame one offered by Schefold, according to whom they vaguely portray the life of the pious in shrines and holy gardens. If some of Schefold's interpretations strike us as being a trifle far-fetched and over-ingenious, we must remind ourselves that the ordinary inhabitants of the Roman Empire were far more openly pre-occupied with religious observances and speculation as to their prospects in the next world than are the great majority of their modern English counterparts. Schefold's views on the meaning of Roman paintings, if not always acceptable in detail, are in general reasonable and probably on the right lines.

In a second article H. Speier (pp. 199–218) provides an extremely lucid and vivid summary of what was known, up to date, about the excavations conducted since 1940 under St. Peter's in Rome. The site of the Apostolic tomb (the discovery of which has since been claimed in the official Vatican *Report*) is not discussed. But we are shown the Roman necropolis lying at a depth of 50 feet below the pavement of the present church, to the east of the *Confessio*, with its two rows of house-tombs, separated by a narrow street, running slightly obliquely to the axis of the Basilica. These tombs date from the second and third centuries A.D. and contain predominantly pagan burials, both cremation and inhumation, while a few Christian burials were inserted into some of them during the later phases of their history. The rich sculptured, painted, and mosaic decoration of the mausolea gives a striking picture of the complexity and variety of ancient pagan other-world imagery; and one small tomb, originally pagan, but reconditioned for Christian use, displays the earliest Christian vault-mosaic (Christus-Helios) so far known. The figure on p. 215 reveals at a glance the enormous difficulties, material and moral (since *violatio sepulcri* was involved), which Constantine had to overcome, when he packed the necropolis with earth, sliced off

the tops of many of the tombs, and cut back the steep southern slope of the Vatican Hill in order to obtain a level terrace on which to build his church, with its central feature immediately above the reputed place of St. Peter's burial. The exact positions of the Via Cornelia and Circus of Gaius and Nero, the latter of which was certainly near at hand (as one of the tomb-inscriptions proves), but not under the Basilica, remain a puzzle. And how did the obelisk contrive to be *in circo*, as Pliny states it to have been? It cannot have stood on the *spina*.

Finally, A. von Salis (pp. 221-32), in an extract from a lantern address, comments on the debt of neo-classical to classical art.

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J. M. C. TOYNBEE

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KURT WEITZMANN: *Greek Mythology in Byzantine Art*. (Princeton Studies in Manuscript Illumination, No. 4.) Pp. 218; 253 figs. on 60 collotype plates. Princeton: University Press (London: Oxford University Press), 1951. Cloth, 78s. net.

DR. WEITZMANN has already devoted two volumes in the Princeton series of publications on medieval manuscripts to a study of the revival of interest in things classical which took place in the Eastern Empire at the end of the ninth century, and which was manifested in thought, in literature, and, more especially, in art. The volume under review is, however, likely to be of greater interest to classical scholars than either of its predecessors, for it deals not so much with the Byzantine aspect of the revival as with the classical themes themselves.

The book consists in the main of a study of the illuminations of two manuscripts, the Pseudo-Nonnus and the Pseudo-Oppian. The themes that are illustrated in these manuscripts are drawn from classical mythology, but the iconography was developed by the Byzantine painters with the aid partly of classical and partly of Christian religious art. The way in which the artists coped with a very wide diversity of themes serves as a clear indication of the vitality of Byzantine art in the ninth and tenth centuries, and shows that the turn to things classical was a fruitful inspiration, and not merely a recourse to something from the past that was better. The artistic importance of these classicizing works is further attested by the carvings

on a large group of ivory caskets, the subject-matter of which is drawn from classical sources. The caskets have usually been grouped together under the heading 'Rosette caskets', but their date has hitherto been disputed. Dr. Weitzmann's evidence shows beyond likelihood of dispute that they should be regarded as products of the period of classical revival at the end of the ninth and beginning of the tenth century.

Dr. Weitzmann's treatment is both scholarly and penetrating, and the book is an important one. Questions of dating which have occasioned considerable controversy in some of his other works do not arise, and the book is consequently to be whole-heartedly recommended. It should prove of great interest to classical students who are concerned with the nature, as well as the survival, of mythological themes. It is admirably produced and fully illustrated.

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Dumbarton Oaks Papers, No. V. Pp. ix+279; 13 plates. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (London: Oxford University Press), 1950. Cloth, 48s. net.

THIS volume of six independent studies in the fields of late classical and medieval civilization maintains the high standard which we have come to associate with *Dumbarton Oaks*. Both A. Grabar and P. A. Underwood give masterly demonstrations of the essential interdependence of literary and non-literary evidence. A. Grabar, whose work over a number of years recently culminated in his monumental volumes on *martyria*, contributes 'Quelques reliquaires de saint Démétrios et le martyrium du saint à Salonique'. Using a group of minute reliquaries (2 on Mt. Athos, 3 at the cathedral of Halberstadt, 1 in the patriarchal treasure at Moscow, and 1 in the British Museum), Grabar relates their iconography to the available literary evidence (the manuscript sources for which, as he points out, still call for further investigation). He is thus able to reconstruct the development of the cult and the form of the *martyrium* at Salonica, the special city of St. Demetrius. This is followed by A. A. Vasiliev's short note on 'The Historical Significance of the Mosaic of Saint Demetrius at Sassoferrato'. This portable mosaic, presented to the city by the fifteenth-century humanist Perrotti, shows the figure of St. Demetrius with two Greek

inscriptions; in the top upper corner are two crosses each surrounded by four Greek letters B and in the lower corners are two-headed eagles. Vasiliev rightly observes that the bicephalous eagle is the symbol of the Palaeologi and therefore the tablet cannot be dated to Justinian II as one inscription on it, if correctly transcribed in its present form, would suggest (cf. F. Dölger's conjectural emendation in *Byz. Zeit.* xlv (1952) p. 239 . . . ἵνα ὡς τῷ πιστῷ σου δούλῳ . . . Ἰουστινιανῷ). With regard to the four B's Vasiliev pleads for further investigation, as also of the terms τετραύγουστος and τετραβάσιλειον.

In 'The Fountain of Life in Manuscripts of the Gospels' Paul Underwood gives a detailed analysis, based on iconographical evidence from the illuminations of certain Carolingian manuscripts of the Gospels and from similar Greek, Georgian, Armenian, and Ethiopic codices, and interpreted in the light of the accepted Christian tradition (cf. J. Danielou's recent work on Christian typology in *Sacramentum Futuri*, 1950 and *Bible et Liturgie*, 1951). Underwood shows how two conceptions (death unto resurrection and rebirth) underlie the symbolical content of the *fons vitae* illumination found as part of the Eusebian Canonical Tables in some manuscripts of the four Gospels. The prototype of this iconography (with its many variations in E. and W.) is the fifth-century Lateran Baptistery with its eight pillars, dome, piscina, and conception of the *fons vitae* in the inscription.

P. Charanis in 'The Chronicle of Monembasia and the Question of the Slavonic Settlements in Greece' provides the long-announced 'basic study' which he has to some extent anticipated in *Am. Hist. Rev.* lii (1946), *Byzantina Metabyzantina* i (1946), and *Byzantinoslavica* x (1949). He urges the validity of the evidence in the so-called Chronicle of Monembasia supported by parallel traditions (e.g. the tenth-century scholium by Arethas of Caesarea) in relation to the settlement of the Slavs in the Peloponnese in the late sixth century and the migration of Greek refugees to Sicily. This view is hotly disputed, particularly by many Greek scholars who favour the eighth century; to the present writer the balance of evidence seems on the whole to incline towards Charanis. But on some points of detail his statements appear too summary, e.g. numismatic evidence at Corinth is not virtually non-existent after Maurice, as he says, but after Constans II (cf. *Hesperia*, x (1941), pp. 143-62; cf. also further criticisms by K. M. Setton, *Speculum* xxv (1950), pp. 516 ff.). It is, however,

valuable to have an interim report on this vital problem in the early medieval history of the Slavs and the Greeks.

The remaining two studies are concerned with the Church in the late Roman Empire. In her '*De Professione Christiana* and *De Perfectione*: a Study of the Ascetical Doctrine of Saint Gregory of Nyssa' Sister Mary Emily Keenan gives a short analysis of the ascetical content of the two works, prefaced by a brief note on Gregory's family background (in which she overemphasizes Basil the Great's originality as a cenobite at the expense of Pachomius). Her main conclusion is that Gregory's writings, strongly influenced by contemporary theological problems, have a marked Christological emphasis; and when he drew on Origen's teaching and the Platonic tradition it was only so far as was consistent with orthodoxy. The complete critical edition of Gregory's works is still awaited, and this little study does not claim to be definitive, but it is a useful contribution to the present efforts of scholars to make better known to the non-specialist the important but hitherto much neglected Cappadocians. Ernest Honigmann's 'Juvenal of Jerusalem' is an authoritative study of impeccable scholarship. It attempts to unravel ecclesiastical events during Juvenal's episcopate (422-58) and discusses his efforts to insinuate himself into the first ranks of the hierarchy. In Honigmann's view the coveted title of 'patriarch' as a sign of ecclesiastical dignity was first officially used by Jerusalem only between the years 451 and 475, so that it is not certain that Juvenal was the first patriarch of Jerusalem. This solid study with its ample documentation will be welcomed by historians of the fifth century; both they and others will await with interest Honigmann's forthcoming article (cf. p. 268) in which he intends to show that Peter the Iberian may possibly have been the author of the Ps.-Dionysian writings (on Peter the Iberian in another connexion see also D. M. Lang in *Journ. Eccl. Hist.* ii (1951), pp. 158 ff., published since Honigmann wrote).

J. M. HUSSEY

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EGON CAESAR, CONTE CORTI: *The Destruction and Resurrection of Pompeii and Herculaneum*. Translated by K. and R. Gregor Smith. Pp. x+220; 38 plates, map and 2 plans. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951. Cloth, 25s. net.

COUNT CORTI, a Ph.D. of Vienna, as we are informed by his publishers, an Austrian staff officer of 1914-18, and author of works *inter alia* on Ludwig I of Bavaria, Maximilian of Mexico, and the history of smoking, has produced a lively and well illustrated 'popular' account of the history, destruction, and resurrection of Pompeii and Herculaneum. In a disarming foreword he confesses consciousness of his 'archaeological and other imperfections', and pleads the absence of any other 'short summary . . . both popular and comprehensive'.

The early historical chapters are indeed the weakest, and the weakness is accentuated by infelicities of translation; e.g. *aediles* are explained as 'architects' (p. 19) and on p. 16, on the Social War, we have 'defendants', 'sections', and 'territory' for, respectively, 'defenders', 'sectors', and 'terrain'. The fastidious reader should not, however, be deterred. In the later chapters much very interesting information is given both on the disaster of 79, and on the shocking story of the eighteenth-century excavations, in which many of the participants seem equally anxious to save themselves trouble and to conceal their finds from the world and their limitations from one another.

Count Corti's presumably highly coloured German cannot have been altogether easy to translate. Works of art are almost invariably 'lovely' or 'wonderful', with 'magnificent' a bad third; for apart from some allusions to pornography, the essential vulgarity of Pompeian civilization is glossed over. As often in such work, proper names have fared badly. Mithridates becomes 'Mithridatus', a Lucretius 'Lucrezius', Annæus Florus 'Aeneas Florus', Nigidius 'Nigidus' (p. 34, three times), Istacidius 'Istazidius' (p. 59), the Sibyl 'Sybilla' (p. 85, three times), Cornelius Tegetus 'Tegete' (p. 203, twice). Among other errors, Spartacus becomes a 'wrestler' (p. 24); *thermopolium* receives a heteroclite plural 'thermopolii' (p. 25); a theatre has been turned into an amphitheatre (p. 37); Piso is made son-in-law of Caesar (*gener* for *socer*!) on p. 39; the Phlegraean fields have become 'phlogistic' (p. 2); and *Murat est bête* should not have been translated 'Murat is a beast' (p. 166, twice). Finally, to call the somewhat steatopygous Indian ivory found at Herculaneum in 1938 'a picture of superfluous and provocative fleshliness' (p. 207) exemplifies the traps which Teutonic popular art-criticism can set for the translator.

Since this book was published in 1940, it may be permissible to add here that the spectacular eruption of 1944 did no damage

to the sites; that an American bomb in 1943 demolished some walls at Pompeii, but nothing of importance; and that in February 1946 the reviewer found work in progress again at Herculaneum. It was being conducted by half-a-dozen unsupervised workmen, who had just knocked a hole in a wall and were 'brewing up' over a fire of timbers first charred in A.D. 79.

A. R. BURN

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PAUL RADIN: *Die religiöse Erfahrung der Naturvölker*. (Albae Vigiliae, N.F., XI.) Pp. 128. Zürich: Rhein-Verlag, 1951. Paper, 5.60 Sw. fr.

THIS methodological essay, by one of the best American anthropologists, is provocative and controversial to a degree. In the reviewer's opinion, most of the criticisms directed against well-known writers on the early history of religion are merited; there is no room to discuss in detail the many points which arise in the five chapters ('Theoretiker und Ethnologen'—'Die Grundelemente religiöser Erfahrung'—'Der Begriff des Übernatürlichen und Heiligen'—'Das religiöse Objekt: Geister und Götter'—'Die höchsten Wesen') which compose the monograph. In general, his complaint against those whom he attacks is the following. They tacitly or expressly assume far too much uniformity in the religious life of communities of low culture, and so take pieces of evidence which, even when not garbled in the interests of some theory, prove no more than that certain individuals or small groups in the community in question believe or practise this and that, as giving a sufficient description of the whole attitude of the people towards the supernatural. The fact is that, as far back in time and as low in culture as we can go, there are to be found at least three types of individual—the truly and deeply religious, those who take a casual and occasional interest in religious matters, and the wholly non-religious. From these classes and their subdivisions come of necessity very varied opinions and what may be described, even among savages, as theological or metaphysical speculations, which become still more noticeable if there exists a priestly order or something corresponding to it. Therefore many plausible theories fail altogether to correspond to the whole of the facts, and so are of little worth for sketching the religious history of mankind. Students of classical religion perhaps need these

warnings less than some of their colleagues in other fields, but still will find much worth reading.

The printing is good, but on pp. 50 ff. the references to notes seem all to be one too low, i.e. 38 should be 39 and so on. The lovely little Ashanti hymn to Tano quoted on p. 118 was published in Rattray's *Ashanti*, p. 208, some five years earlier than the authority Radin cites. On p. 11 and elsewhere, van der Leeuw is spoken of as if still alive; he died about two months before the preface was written.

H. J. ROSE

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J. W. H. ATKINS: *Literary Criticism in Antiquity*. Vol. I: Greek. Pp. xi+199. Vol. II: Graeco-Roman. Pp. xi+363. London: Methuen, 1952. Cloth, 18s. and 25s. net.

THESE two volumes were first published by the Cambridge University Press in 1934 and were then reviewed in *C.R.* lxix (1935), 73-75. They are now reissued by Messrs. Methuen, who have already published the author's three later volumes on English Literary Criticism.

SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS

CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

XLVII. 2: APRIL 1952

E. J. Bickerman, *Origines Gentium*: contrasts Greek *a priori* reconstructions of the pre-history of mankind with the later empirical method, first seen in Caesar, of accepting native traditions. T. Silverstein, *Aristotle, Adelard and the De Natura Deorum*: Adelard's quotations from Aristotle and Cleanthes (*Quaest. Nat.* 74) point to use of *N.D.* 2. 40 and 2. 44. G. M. Bolling, *Genuine Tradition and Late Manuscripts*: discusses the implications of agreements between late manuscripts and papyri: *Od.* 20. 55 U and P 19(3a) have ἀπέστιχε for Ω's ἀφίκετο; *Il.* 11. 814 W³, M¹², P⁸ and the Ptolemaic P 5(2a) have ἀγλαός for Ω's ἀλκιμος. J. S. and A. E. Gordon, *Publilius Memorialis and C.I.L. xi. 7554*: corrects Vaglieri's reading of ll. 8-9 to <proc.> Ang. in Africa item N/oricae? provinciae item ferrar(iarum). O. J. Todd, *Frustum porcinum: glandia or glandulae* in Plaut. and Mart. are probably thymus gland, sweetbread. F. Solmsen, *Aristotle, De Caelo A 278 a 28 ff.*: reads καμπυλότης ἐν βύλῃ [ἡ σάρκι] καὶ . . . μία γένοιντο ρίς καὶ ὑπάρξειεν . . ., supported by Simplicius' paraphrase. W. C. Helmbold, *Athens and Aegina*: examines Walker's account of the ἀκήρυκτος πόλεμος in *C.A.H.* iv. 204-9 and criticisms of it. L. W. Daly, *Callimachus and Catullus*: Aristaeus' version of the Cydippe story in the *Aetia* suggests that the metaphor in Cat. 65. 19-24 may be a close imitation of Call., borrowed from the speculations of the nurse. B. Einarson, *Plutarch's Ancestry*: if Timon in *De sera num. vind.* 558 a is P's

brother, then P. was descended from Daiphantus, whose life he wrote, and Opheltas. E. Vetter, *Terence, Eun.* 19-24: punctuates . . . copia, magistratus quom ibi adessent. accepta est . . .; Luscius asked and was given leave to read T.'s play under supervision in the temple.

XLVII. 3: JULY 1952

L. R. Taylor and L. A. Holland, *Janus and the Fasti*: by Augustan times Janus was associated with the calendar and with consular records, and the Arch of Augustus could be thought of (though it is not so described) as a *ianus*, being a gateway marking a river-crossing: hence the position of the Capitoline Fasti on the Arch of Augustus. That list, which ended at A.D. 13, was continued on the later Ianus Quadrifrons in the Forum Transitorium. V. Ehrenberg, *Thucydides and Athenian Colonization*: defends his view (challenged in *A.T.L.* 3. 285, n. 46) that Thuc. did not use the terms for colonists in their technical sense only and discusses its implications in relation to Aegina, Lemnos, and Histiaeia. A. D. Fitton-Brown, *Notes on the Agamemnon*: 51 supports Headlam's ὑπατηλεχέων, 104 supports Francken's τέρας, 177-9 supports Schultz's τόν and defends ἐν θ' ὑπνω, 1630 supports Rees's πάντα που, 1595 defends ἐθρυπτε. E. N. O'Neil and W. C. Helmbold, *Herodotus 4. 2*: Hdt.'s statement about the blinding of Scythian slaves may be accepted, but the reason for the practice was Scythian cruelty, not that which he suggests. G. Norwood on Pindar, *Isthm.* 8. 77 proposes ὑπόχειρ' ἀντίων δάμασεν. M. W. Bloomfield

finds in Boccaccio's *Filos rato* 3. 74-99 evidence for the existence in Italy before 1388 of a manuscript of Lucretius, a second Italian archetype from which variants in Italian manuscripts (especially F) may be derived. R. J. M. Lindsay on Virgil, *Aen.* 4. 244 takes *lumina morte resignat* as 'opens up the eyes at the point of death', i.e. restores to life. R. F. Willetts on Aesch. *Agam.* 1656 proposes *πυμονῆς δ' ἄλις γ', ὕπαρχε* (vocative, addressed to the *λοχαγός*)· *μηδὲν αἰτιώμεθα*.

XLVII. 4: OCTOBER 1952

W. H. Stanford, *The Homeric Etymology of the Name Odysseus*: H. represents O. as 'the man doomed to odium' who subsequently surmounted the nemesis of his name by intelligence and endurance. V. B. Schuman, *The Seven-Obol Drachma of Roman Egypt*: on the silver standard there was no 6-obol drachma coin but there was a 'silver' 7-obol drachma, actually made of copper; under Augustus there existed a 29-obol tetradrachm and a 7-obol drachma, not issued by him but part of the Ptolemaic coinage. R. T. Brùère, *Silius Italicus* 3. 62-162 and 4. 763-822: analyses S.'s technique and his use of Lucan and Virgil. J. F. Gilliam, *The Prefects in P. Dura inv.* 3 verso: the 'pref.' who are apparently concerned with remounts are probably *praefecti praetorio*. B. L. Charney, *Examples of the Omission of Tantum ('only') in Seneca*: explains *Ep.* 12. 7 (*tantum*) *plura facit*, 14. 6 (*tantum*) *cum occidit*, 33. 1 *esse (ibi tantum)*, *ubi*, 95. 56 (*tantum*) *se sciunt*. E. N. O'Neil on *Juv.* 10. 358 defends the interpretation 'reckons length of days least among the blessings of nature'.

MNEMOSYNE

4th Series, V (1952), fasc. ii

W. J. W. Koster, *De graecorum genitivo, qui dicitur auctoris*; de *Od.* θ 499: Schwyzler-Debrunner, 119 has insufficient evidence for postulating a pure Gen. of Agent; examples fall into these classes: (1) gen. of origin, gen. with verbs of hearing and learning, gen. of comparison; (2) possessive gen. with substantives (including substantival participles); (3) *Eur. El.* 123, *Or.* 497, where the text is doubtful; (4) *Od.* viii. 499 δ' δ' ὀρυθθεῖς θεοῦ ἤρχετο, where θεοῦ is probably to be constructed with ἤρχετο. A. G. Woodhead, *Πορεία*: probably never means 'travelling expenses', as given in *L.S.*⁹; in fifth-century B.C. inscriptions it means 'arrangements for a journey' (thus *στρατηγοί* did not disburse money in Athens), in papyri 'transfer'(?), 'caravan', 'transport', 'survey'. J. C. Kamerbeek, *De novo fragmento tragico in quo de Gyge*

et Candaule agitur: textual criticism of the dramatic fragment (Candaules' queen speaking) first published by Lobel in *Proc. Brit. Acad.* xxxv (1949), 3-12, and support for Latte's view that it is Hellenistic. J. H. Croon *The Palici—An Autochthonous Cult in Ancient Sicily*: the P. (cf. Ziegler in *R.E.*) were Sicel gods, originally a dynamistic cult, of a bubbling crater lake; the oath-oracle (with severe penalties) resembles those of Zeus Asbamaeus near Tyana and of Gallic gods identified with Apollo; the name may come from root *pal-* (*pello*, *πάλλω*, etc.); the right of asylum was perhaps a Greek addition. I. Heinemann, *Die Allegoristik der hellenistischen Juden außer Philon*: in Proverbs 2. 16-17 LXX has ἀπὸ ὁδοῦ εὐθείας and διδασκαλίαν νεότητος where the Hebrew speaks of the strange woman and the confidant (A.V. 'guide') of her youth, but even here the allegory seems not to be part of an apologia; elsewhere, apart from Philo, allegory does not reinterpret or explain away the thought (Suidas' definition), but is confined to the narrower sense (Quint. ix. 2. 46 ἀλληγορίαν *facit continua μεταφορά*). A. R. A. van Aken, *Lateres and Latericium*: modern writers use (*opus*) *latericium* and *testaceum* in varying senses; in ancient writers *testa* is tile or brick, *later* is (1) sun-dried brick (often *lateres crudi*), (2) baked brick, i.e. *crudi* hardened in the kiln (often *lateres cocti*), or (3) brick proper (usually *cocti*); since normally *structura* = 'mural core', *opus* = 'masonry', *latericium* should vary in meaning according to which of these it qualifies. A. Kurfess, *Heilungsversuch an einer schwer verderbten Stelle der Oracula Sibyllina*: v. 373 reads θεοῦ for τῆς, 374 συμμαχίην δὲ διδῶ λαφ . . . H. Wagenvoort explains Cic. *de Div.* i. 35 *non reperio causam* and 38 *idem . . . facit* as imaginary objections [explanations anticipated by Ernesti and Roos in the eighteenth century].

REVUE DE PHILOLOGIE

XXV. 2 (1951)

A. Ernout, *Notes lexicographiques*: (1) *colaphus*—*percolophare*: κόλαφος → *colpus* → *colopos* shows S. Italian anaptyxis; (2) *dictaturo* (Pris. *G.L.K.* 2. 501. 6) is parallel to *proscripturio*; (3) *farcimino* *Veg. Mul.* 1. 7. 2 is a ghost—read *farcimine*; (4) notes on the late fragments of the *Acta Fratrum Arvalium*. G. Posener, *A propos de la 'Pluie Miraculeuse'*: comments on Guey's article in *R. de P.* 22 (1948). E. Cavaignac, *Les six ans de service et la guerre d'Espagne*: in the third century the legionary's service was six years, though he could be recalled for fourteen more: in the second century this system was continued,

though it became more and more inadequate to military needs, and the Spanish campaigns of 154-33 show increasing difficulties in maintaining man-power in spite of the reduction of the legionary census. E. Will, *Alcibiade, Sappho, Anacréon et Hérodote*: re-examines the chronology with reference to Pugliese-Carratelli's conclusions. J. Schwartz, *Pompeius Macer et la jeunesse d'Ovide*: Macer of *Am.* 2. 18 and *Pont.* 2. 10 is Pompeius Macer, son of Theophanes of Mitylene, and Ovid's second wife was his daughter. J. Colin, *Restitution de l'inscription des sévirs de Lanuvium au Vatican*: C.I.L. 14. 2096 has been dated to the Julio-Claudian period and made the basis of a theory of the number of *Seviri Augustales* at the beginning of the Empire: C.'s restorations make the date 1 Oct. 81 and the occasion the confirmation of Domitian's trib. potestas by the comitia. M. Lejeune, *Problèmes de philologie vénète*: (1) the signs transcribed *h* or *·i·* have the *h*-value only at the beginning of a word before a vowel and occasionally to mark internal hiatus between *i* and a vowel; (2) the word read as *lahvnah* in a text from Idria is *laivnai*, dative of a woman's name; (3) the word read as *sahnatei* in an Este dedication and interpreted *sanatrici* is dative of an ethnic *Sainatis*; (4) *-ic-* in N. Venetic inscriptions is merely a local variant of writing for *-ii-* = *î*; (5) *ichtei* interpreted as *Ἐκάρη* in Calalzo inscr. is the termination *-iiatei-* belonging to the divine epithets *tribusiatis*, *trumusiatis*.

XXVI. 1 (1952)

G. Dumézil, *Maiestas et gravitas*: the Romans were not Austronesians, and *maiestas* and *gravitas* are not primitive mystical concepts connected with *mana*, as Wagenvoort thinks, but advanced intellectual concepts, characteristically Roman; *maiestas* is recognized superiority, of a category or of an individual, relative or absolute, in an order established by nature or reason; *gravitas*, one of a series of words which show the importance of weight and balance in Roman thought, combines the notions of stability and motive power. P. Louis, *Le Traité d'Aristote sur la nutrition*: Aristotle's allusions are best explained by the assumption that while he produced preliminary studies on the subject his definitive treatise was never completed. R. Mugnier, *La Filiation des manuscrits des Parva Naturalia d'Aristote*. J. de Foucault, *A propos du tremblement de terre de Rhodes*: Polybius' digression in 5. 88-90 is out of place; it may have been originally attached to his account of the siege of Sinope (4. 56) which is clearly mutilated.

XXVI. 2 (1952)

A. Ernout, *Cor et c(h)orda: concors and discors*, formed from *cor*, produced the verbs *concordare*, *discordare*, whose meaning attached them to a series of verbs embodying sound-metaphors, *concinnare*, *consonare*, *discrepare*, and so led to a popular association with *corda*: the transitive *accordare* was later formed by analogy. A. Dain, *Reginenses Gr.* 88 et 89: these manuscripts are connected with the project for a corpus tacticorum in which Lucas Holstein (1596-1661) was interested; 88 is a transcript of Barberinianus 276 (*De obsid. tol.*) and Laur. LV-4 (*Hypotheseis, Excerpta e Mauricio*), 89 a critical copy of Barb. 276 (*Apparatus bellicus*). J. Heurgon, *La fixation des noms de lieux en latin d'après les itinéraires routiers*: the variation in the cases (nom., acc., abl.) used in *itineraria* goes back to Republican times; the use of the abl. originated in popular spelling of the acc. sing. without *-m*. R. Bloch, *Remarques sur quelques inscriptions latines archaïques*: on the Praenestine mirror C.I.L. i². 547 read *opeinor*, not *opeinod*, D or Q being the Etruscan symbol for R (similarly *pretor*, not *pretod*, in C.I.L. i². 365); in C.I.L. i². 558 *Venus Diovem Prosepnai* (another Praenestine mirror) the dial. form *Prosepnai* comes from Etruscan (*phersipnai*) and is probably a gen. of relation (Venus appeals to Jupiter in the matter of P.). P. Fournier, *Notulae Pliniana*: Plin. 16. 73, 206, 231 for *populus* read *opulus* (*Acer Opalus* Miller); 16. 186 for *ornus* read *cornus*; Geo. 1. 81 *cinis immundus* is explained by Plin. 17. 49 *fimo iumentorum quod . . . exurunt*; *aesculus* of Geo. 2. 16, 290-97 and Plin. 16. 11, 17, 20, 80, 82, 106 is *Quercus Farnotto Tenore*. M. Lejeune, *Problèmes de philologie vénète*: (7) Ven. has a proclitic conjunction *ke*, related to *καί*, *κάς*; (8) in the alphabetical tablets of the sanctuary of Reitia at Este the repeated magical formula *akeo* is *a ke o* (= *ἄλφα και ὦ*); (9) analysis of the structure of the votive formula in dedications from Este, Lagole, and Gurina; (10) *aisu-* in Gurina dedications is probably = *deus*.

RHEINISCHES MUSEUM

VC. 2 (1952)

E. Bickel, *Das Denkmal der Varusschlacht in Bonn*, in C.I.L. xiii, 8648, reads: *M(arco) Caelio T(iti) f(ilio) Lem(onia) Bon(onia). / T(riario) O(rdini) leg(ionis) XIIIX. ann(or)um LIII, [ce]dit bello Variano. ossa / [l]ibertorum [i]nferre licebit. P(ublius) Caelius T(iti) f(ilius) / Lem(onia) frater fecit* and discusses in detail the establishment of centurions in the Legion

and Praetorian Cohort of the Julio-Claudian period. H. Schaefer, *Die verfassungsgeschichtliche Entwicklung Kyrenes im ersten Jahrhundert nach seiner Begründung*: Delphi took the initiative in suggesting colonization in North Africa, and the colony enjoyed such great prosperity through the willing co-operation of the native peoples, who were not alarmed by the small number of original colonists. H. Erbse, *Die Genfer Iliasscholien*: The Ge-I scholia are compiled from T-, D-, and h-scholia. Their value springs from their preservation of the h-scholia, which were, however, seldom consulted. Ge-II consists of excerpts from the D-scholia supplemented from an unknown source. A. Thierfelder, *Petronianum*, in Petr. 77. 4, takes *hospitium* as gen. pl. (cf. *T.L.L.* s.v. *hospes* p. 3020, 17) and interprets *hospitium hospites* as *innumeri hospites* (cf. *nummorum nummos*, 37. 8; *olim oliorum*, 43. 8).

SYMBOLAE OSLOENSES

Fasc. XXIX (1952)

G. Rudberg, *Solon, Attika, Attisch*: raises the question of the 'Attic speech' to which Solon refers and its bearing on the history of Atticism. T. B. L. Webster, *Plato and Aristotle as Critics of Greek Art*: seeks to illustrate various dicta of these philosophers by refer-

ence to contemporary and later works of art. M. Richard, *Le Recueil d'Homélies d'Astérius le Sophiste*: revises an earlier article (1947) on Asterius, partly in the light of two newly discovered manuscripts. Franz Bömer, *Naeuius und Fabius Pictor*: considers their historical content and technique with a view to deciding the question of priority and their dependence on possible sources. A. Kurfess, *Ad Oracula Sibyllina*: detailed notes and emendations (continued from Fasc. xxviii). A. J. Festugière, *Postscriptum sur vai*: adds another example to support the Greek character of the usage described in xxviii. 89. H. Morland, *Theodorus Priscianus im lateinischen Oribasius*: the old Latin translation of Oribasius shows frequent use of the works of Theodorus Priscianus. E. Skard, *Eine Bemerkung zum Diognetbrief*: annotates the construction of the first sentence. M. Richard, *Deux Homélies inédites du Sophiste Astérius*: a preliminary edition of the Greek text. E. Vandvik, *A new Approach to the Konungs Skuggsiá*: suggests the application of some features of Homeric scholarship to this medieval work. K. Kerényi, *Griechisches aus Properz' Heimat*: on an inscription found at Assisi. H. P. L'Orange, *È un Palazzo di Massimiano Erculeo che gli Scavi di Piazza Armerina portano alla luce?*: discusses mainly the mosaics excavated at this Sicilian site. S. Eitrem, *Varia*.

NOTES AND NEWS

WE have received some new volumes in cheap popular series which we mention here since by the time when reviews can be published they may be difficult to obtain. Four are Penguin Books—*The Hittites* by Dr. O. R. Gurney, and new translations of Caesar's *Gallie War* by Mr. S. A. Handford, of four plays of Sophocles (*Phil.*, *Trach.*, *El. Aj.*: in verse) by Mr. E. F. Watling, and of the four Gospels by Mr. E. V. Rieu, the last with a long and interesting introduction. Dr. Charles Seltman has written for Pan Books *The Twelve Olympians*, 'a Modern View of Ancient Myths', and for King Penguins *A Book of Greek Coins*, a 'condensed survey' with more than a hundred illustrations.

We are asked by the University Press of Liverpool to draw attention to the appearance in the *Town Planning Review*, vol. xxii, No. 2, published (6s. net) under the auspices of the Liverpool School of Architecture, of an article on Hellenic Cities by Professor R. E. Wycherley, illustrated by plans and plates.

The Société des Professeurs de Français et de Langues Anciennes, whose Secretary is Mlle. J. Duchemin of the University of Poitiers, has recently organized two conferences between French and German classical teachers in universities and schools. It hopes to be able to arrange similar meetings with British classical teachers.

The twelfth and subsequent volumes of *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* will take the form of an annual review of Greek Epigraphy which will give references to work done during each year on or relating to Greek inscriptions, and will reprint new or emended texts. The arrangement of the contents will be by geographical areas, on the general pattern of the early volumes of *S.E.G.* The editor and publishers are confident that epigraphists, and classical scholars generally, will find this service helpful. The editor would, therefore, be grateful if any scholar who publishes work on Greek Epigraphy, or substantially using epigraphic material, would send him a notice (or if possible a reprint) of it. Such co-operation would be much appreciated, and would greatly aid him and the publishers in making *S.E.G.* as complete as possible. Communications should be addressed to Mr. A. G. Woodhead, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. Part II of volume xi, which was left unfinished at the death of the previous editor, Dr. J. J. E. Hondius, will be published as soon as possible.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Excerpts or extracts from periodicals and collections are not included unless they are also published separately.

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